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Chapter 1
General Introduction

General Introduction 9
1
the Chameleon effeCt
Although we might not be aware of it, our social interactions are character-
ized by a tendency to copy one another’s behaviors and postures. In early 
explorations of this phenomenon, researchers transcribed interaction partners’ 
behaviors and postures over time using video recordings of real social interac-
tions. These timelines revealed that a speaker’s behaviors and postures were at 
times mirrored by the listener (Kendon, 1970). Moreover, instances of postural 
mirroring were related to the social dynamics of the interactions, which was 
often measured as rapport: the interaction partners’ subjective experience of the 
interaction typified by mutual attentiveness, friendliness and a coordinated feel-
ing (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1990). For example, during a therapy session, 
postural mirroring between therapist and client increased over time and was 
related to their rapport (Charny, 1966). Similarly, higher levels of postural mir-
roring during interactions were related to higher levels of questionnaire-reported 
rapport between instructors and students during college seminars (LaFrance, 
1979; Lafrance & Broadbent, 1976).
These observations were succeeded by naturalistic experiments with the aim 
of testing this relationship between posture sharing and social dynamics. In an 
in situ experiment, when counselors assumed the arm and leg postures of their 
high school student clients they were perceived as significantly more empathic 
by their clients than when they ensured that their posture was non-congruent 
(Maurer & Tindall, 1983). In another ecological approach, the social dynamics 
of the interaction were manipulated while the naturally occurring behaviors of 
naïve interaction partners were measured. Here, LaFrance (1985) found that 
college student dyads who were instructed to cooperate with another dyad 
showed higher postural mirroring as a group, while dyads who were competing 
with the other dyad showed more within-dyad mirroring (LaFrance, 1985). Thus, 
copying during natural interactions increases interpersonal rapport and, fittingly, 
the amount of copying differs depending on the social context (i.e. the desired 
level of rapport).
In 1999, Chartrand and Bargh published a set of controlled experiments 
measuring this propensity to copy the behaviors of others and the social conse-
quences thereof. In a shift away from the mirroring of postures, more transient 
yet repetitive behaviors were used. They tested whether participants would 
mirror the face rubbing, foot shaking, and smiling of confederates. Following 
a one-minute baseline during which the participant was left alone in the wait-
ing room, the participant performed a photograph description task with two 
confederates, one after the other. In this task, interaction partners took turns 
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describing a photograph to the other. One of the confederates tapped their foot 
during the interaction while the other rubbed their face. Additionally, one of the 
confederates smiled throughout the session while the other did not. Participants’ 
performance of these target behaviors was quantified as the number of times 
performed per minute of interaction. Analyses with individual participants’ base-
line behavior rates as covariates showed that participants smiled significantly 
more when interacting with the smiling confederate than they did with the non-
smiling confederate and performed each behavior more often while interacting 
with the confederate performing that behavior than with the other confederate. 
Interestingly, when later asked about the experiment, participants did not report 
noticing or copying these mannerisms. Hence, Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
provided the first experimentally controlled evidence that individuals mimic their 
interaction partners’ behaviors and facial expressions outside of awareness. 
They referred to this tendency to mimic as the ‘chameleon effect’. Humans, 
they proposed, match their behaviors to the current social environment just as 
a chameleon might change the color of its skin to blend in with the physical 
surroundings (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). A myriad of investigations into the 
chameleon effect have since ensued.
Behavioral mimicry
While in its broadest sense ‘mimicry’ can refer to various forms of implicit copy-
ing (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009) – including accents (Giles & Powesland, 
1975 in Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003), co-speech gestures (Holler 
& Wilkin, 2011), and facial and emotional expressions (Dimberg, 1982; Hat-
field, Cacioppo, & Rapson, 1994; Lundqvist, 1995) – the present thesis focuses 
on behavioral mimicry (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Lakin, 2013). This form of 
mimicry encompasses the examples from the aforementioned experiments, 
including posture, manual and pedal behaviors, and other motor behaviors, 
such as head movements. These behaviors have in common that they are in 
themselves meaningless and non-valenced. Although arguably any behavior 
can be communicative in a specific setting, these behaviors are not functionally 
related to the explicit nature of the examined interactions (e.g. rubbing your 
hands over one another during a conversation over dinner might be mimicked 
by your fellow diners). Hence, they are neither cultural gestures (e.g. waving to 
the person seated at the end of the table) nor object-directed actions with the 
goal of achieving an end state (e.g. shaking a pepper shaker to season your 
meal).
Mimicking. Following Chartrand and Bargh (1999), experimental mimicry 
paradigms have followed a general formula. Typically, a behavioral mimicry 
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1experiment entails a participant interacting with a confederate who repeatedly 
but surreptitiously performs a target behavior. Either the particular social context 
of the interaction is manipulated to test its effect on mimicry or participants’ mim-
icry is related to a third external measure. Ideally, a baseline measure is used 
to establish whether the participant performed the behaviors more during the 
experimental interactions than she might otherwise do (Lakin, 2013). Oftentimes 
participants are subjected to a funneled debriefing at the end of the experiment 
(e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999) and only the data of participants who did not 
notice the behaviors is included in the final analyses (e.g. Lakin, Chartrand, & 
Arkin, 2008).
Given the link between behavioral mimicry and rapport found in the early 
observational studies, numerous experiments have investigated under which 
circumstances participants enhance or suppress their behavioral mimicry. In a 
set of studies, Lakin and Chartrand (2003) hypothesized that mimicry would 
increase in situations in which individuals wanted to affiliate with their interac-
tion partner. In the first study, participants viewed a video of a confederate who 
was performing clerical tasks and surreptitiously touching her face. Participants 
who had been told they would later need to interact with her before watching 
the video, and thereby had reason to affiliate her, performed these behaviors 
significantly more often than participants who were not told this (note though that 
there was no baseline measure). In a second study, the authors let participants, 
who had or had not received an affiliation goal first, experience being treated 
in an unfriendly or friendly manner during an online interview. Subsequently, 
participants interacted with a second confederate, who shook her foot through-
out the interaction. In an analysis including a baseline measure as a covariate, 
participants with an affiliation goal mimicked the second confederate’s foot 
shaking significantly more if they had been treated in an unfriendly manner than 
in a friendly one. Also, the second confederate, blind to condition, liked partici-
pants more and reported higher rapport after interactions with affiliation-goal 
participants in the unfriendly condition than in the friendly condition (see also 
the following section). The authors concluded that mimicry served as a means to 
affiliate and stimulate liking (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003).
In the above study, mimicry was more evident after a failure to affiliate with a 
peer. This ostracism-like effect was further tested in a study in which participants 
were included or excluded during a digital ball passing game called Cyberball. 
In a subsequent live interaction with a foot-shaking confederate, participants 
displayed this behavior for a greater percentage of time if they had been ostra-
cized during Cyberball than if they had been included (with baseline included 
as a covariate; Lakin et al., 2008). This finding provides further support for 
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an affiliation role of mimicry; the ostracism that participants experienced dur-
ing the ball passing game is thought to have threatened participants’ need to 
belong (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005; Lakin et al., 2008; Leary, 2001). Humans 
have a need to frequently interact with others in positive affiliative interactions 
and form lasting meaningful relationships. This motivation guides individuals to 
form relationships and social groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). As a result, 
exclusion from specific relationships threatens an individual’s need to belong (to 
that social relationship) more than from others and thereby might trigger more 
affiliative behaviors, such as mimicry (Lakin et al., 2008).
This pattern was identified in Lakin and colleague’s (2008) second study. 
Female participants were first informed of the gender of their fellow players 
and then ostracized during a game of Cyberball. In a subsequent interaction, 
participants who had been ostracized by fellow females mimicked female con-
federates (i.e. in-group members) significantly more than male confederates (i.e. 
non-in-group members). There were no differences in mimicry of in-group and 
non-in-group confederates in the sample that had been excluded by non-in-group 
Cyberball players. Even though they had been excluded from their in-group, 
these participants reported higher belonging to their in-group than participants 
excluded by non-in-group members, and belongingness significantly predicted 
mimicry in these participants (Lakin et al., 2008). These two studies (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2008) demonstrate that individuals mimic others 
more when they want to affiliate with them and an inability to affiliate, such as 
through being ostracized, enhances mimicry. Hence, mimicry seems to be a 
dynamic and specific means of pursuing affiliation.
However, if mimicry communicates affiliation, it should be absent when one 
does not want to affiliate, such as while interacting with an out-group member. 
Yabar and colleagues (2006) demonstrated this by comparing behavior rates 
during the experimental session with those from a baseline such that absolute 
increases (i.e. mimicry) or reductions (i.e. negative mimicry) could be tested. 
Participants viewed videos of a neutral individual and an out-group member. 
After seemingly studying a picture for one minute (serving as a baseline period), 
the model in the video started to describe the picture while rubbing her face. 
Participants’ face rubbing was coded and the percentage of time spent rubbing 
during the baseline period was subtracted from that of the experimental period. 
A significant difference in face rubbing between the neutral model and out-group 
model was reported. Whereas participants performed the behaviors significantly 
more when demonstrated by the neutral model, indicating mimicry, the authors 
reported a trend towards negative mimicry: a decrease in behaviors relative to 
the baseline when performed by an out-group member. Hence, the chameleon 
General Introduction 13
1effect is not a necessary tendency in all interactions (Yabar, Johnston, Miles, & 
Peace, 2006); instead, humans selectively mimic to blend in with certain social 
environments, like those filled with in-group members, but refrain from mimicking 
in social environments for which they do not hold affiliation goals (cf. Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999).
The term ‘blending in’ implies that mimicking also communicates similarity. 
Some evidence for this comes from a study in which participants interacted with 
two confederates; one shared the participant’s opinions on a holiday destination 
and the other disagreed. When controlling for a baseline measure taken from 
the start of the interaction, participants shook their foot more when the similar-
preference confederate did so than when the similar-preference confederate 
rubbed their arm (though this mimicry effect was not found in participants’ arm 
rubbing; van Swol & Drury, 2006). Interpreting this finding in combination with 
the ostracism and group effects on (negative) mimicry suggest that in the context 
of social interactions, similarity and affiliation are closely intertwined. Indeed, 
humans tend to prefer similar others and similarity is a marker of social groups 
(Haun & Over, 2015). It could thus be said that mimicry conveys, “I (am) like 
you”.
Being mimicked. For mimicry’s message of “I (am) like you” to be effective, 
it must also be the case that we like people who mimic us. Such a consequence of 
being mimicked was suggested by the initial investigations into the relationship 
between mimicry and rapport (e.g. Maurer & Tindall, 1983). Chartrand and 
Bargh (1999) went on to test this in their laboratory setup. During a photograph 
description task, confederates either did or did not mimic the natural mannerisms 
and postures of participants. Participants who were mimicked reported liking 
the confederate more and experienced a smoother interaction than participants 
who were not mimicked. Interestingly, participants did not report noticing being 
copied (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). This positive effect of being mimicked was 
replicated in a study in which digital avatars either mimicked participants’ head 
postures at a delay of four seconds or used the head postures of a previous 
participant. Mimicking avatars, though their mimicry was not detected, were 
rated as being more likeable and realistic and possessing more positive traits 
(as measured in one composite score) than the yoked avatars (Bailenson & 
Yee, 2005). Hence, mimicry seems to be an effective affiliation tool, as being 
mimicked increases liking (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013).
Experiments testing the effects of being mimicked further highlight the typical 
presence of mimicry during affiliative interactions. When participants were not 
mimicked during a social interaction, markers of stress increased, an effect medi-
ated by the extent to which participants reported a need to belong (Kouzakova, 
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van Baaren, & van Knippenberg, 2010). Such experiments typically exclude 
participants who detected the mimicry manipulation (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Kouzakova et al., 2010). Investigating this situation, though, indicates 
that when mimicry is too obvious, the positive effects diminish (Bailenson, Yee, 
Patel, & Beall, 2008; Leander, Chartrand, & Bargh, 2012). Thus, there seems to 
be a typical level of mimicry during casual, affiliative, social interactions.
Accordingly, and further reflective of the early studies, observing (an absence 
of) mimicry provides information as to the rapport of the interaction. For example, 
participants who observed staged interactions between a therapist and a client 
rated interactions in which the therapist mimicked the client as having higher 
rapport than interactions without mimicry (Trout & Rosenfeld, 1980). Relatedly, 
participants rated individuals who mimic unkind individuals as less competent 
than individuals who do not mimic an unkind person and individuals who do 
mimic a kind person (Kavanagh, Suhler, Churchland, & Winkielman, 2011). 
This visibility of the affiliative effect of mimicry to observers further suggests 
that mimicry is a commonplace and essential, albeit implicit, feature of positive 
social interactions.
Overall, behavioral mimicry occurs during affiliative social interactions and 
leads to increased liking and rapport. It occurs without us being explicitly aware 
of its presence, as evident from live interaction experiments (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Lakin et al., 2008) and video-based designs (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; 
Yabar et al., 2006). As an affiliation means, it can be enhanced through increas-
ing our desire to affiliate or to be similar to our interaction partners, for example 
by increasing liking or by threatening our belonging to a social group. Although 
the aforementioned studies concerned primarily English-speaking Western cul-
tures, behavioral mimicry has also been tested in continental European samples 
(e.g. van Baaren, Fockenberg, Holland, Janssen, & van Knippenberg, 2006) 
and Japanese participants (though this sample had lived at most four years in the 
USA; van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003).
Given the affiliative function and the seeming prevalence of this implicit 
social interaction behavior in adults, it is surprising that we still know very little 
about where mimicry comes from. When does it emerge? Which developmental 
mechanisms are involved? And how does the brain produce this implicit social 
behavior? Through investigating both the development and neurocognitive 
basis of behavioral mimicry, we will not only come to a better understanding of 
mimicry as a behavioral phenomenon, but we can also use this social behavior 
as a window into social development and the social brain. As an implicit means 
of affiliation, children’s (selective) use of mimicry can reveal their understanding 
of and sensitivity to social interaction contexts. Similarly, identifying the neuro-
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1cognitive processes that lead to mimicry might further shed light on our implicit 
processing of the social environment.
The present thesis explores the development of social behavioral mimicry 
and the neurocognitive processes underlying it. In the following two sections, I 
outline what is known about the development and neurocognitive foundations 
of copying behaviors to gain insight into the possible bases of mimicry and to 
highlight what remains unknown.
the Development of soCial Behavior Copying
Young children’s play is riddled with copying behaviors (Eckerman & Peterman, 
2004). These instances of copying can take many forms but have in common 
that the observation of an individual’s movement is causally related to a similar 
movement in the observer (Heyes, 2001).
Development of Copying
An often-cited form of copying behavior is neonatal imitation. Several experi-
ments reported that newborn infants (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983) and infants of 
a few weeks old (Meltzoff & Moore, 1977) imitate facial and manual actions 
modeled by an adult. These findings have been cited by the mimicry literature 
as evidence that mimicry is present from birth (Lakin, 2013; Lakin et al., 2003), 
though criticism of these effects has also been considered (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). This criticism has concerned the sta-
tistical methodology as well as failed replications and alternative explanations 
(Abravanel & Sigafoos, 1984; Anisfeld, 1991; Anisfield, Masters, Jacobson, 
& Kagan, 1979; Jones, 1996, 2006a). After over 80 replication studies with 
mixed results and limited sample sizes (Heyes, 2016), a recent longitudinal 
study conducted with 106 1- to 9-week-old infants provided fairly definitive 
evidence against neonatal imitation (Oostenbroek et al., 2016). Oostenbroek 
and colleagues (2016) found that infants were as likely to produce the target 
behaviors in response to models demonstrating these behaviors as they were 
to models performing other behaviors. Thus, it is unlikely that infants can copy 
behaviors from birth (Heyes, 2016).
Instead, infants are first able to copy the behaviors they observe others 
perform near the end of their first year of life and the complexity of copying 
increases with age. In a cross-sectional study of infants of 6 to 20 months old, 
Jones (2007) compared infants’ behavior rates while a parent demonstrated the 
target behavior with the spontaneous production of the target behavior during 
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the parent’s demonstration of another behavior. At 8 and 12 months of age, 
infants demonstrated reliable imitation of vowel vocalizations. At 12 months, 
infants reliably imitated action-effect pairs, such as clapping hands together to 
make sound, and a cultural gesture, namely waving bye-bye. It was not until 16 
to 18 months of age that infants imitated actions without salient effects, such as 
putting a hand on their head (Jones, 2007). This earlier acquisition of interesting 
action-effect associations was also reported in a longitudinal study with 6- to 
15-month-olds. Infants started imitating transitive actions with visual or auditory 
effects, such as stacking blocks or squeezing a rubber duck to make a sound, 
between 9 and 12 months and imitation rates increased again from 12 to 15 
months of age (Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt, & Stevenson, 1976). Indeed, 
the preference for action-effect imitation persists in the second year of life, as 
shown in an experiment with 12- and 18-month-olds; after observing a sequence 
of three actions of which one or none had a salient effect, infants preferentially 
imitated the action-effect pair and did so quicker and more frequently than ac-
tions not coupled with a salient effect (Hauf, Elsner, & Aschersleben, 2004). 
Notably, there is limited evidence for infants imitating intransitive gestural 
behaviors like those of adult mimicry studies (e.g. head shaking; Abravanel, 
Levan-Goldschmidt, & Stevenson, 1976). This gradual emergence of imitation 
suggests that multiple motor, social, cognitive and motivational components play 
a role in the development of copying (Jones, 2009) and that infants’ initial 
copying is largely constrained to salient action-effect associations (Elsner, 2007; 
Paulus, 2014).
Beyond a difference in what is being copied (i.e. action-effect pairs versus 
meaningless mannerisms), this evidence for early copying differs from adult 
behavioral mimicry in the circumstances under which it occurs. Whereas adult 
mimicry is typified by its occurrence in situations in which participants’ primary 
focus is the task at hand and the demonstrated mimicry behaviors are unrelated 
to this task (van Baaren, Janssen, Chartrand, & Dijksterhuis, 2009), in develop-
mental studies the copying behavior is the focus of the interaction. Often, infants 
are encouraged to copy demonstrated behaviors (e.g. Jones, 2007) and are 
rewarded when they indeed do so (Heyes, 2013). Only a handful of studies 
have investigated (semi-)implicit instances of copying resembling adult mimicry. 
The investigated behaviors entail the notoriously contagious yawn (Anderson & 
Meno, 2003; Helt, Eigsti, Snyder, & Fein, 2010; Millen & Anderson, 2011) and, 
more recently, facial expressions (Deschamps, Schutte, Kenemans, Matthys, & 
Schutter, 2012; Geangu, Quadrelli, Conte, Croci, & Turati, 2016).
On a subjective level, most adults would likely agree that yawning is highly 
contagious. In addition to the many hypotheses regarding the physiological 
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1functions of yawning, this contagious characteristic has led to a hypothesized 
communicative function, which some argue is the most probable function of 
yawning (Guggisberg, Mathis, Schnider, & Hess, 2010). Still, evidence for the 
presence of contagious yawning in children is limited to a handful of studies. Us-
ing live (Helt et al., 2010), video (Anderson & Meno, 2003), and photographic 
models (Millen & Anderson, 2011), evidence for children contagiously yawning 
was found from the age of 4-5 years onward, while the youngest tested age was 
12 months. This developmental trajectory has been interpreted as evidence that 
contagious yawning depends on social developmental factors (Guggisberg et 
al., 2010). In support of a relationship with social development, studies with 6- 
to 15–year-old typically developing children and children with ASD demonstrate 
that children with ASD are less susceptible to contagious yawning (Giganti & 
Ziello, 2009; Helt et al., 2010; Senju et al., 2007). Extending these findings, 
it could hence be the case that other forms of behavioral mimicry also develop 
during early childhood, depending on factors of social development. However, 
while contagious yawning might be a textbook example of behavioral mimicry 
on a subjective level, the physiological functions of yawning complicate the 
communicative argument of the behavior. Indeed, yawning and its (non)social 
function(s) are still a matter of much debate (Gallup, 2011; Guggisberg, Mathis, 
Schnider, & Hess, 2011).
In another line of research, recent advances have allowed for the application 
of relatively child-friendly electromyography (EMG) electrodes to measure facial 
mimicry in children. Adult studies have shown that corresponding facial muscle 
activation can be recorded upon presentation of a facial expression (Hess, 
Houde, & Fischer, 2014; Seibt, Mühlberger, Likowski, & Weyers, 2015). This 
technique has been successfully utilized to study facial mimicry in 6- to 7-year-old 
children (Deschamps et al., 2012) and recently even in 3-year-olds (Geangu et 
al., 2016). As is the case for contagious yawning, differences have been identi-
fied between typically developing children and those with social developmental 
disorders. In several samples of children ranging from 6 to 13 years of age, 
children with ASD or disruptive behavior disorder displayed decreased facial 
mimicry and slower mimicry responses (Beall, Moody, McIntosh, Hepburn, & 
Reed, 2008; De Wied, van Boxtel, Posthumus, Goudena, & Matthys, 2009; De 
Wied, van Boxtel, Zaalberg, Goudena, & Matthys, 2006; Deschamps, Coppes, 
Kenemans, Schutter, & Matthys, 2015; Oberman, Winkielman, & Ramachan-
dran, 2009). Such findings again suggest an influence of social development 
on behavior copying. Moreover, these studies demonstrate the potential clinical 
relevance of investigating affiliative social copying behaviors during early child-
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hood, starting with the prerequisite of first understanding the typical develop-
ment of these behaviors.
However, while the facial mimicry studies best match adult mimicry in that 
they involve non-instructed instances of copying, facial mimicry differs from 
behavioral mimicry in three fundamental ways. First, the nature of what is being 
copied is not per definition non-valenced. Though not always the case, facial 
expressions communicate emotions and these can further convey appraisals such 
as affiliation and dominance (Hess et al., 2014; Seibt et al., 2015). Second, 
facial mimicry as measured with EMG entails reactions that occur in the order of 
milliseconds (Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998). Although often defined as occurring 
within a few seconds (Lakin, 2013), behavioral mimicry studies in adults rarely 
report the time window in which a participants’ behavior is still scored as mim-
icry. Likewise, the duration of the recorded EMG responses lasts a few seconds 
(Dimberg & Thunberg, 1998), while behavioral mimicry can entail postures that 
are maintained throughout an interaction. Third, the use of EMG measurement 
indicates that the reported facial mimicry occurs on the level of subtle muscle 
contractions. These therefore might not always be visible to interaction partners 
(Seibt et al., 2015). Behavioral mimicry, on the other hand, is visually coded, 
meaning that behaviors must be detectable by the naked eye. Thus, the pres-
ence of facial mimicry in young children might be distinct from children’s use 
of non-valenced, slow and overt behavioral mimicry during social interactions. 
Nonetheless, the adult literature presents many parallels between the social con-
sequences of facial and behavioral mimicry (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009; 
Hess et al., 2014; Seibt et al., 2015), suggesting that the emergence of social 
behavioral mimicry might also occur during early childhood.
social Copying
The ontogeny of copying is inherently social and positively valenced (Heyes, 
2013). Infants spend the majority of their waking hours in face-to-face inter-
actions during which parents repeatedly copy their infant’s behaviors (Jones, 
2006b; Kokkinaki & Kugiumutzakis, 2000; Užgiris, Benson, Kruper, & Vasek, 
1989). In turn, when an infant is the one to copy, mothers have been shown to 
reward this imitation with smiles and vocal encouragement (Pawlby, 1977 in Ray 
& Heyes, 2011). This seems to promote copying, as infants who were rewarded 
for imitation more frequently also imitated more types of behaviors and did so 
more often (Waxler & Yarrow, 1975). Thus, copying is already associated with 
positive affiliative interactions during early development.
This social connotation of copying continues to be evident during toddlers’ 
interactions with others. During peer interactions, imitative acts, such as perform-
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1ing the same action on the same toy, increase considerably in occurrence from 
16 months to around 3 years of age (Eckerman, Davis, & Didow, 1989). In these 
interactions, imitation is the most common means of initiating interactions and 
social play, and many of toddlers’ spontaneous games are imitative in nature 
(Eckerman et al., 1989; Lubin & Field, 1981; Nadel, 2002). Yet, imitation dur-
ing natural peer interactions decreases starting from 3 up until 11 years of age 
(Abramovitch & Grusec, 1978; Grusec & Abramovitch, 1982; Lubin & Field, 
1981). As children age, they likely increasingly rely on other affiliation strate-
gies instead of explicit imitation (Abramovitch & Grusec, 1978; Nadel, 2002). 
Importantly, even though the frequency of explicit imitative acts decreases with 
age, peer imitation remains socially sensitive across childhood, with dominant 
children being copied most (Abramovitch & Grusec, 1978; Grusec & Abramo-
vitch, 1982).
During adult-child interactions, children’s imitation is also sensitive to social 
dynamics (Užgiris, 1981). In over-imitation paradigms an adult demonstrates 
a set of novel actions on a novel toy, some of which are causally related to an 
end-state and others of which are not (Horner & Whiten, 2005; Lyons, Young, & 
Keil, 2007). Modulations of the social dynamics in which the task occurs have 
demonstrated that toddlers’ imitation in these tasks can be guided by affiliation 
or similarity goals (Over & Carpenter, 2012). For example, 2-year-olds copy 
adult models more faithfully when they are responsive (e.g. live or via CCTV) 
than when they cannot provide interactive feedback (e.g. via a video; Nielsen, 
Simcock, & Jenkins, 2008). Similarly, when 2-year-olds played an imitative game 
with a model prior to an over-imitation task they were more likely to imitate faith-
fully than if they had interacted with the model in a less social way by playing a 
puzzle-matching game or barely interacted with the model by drawing pictures. 
Interestingly, in this study, 4-year-olds were more likely to imitate faithfully than 
2-year-olds and they did so across these conditions (Yu & Kushnir, 2014). Corre-
spondingly, in another study, 4-year-olds’ imitation was sensitive to the presence 
of the demonstrator, as they imitated more faithfully if the over-imitation model 
was still in the room than if she had left (Nielsen & Blank, 2011). Thus, young 
children’s imitation seems to become increasingly sensitive to a goal to affiliate 
in general. Indeed, as opposed to natural instances of explicit peer imitation, 
over-imitation rates have been reported to significantly increase with age, even 
into adulthood (Marsh, Ropar, & Hamilton, 2014; McGuigan, Makinson, & 
Whiten, 2011). This developmental increase suggests that social understanding 
increasingly plays a role in these explicit imitative contexts.
Further support for affiliative over-imitation comes from a conceptual replica-
tion of the Lakin and colleagues (2008) ostracism mimicry study. In the develop-
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mental paradigm, 5- to 6-year-olds were first assigned to the yellow group and 
made to think they shared several preferences with other yellow group members. 
They then played Cyberball with in-group or out-group members during which 
they were included or ostracized. Subsequently, they observed a video of an 
in- or out-group member performing a task with several arbitrary steps. There 
was a main effect of Cyberball condition, with ostracized children imitating 
more faithfully than included children. Post hoc analyses performed separately 
within the in-group condition and the out-group condition indicated that this 
effect was only present in children excluded by their in-group (Watson-Jones, 
Legare, & Whitehouse, 2016). Taken together, like adults’ behavioral mimicry, 
children’s social imitation is used to communicate similarity and affiliation (Over 
& Carpenter, 2012; Užgiris, 1981).
Additional evidence for the social communicative function of imitation during 
early childhood comes from two further lines of research. The first is similar to 
the absence of or even negative mimicry of out-group members found in adults 
(Yabar et al., 2006). Oostenbroek and Over (2015) showed two methods of 
turning on a light, with the elbow or with two hands pressed together. Either an 
out-group member or a neutral-group member subsequently demonstrated one 
of these two methods. Significantly more 4- and 5-year-olds turned the light on 
using the contrasting (i.e. not demonstrated) method in the out-group condition 
than the neutral-group condition (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015). The second line 
of research reflects the importance of nonverbal behavior in third-person obser-
vations of interactions, as also found in adults (e.g. Kavanagh et al., 2011). 
After observing an adult model imitate one of two other adults in several ways, a 
greater proportion of 5-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, reported that the imitating 
model liked the person she imitated more than the other person. The majority 
of these children explained their choice based on the imitative behavior of the 
target model (Over & Carpenter, 2015). Hence, although the type of social 
imitation studied thus far in children differs from behavioral mimicry in its explicit 
and transitive nature, similar social sensitivities and functions of copying behav-
ior are evident and become increasingly influential during early development.
social-Cognitive Development
As reviewed above, children use copying to establish interactions with peers and 
adults (e.g. Eckerman et al., 1989; Waxler & Yarrow, 1975) and affiliate with 
their interaction partners and social groups (e.g. Watson-Jones et al., 2016). 
In addition to these social functions, copying also serves a nonsocial learning 
function, allowing children to learn how to use new tools or perform new actions 
(Over & Carpenter, 2012, 2013). This array of functions has led many scholars 
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1to suggest that copying plays a fundamental role in early social-cognitive devel-
opment (Jones, 2009; Meltzoff & Williamson, 2010; Over & Carpenter, 2012; 
Paulus, 2014). Yet, arguably, social-cognitive development and the development 
of imitation are likely mutually interdependent; while in some situations copying 
fosters novel social interactions that develop social understanding, in other situ-
ations a certain level of social understanding and behavioral control is needed 
in order for a child to amplify or prevent their copying behavior in a socially 
sensitive manner. Hence, in the pursuit of behavioral mimicry, certain advances 
in social understanding and behavioral control are likely necessary contributors 
to its development.
The term social understanding is used here in a broad sense as a marker 
of a child’s performance on social perception tasks as well as her concepts of 
relationships and comprehension of social norms. As such, social understanding 
can be seen as a dynamic product of social interaction experiences during 
development (Carpendale & Lewis, 2004). A widely studied component of 
social understanding is social perspective taking. These tasks typically assess a 
child’s ability to understand that other individuals can perceive a situation from 
a different perspective, can hold knowledge that is outdated or contradicting the 
child’s current knowledge, and can have different emotional states or intentions. 
Performance on such theory of mind tasks indicate that a basic level of this 
understanding is present in 2-year-olds and that it advances rapidly through 
early childhood (Tahiroglu et al., 2014).
Understanding of interpersonal characteristics and social norms similarly 
show marked increases during early childhood. For example, similarity already 
affects toddlers’ novel object or toy preferences, as they tend to choose items 
endorsed by individuals who shared earlier preferences with the child (Fawcett 
& Markson, 2010a; Gerson, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2017). Three-year-olds 
are further sensitive to social or group markers of similarities, such as gender, 
age, and physical appearance (Fawcett & Markson, 2010b; Shutts, Banaji, & 
Spelke, 2010). Furthermore, children are even sensitive to arbitrary novel-group 
boundaries, with children as young as 3.5 years old explicitly preferring novel 
in-group members over out-group members (Richter, Over, & Dunham, 2016). 
This preference strengthens and by 5-6 years of age expands to encompass an 
in-group bias in both reasoning about whether an individual would perform 
positively-valenced behaviors and memory of who was said to have performed 
valenced behaviors (Dunham, Baron, & Carey, 2011). Additionally, 5- to 6-year-
olds reason about different types of groups, acknowledging that friend groups 
like, share with, and are loyal to one another, while people who look like one 
another are more similar with respect to preferences and common knowledge 
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(Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2016). Likewise, social norm under-
standing parallels this drastic increase from toddlerhood to early childhood. 
For example, while toddlers and young children acknowledge that sharing is 
important and fairly divide resources in certain circumstances, they also show 
biases in their sharing which last until middle childhood (e.g. Chernyak & Sobel, 
2016; Smith, Blake, & Harris, 2013). In short, during early childhood, children 
begin to recognize the affiliative characteristics of relationships and importance 
of social norms.
The transition from toddlerhood to early childhood is also a time during which 
children’s inhibitory control improves. Inhibitory control refers to the ability to 
regulate or prevent dominant behavior from becoming overt. A range of tasks 
indicate that between the ages of 2 and 6 children become increasingly able to 
inhibit certain responses either entirely or in favor of executing other responses 
(Carlson, 2005). Interestingly, in addition to contributing to performance on 
social perspective taking tasks (Carlson, Mandell, & Williams, 2004; Carlson, 
Moses, & Breton, 2002), inhibitory control might also be related to young 
children’s ability to regulate their behavior during joint interactions (Meyer, Bek-
kering, Haartsen, Stapel, & Hunnius, 2015).
In summary, copying ability develops during children’s first years of life. Early 
social interactions reward copying and copying continues to be rewarded by 
stimulating peer play in toddlerhood. During early childhood, spontaneous ex-
plicit imitation during peer interactions seems to decrease, but the social sensitiv-
ity of other instances of copying continues to increase. Over-imitation paradigms 
indicate that young children’s behaviors are sensitive to social dynamics in 
similar ways as adults’ mimicry. This ongoing development of social copying 
coincides with children’s increasing social understanding during early child-
hood. Concurrently, improvements in inhibitory control help children regulate 
their social interaction behaviors. While no studies have investigated behavioral 
copying akin to adult mimicry paradigms, investigations of contagious yawning 
suggest that it emerges during the kindergarten years and continues to increase 
in prevalence throughout childhood. Taken together, there is no direct evidence 
of uninstructed behavioral mimicry during early childhood, but the increasing 
social sensitivity of copying behaviors during this time suggests that mimicry 
might be an emerging product of young children’s social-cognitive development.
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the neuroCognitive Basis of soCial Copying
Chartrand and Bargh’s (1999) experimental investigation into behavioral mimicry 
was an extension of the social psychologists’ work on the ‘perception-behavior 
link’. They defined this link as the tendency to act in a similar way after having 
observed another individual’s behavior. Following this reasoning, the authors ex-
pected that perspective taking would be positively related to behavioral mimicry, 
as participants who attended their interaction partners more would perceive 
their behaviors more and hence be more susceptible to the effect of perception 
on behavior. To test this, they had participants perform the photograph descrip-
tion task with a simultaneously foot-shaking and face-rubbing confederate and 
fill in a perspective taking scale. The subset of participants who scored above the 
sample median on perspective taking performed these behaviors significantly 
more often than those who scored below the sample’s median (though note that 
no baseline measure was included; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). The perception-
behavior link has since been the cited mechanism of behavioral mimicry and the 
wealth of cognitive (neuro-)science evidence for perception-behavior mapping 
has been used in support of this explanation.
The notion that there is a link between the perception and execution of behav-
iors stems from decades of cognitive psychological theorizing and behavioral 
research (Greenwald, 1970; James, 1890; Prinz, 1990). Findings from an 
array of behavioral paradigms provide evidence for a common neurocognitive 
representation of perceiving and executing actions (Prinz, 1997). Furthermore, 
neurophysiological findings have shed light on the neural implementation of 
this overlap (di Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) and a 
great number of cognitive neuroimaging studies have since identified the specif-
ics of this neural activity (Fadiga, Craighero, & Olivier, 2005; Fox et al., 2016; 
Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012). Developmentally, this coupling 
of perception and action likely develops as a product of (social) experience dur-
ing early ontogeny (Del Giudice, Manera, & Keysers, 2009; Ferrari, Tramacere, 
Simpson, & Iriki, 2013; Heyes, 2010, 2013). Adult studies further demonstrate 
that perception-behavior mapping is modulated by the social context of interac-
tions (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013; Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2010) and provide 
part of the neurocognitive basis of instructed imitation (Caspers, Zilles, Laird, 
& Eickhoff, 2010; Iacoboni, 2009; Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 
2009). Together, the characteristics and social sensitivity of perception-behavior 
mapping support its role in producing this implicit imitative social behavior.
However, there is scarce evidence from which a causal role of a perception-
behavior mapping system in producing behavioral mimicry can appropriately 
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be inferred (Hogeveen, Chartrand, & Obhi, 2015). In other words, very few 
neuroimaging studies have investigated behavior observation contexts compa-
rable to those in which behavioral mimicry naturally occurs (see for an exception 
van Ulzen, Fiorio, & Cesari, 2013). Instead, the existent behavioral and neu-
roimaging experiments, which entail instructed imitation or explicit observation 
of simple actions, provide insight into the plausible brain basis of mimicry. The 
behavioral paradigms deliver a robust, easily applied measure through which 
the modulation of perception-behavior mapping by social factors (e.g. interaction 
partner’s group membership) can be tested in both adults and young children. 
Additionally, neuroimaging studies present a more direct measure of social ef-
fects on perception-behavior mapping while allowing for passive observation, 
which better matches the circumstances under which mimicry occurs.
response Compatibility paradigms
Behavioral evidence for an overlapping representation of the perception and 
execution of action comes from response compatibility paradigms (RCPs). In 
these paradigms, participants need to perform one action while simultaneously 
observing either a congruent or an incongruent action. Participants’ responses 
during incongruent conditions demonstrate interference, indicating that the pro-
cessing of the incoming action perception overlaps with that of action execution. 
Two types of RCPs have demonstrated a social sensitivity in perception-behavior 
mapping: motor interference and automatic imitation.
In the motor interference task, participants make continuous, straight, back-
and-forth arm or hand movements while observing the same type of movement 
in either a congruent or incongruent direction. Studies find that, during incongru-
ent trials, participants’ motion paths deviate in the direction of the incongruent 
stimulus. For instance, if a participant moves his arm along the horizontal axis, 
concurrently observing a model moving her arm in the vertical axis leads the 
left-to-right motion path of the participant to deviate upwards and downwards 
into this uninstructed axis (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Kilner, Paulignan, & Blake-
more, 2003; Kilner, Hamilton, & Blakemore, 2007). Although there is a spatial 
component to the task, spatial compatibility cannot fully explain the interference 
effects. In a variant of the task, participants observed either a straight vertical 
movement, or a curvilinear horizontal movement with the same endpoint of the 
participants’ own straight horizontal movement. Both the horizontal curvilinear 
and vertical straight conditions caused interference in the participants’ straight 
horizontal movements, despite the fact that the curvilinear movement’s spatial 
endpoints were identical to the participants’ (Roberts, Hayes, Uji, & Bennett, 
2015).
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1What makes the motor interference task relevant for the present investigations 
into children’s behavioral mimicry is its amicability to both social manipula-
tions (Roberts, Bennett, & Hayes, 2016) and developmental adaptations. Two 
developmental studies have utilized a tablet computer adaptation of the motor 
interference task (Marshall, Bouquet, Thomas, & Shipley, 2010; Saby, Marshall, 
Smythe, Bouquet, & Comalli, 2011). Here, kindergartners were asked to draw 
back-and-forth in a predefined direction on the tablet using a stylus. Simultane-
ously, a stimulus video being displayed on the tablet showed a model moving her 
arm in either the congruent or incongruent direction. Four- to 5-year-olds were 
found to experience motor interference, as their drawings had higher devia-
tions in the uninstructed axis during incongruent stimulus videos than congruent 
(Marshall et al., 2010; Saby et al., 2011). Moreover, the extent of interference 
experienced was modulated by whom the children were observing; children ex-
perienced greater interference when they observed a peer in the stimulus video 
than an adult and this was interpreted as a consequence of the models’ social 
identities (i.e. a possible friend versus an adult; Marshall et al., 2010). Thus, in 
addition to demonstrating the feasibility of using motor interference tasks with 
children, these studies suggest that social modulation of perception-behavior 
mapping might already be evident in young children.
A second RCP, automatic imitation, requires participants to perform a par-
ticular movement, like opening the hand, at the sight of one cue and to make an 
opposing movement, closing the hand, in response to another cue. At the same 
time, participants see a photo or video of a congruent or incongruent action. In-
terference in participants’ responses are evident in the slower reaction times dur-
ing incongruent conditions than congruent conditions (Brass, Bekkering, & Prinz, 
2001; Brass, Bekkering, Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, 
& Prinz, 2000). Automatic imitation is relevant for mimicry research because 
the imitative nature and unintentional occurrence that are characteristic of both 
automatic imitation and behavioral mimicry have led automatic imitation to be 
termed the laboratory version of mimicry (Heyes, 2011). Consequently, auto-
matic imitation has been utilized as a proxy for mimicry in investigations into the 
possible mechanisms of this social behavior. In many ways, automatic imitation 
is advantageous because it is easily used in confined and controlled conditions, 
lending itself to neuroimaging setups (e.g. Wang, Newport, & Hamilton, 2011). 
Additionally, many of the social factors that influence behavioral mimicry have 
also been found to modulate interference effects (e.g. Hogeveen & Obhi, 2013; 
Leighton, Bird, Orsini, & Heyes, 2010). Hence, combining automatic imitation 
with neuroimaging provides some insights into how the social sensitivity of these 
behaviors is implemented neurally (e.g. Klapper, Ramsey, Wigboldus, & Cross, 
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2014; Rauchbauer, Majdandžić, Hummer, Windischberger, & Lamm, 2015; 
Wang & Hamilton, 2015). However, in contrast to mimicry, during automatic 
imitation tasks participants’ attention is explicitly guided towards the specific 
target actions that they are prepared to perform. Indeed, a recent neuroimaging 
experiment suggests that natural behavioral mimicry and automatic imitation 
rely to a different degree on specific neural correlates (Hogeveen, Obhi, et al., 
2015). Thus, while providing an experimental task in which social modulation 
of perception-behavior mapping can be readily tested, neuroimaging during 
automatic imitation tasks cannot fully address how naturalistic observation of an 
interaction partner leads to behavioral mimicry.
the mirror system
The discovery of so called ‘mirror neurons’ provided the neuroanatomical cor-
relates of the perception-behavior mapping evident from the behavioral tasks. 
Single-cell recordings of the macaque cortex showed that a selection of neurons 
in the rostral premotor cortex fired both when the individual carried out an action 
and when the individual observed the experimenter carrying out a similar action 
(di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzo-
latti, Fadiga, Gallese, & Fogassi, 1996). Neurons with similar properties were 
further detected in the macaque inferior parietal lobule (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004). In 2010, single-cell recordings in the human cortex provided evidence for 
the presence of neurons with mirroring properties in humans (Mukamel, Ekstrom, 
Kaplan, Iacoboni, & Fried, 2010). Moreover, converging evidence from multiple 
neuroimaging techniques suggests a similar mirror system with multiple nodes 
is present in humans (transcranial magnetic stimulation: Fadiga, Craighero, & 
Olivier, 2005; electroencephalography: Fox et al., 2016; magnetic resonance 
imaging: Molenberghs, Cunnington, & Mattingley, 2012).1
Recently, several studies have investigated how social interactions and their 
characteristics influence the degree of mirror system activation. Hogeveen and 
Obhi (2012) investigated the role of prior social interaction on participants’ 
action mirroring using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). After having 
interacted with the experimenter or not, participants observed simple action 
stimuli in which a hand or robot squeezed a ball. Sensorimotor facilitation was 
found to be higher when participants observed a human hand performing the 
1 It seems as if there are as many different terms for this overlapping representation of action perception and 
execution as there are researchers investigating it. Here, an attempt has been made to conform to the terminol-
ogy of the experimental discipline from which the research originates; the general terms ‘perception-behavior 
link’ or ‘perception-behavior mapping’ are used to refer to the behavioral phenomena while deviations of 
‘mirror system’ are used in the context of neuroimaging experiments. Yet, per neuroimaging technique, the 
way mirror system activation is measured differs, hence at times more specific terminology is used, such as 
‘sensorimotor facilitation’ in the context of TMS studies as the sensorimotor cortex is the site of stimulation.
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1action than when a robotic arm did so, but only in the prior-interaction condition. 
Interestingly, in an exploratory analysis, participants who had mimicked the ex-
perimenter during the initial interaction were found to have significantly higher 
mirror system activation during the human action stimulus than participants who 
had not mimicked (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012). Subsequently, the effect of having 
been mimicked was investigated in a similar paradigm using electroencephalog-
raphy (EEG). Participants in this study underwent two sessions of observing the 
simple squeezing action with an experimental manipulation in between. Partici-
pants who engaged in an interaction in which they were mimicked in between 
stimulus sessions showed a significant increase in mirroring from the pre to the 
post stimulus observation session (Hogeveen, Chartrand, et al., 2015). These 
studies suggest that action mirroring is generally enhanced following natural 
social interactions in which mimicry is likely to occur, but do not yet specifically 
indicate the role of mirroring in producing mimicry.
Online mirror system activation has also been shown to be sensitive to social 
manipulations in the stimuli. TMS (Molnar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 
2007) and EEG (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013) experiments have found differences in 
mirroring of racial in- and out-groups. For example, participants who observed 
individuals from their in-group and from different out-groups perform a simple 
action showed more mirror activation while watching in-group members than the 
out-group members. Mirroring of the out-groups was related to the stereotypes of 
those out-groups and participants’ liking; the more negatively stereotyped and 
disliked the group the less mirror system activation (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010). 
Similar effects have been documented in a study using a minimal group proce-
dure in which participants are assigned to one of two groups upon arrival. In 
this magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) study, participants had to judge whether 
an in-group member or an out-group member was faster in pressing a button. 
In participants who showed an in-group bias in their speed judgments, activa-
tion of the inferior parietal lobule, a mirror system region, showed a significant 
increase in activation when participants viewed their own group’s actions versus 
the out-group’s actions (Molenberghs, Halász, Mattingley, Vanman, & Cunning-
ton, 2013). These studies indicate that the extent to which mirroring takes place 
is modulated by social dynamics. Thus, it might be the case that the social effects 
of mimicry are underpinned by selective mirror system activation as a function 
of social relevance.
Taken together, perception-behavior mapping can be measured in behavioral 
tasks and is neurally underpinned by a mirror system network in which the ob-
servation and execution of actions are associated. Interestingly, both behavioral 
and neural measures of perception-behavior mapping demonstrate modulation 
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by the social characteristics of (or directly preceding) the action observation. 
Though there is little direct evidence of online mirror activity playing a role in the 
generation of behavioral mimicry, it most likely serves as the basis of mimicry’s 
neural mechanisms.
outline of the thesis
The aims of the present thesis were to investigate whether young children display 
social behavioral mimicry and to explore the developmental and neurocognitive 
mechanisms contributing to this behavior. The reviewed literature serves as the 
theoretical basis of these investigations. The developmental trajectory of imita-
tion suggests that mimicry likely develops during early childhood. Building on 
an already capable mirror system, late toddlerhood and early childhood are 
periods in which social imitation undergoes considerable advances. After an 
initial increase, the natural occurrence of explicit imitation as an affiliation tool 
among peers decreases from the age of 3. It has been suggested that explicit 
forms of affiliative imitation are gradually made redundant through the emer-
gence of other affiliation means. It could hence be the case that as a nonverbal 
social behavior, mimicry begins to fulfill this affiliative function around 3 years 
of age. Subsequently, the increasing social sensitivity of children’s behavior 
during experimental imitation tasks reflects a developing social understanding, 
which may gradually drive an increase in the production of social mimicry into 
early childhood. The concurrent improvements in behavioral control could help 
regulate the selectivity of this social behavior. Furthermore, underlying mimicry 
is likely the perception-behavior link, as it typically generates imitative motor 
activity. Like the execution of behavioral mimicry, the extent to which actions are 
neurally mirrored is dependent on the social relevance of the individuals being 
observed. This enhanced mirror activity for relevant interaction partners is likely 
an essential component of producing behavioral mimicry.
Following from this, we designed a series of experimental investigations. 
We began by examining whether 3-year-olds display social behavioral mimicry. 
In Chapter 2, we developed a video paradigm in which children observed 
meaningless mannerisms being performed by kind or unkind adult models with 
neither instruction nor encouragement to copy these behaviors. Subsequently, 
the development of social mimicry during early childhood was examined. 
Chapter 3 presents an adapted version of the video paradigm in two studies, 
one with 3-year-olds and one with 4- to 6-year-olds. A group manipulation was 
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1implemented to determine the influence of affiliation on children’s behavioral 
mimicry.
Next, we studied the role of social-cognitive development in children’s social 
behavioral mimicry. Chapter 4 presents a novel, semi-live, behavioral mimicry 
paradigm used in conjunction with a social manipulation. Measures of the 
5-year-old participants’ inhibitory control and social understanding were related 
to individual differences in their (social) mimicry.
Lastly, we explored the neurocognitive basis of mimicry. The social sensitivity 
of perception-behavior mapping in young children was examined in Chapter 5. 
Here, the tablet adaptation of the motor interference task was used in combina-
tion with a social group manipulation. As the final empirical chapter, Chapter 
6 presents a naturalistic TMS paradigm used to test the role of online mirror 
system activation in mimicry. Through providing a cover task unrelated to the 
motor behaviors of the confederates, adult participants’ sensorimotor simulation 
was measured as they observed confederates perform meaningless mannerisms.
The thesis is concluded in Chapter 7 with a General Discussion of the reported 
findings and their implications for the study of copying development, behavioral 
mimicry, and social interaction.
2Behavioral mimicry is the nonconscious copying of an interaction partner’s behavior and is affected by social dynamics. Whereas it has been studied extensively in adults, little is known about the development of mimicry. The aims of this study were twofold, fi rst to identify whether young children demonstrate mimicry and, second, to investigate whether young children’s mimicry displays sensitivity to social dynamics. Using a video-based paradigm, 40-month-old chil-dren observed six types of behaviors (i.e. yawning, laughing, frowning, cheek-scratching, mouth-rubbing and head-wiggling) performed by a model which they had previously seen either helping or hindering another model. Results indicate that children carried out fi ve of the six behaviors more often while watching the behavior videos than during baseline. However, no differences were found between the two social manipulations. We conclude that young children demon-strate mimicry like that reported in adults and discuss the possible causes of the absence of a social effect.
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2
An often unnoticed component of social interactions is behavioral mimicry. Mim-
icry can be defined as nonconsciously adopting the behaviors of an interaction 
partner (van Baaren et al., 2009). In one of the first comprehensive studies of 
mimicry, participants were exposed to foot-shaking or face-rubbing confederates 
with smiles or neutral expressions on their faces. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) 
showed that participants were more likely to carry out the modeled behaviors 
and expressions than the non-modeled behaviors and expressions. Importantly, 
replicating these behaviors occurred outside of the participants’ awareness 
(Chartrand & Bargh, 1999).
In contrast to the extensive adult literature on mimicry (for a review see 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), exceptionally few studies have investigated 
the development of mimicry. Some authors have documented neonatal imitation 
(e.g. Meltzoff & Moore, 1977, 1983). Others, however, note the lack of breadth 
of these behaviors and have been unable to replicate original findings with older 
infants and young children (e.g. Anisfeld, 1996; Jones, 2007). Additionally, in 
such studies, infants and young children are encouraged to replicate modeled 
behaviors (e.g. Jones, 2007), which stands in contrast to the uninstructed mimicry 
reported in adults. In one study that did not give replication instructions, children 
saw video stimuli in which someone often yawned, but children under the age of 
five did not demonstrate instances of yawning (Anderson & Meno, 2003). In a 
live paradigm, only three out of 40 children under the age of four demonstrated 
contagious yawning (Helt et al., 2010). Similarly, Over and Carpenter (2009) 
report that, in a pilot study, 5-year-old children who interacted with an adult who 
repetitively touched her face failed to mimic this behavior. Notably, the authors 
posited that there was little evidence to suggest that children under the age of 
five exhibit mimicry of the sort found in adults (Over & Carpenter, 2009).
Not only do adult studies indicate the uninstructed nature of mimicry, but they 
also bring to light its sensitivity to social dynamics. For example, liking one’s 
interaction partner has been shown to increase mimicry rates, both when liking 
was preexistent and manipulated (Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 
2008; Mcintosh, 2006). Although there is no evidence of uninstructed mimicry 
in young children, a form of imitation has been shown to be affected by social 
dynamics. Over-imitation (also called affiliative imitation) is the replication of 
actions shown during a task demonstration that are unrelated to achieving the 
desired end-state of the task (Over & Carpenter, 2012). In a conceptual replica-
tion of an adult study by Lakin, Chartrand and Arkin (2008) which showed 
that being socially excluded lead to higher mimicry rates, Over and Carpenter 
(2009) found that priming 5-year-olds with social exclusion increased over-
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imitation rates (Over & Carpenter, 2009), indicating that non-mimicry forms of 
behavior replication are sensitive to social factors in young children.
Children’s sensitivity to social dynamics is also manifest in other behavioral 
measures. One study showed that 3-year-olds helped helpful adults more than 
destructive adults (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010). Kenward and Dahl 
(2011) demonstrated that, when given an uneven number of biscuits, 4.5-year-
olds distributed more biscuits to puppets they saw helping another puppet than 
to puppets they saw violently hindering the other puppet. Three-year-olds did not 
distinguish in their biscuit-distribution but the authors suggest this was because 
they were shocked by the violent nature of the events and were not sure which 
puppet was which (Kenward & Dahl, 2011).
Thus far, no studies have reliably found uninstructed mimicry during early 
childhood, and it is hence also unknown if children’s mimicry is affected by 
social dynamics. In the present study, we first aimed to identify whether young 
children demonstrate mimicry like that found in adults. Importantly, we incorpo-
rated a range of behaviors, such as facial expressions and manual behaviors, 
to investigate the generality of young children’s mimicry. Also, as past adult 
studies have successfully used videos to elicit mimicry (e.g. Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; Platek, Critton, Myers, & Gallup, 2003), we chose to present the stimuli 
as videos to ensure that all children saw identical behaviors. Moreover, this 
provided the children with a ‘task’, namely to watch TV, which is in line with 
the contention of van Baaren and colleagues (2009) that during mimicry experi-
ments the focus should not be on the behaviors specifically. We incorporated a 
baseline measure so as to compare natural behavior rates with those elicited 
by observation within participants, because past studies indicate that individual 
differences influence mimicry rates (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Platek et 
al., 2003; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002). We hypothesized that children would 
demonstrate the behaviors at greater frequencies while watching the behavior 
videos than during baseline.
The second aim was to address whether mimicry is sensitive to social dynam-
ics at three years of age. As past studies demonstrated that children around three 
and four years of age show differential treatment of helpers versus hinderers 
(Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Vaish et al., 2010), we used a similar paradigm to 
manipulate the social dynamics. We designed the models’ interactions such that 
the helper would come across as a nice individual whereas the hinderer would 
be seen as a mean but not violent individual. In this manner, we aimed to imple-
ment a similar effect as in the manipulated-liking designs of adult mimicry stud-
ies (Likowski et al., 2008; Mcintosh, 2006). Due to possible carry-over effects 
from previous interactions (e.g. Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), we used this social 
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manipulation as a between-participants factor, such that half of the children were 
randomly assigned to the helper condition and half to the hinderer condition. We 
hypothesized that children would mimic helpers more than hinderers, replicating 
the pattern of higher mimicry rates for liked individuals in adult studies.
methoDs
participants
Participants were recruited through the database of volunteer families of the 
Baby Research Center Nijmegen. Signed consent was obtained from parents 
beforehand. Thirty-three children participated in this study (Age: M = 39.7, 
range: 39.2-40.2 months; 23 girls). Seven children were excluded due to not 
wanting to watch the videos (n = 1), technical error (n = 1), and not meeting the 
inclusion criteria of having attended to at least 40% of the behavior videos (n = 
3) or having watched each behavior video at least once (n = 2). Thus, the final 
sample consisted of 26 children (19 girls).
stimuli
The stimulus videos for the experiment were made using a digital video camera 
(Sony Handycam, DCR-SR190E) and were digitally muted. Two types of videos 
were recorded, social manipulation videos and behavior videos.
Figure 1.2 shows the final scene of the helper video, and gives an indication 
of the scene composition used in the social manipulation videos. In both the 
helper and hinderer videos, a stuffed animal was initially positioned in the left, 
front corner of the table, and the helper or hinderer (H) walked in from the left 
and the neutral model (N) from the right, each sitting down at their respective 
sides of the table. After N failed to reach the stuffed animal from her position, H 
reached over to get the stuffed animal and held it out to N who reached for it. At 
this point the videos differed; in the helper videos, H passed the stuffed animal 
to N who held it as in Figure 1.2, whereas in the hinderer videos, H pulled the 
stuffed animal back and held it to her chest.
Three adult female models were used. Two models were used for H (i.e. 
H1 and H2), who each played both the helper and the hinderer in order to 
control for possible idiosyncrasies of each model. The model for H was kept 
consistent within participants, such that children who saw H1 during the social 
manipulation video also saw the behavior videos of H1, and the same for H2. 
The H models wore a colored shirt to aid subsequent identification while N wore 
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black. Since N never reappeared in the behavior videos, only one model played 
her role.
Six different behavior videos were made. The fi rst, yawning, was selected for 
its contagious qualities (Figure 1.3; Platek et al., 2003). Two emotional facial 
expressions, laughing and frowning (i.e. a sad facial expression), were used 
as they have successfully elicited mimicry in adult studies (Moody & McIntosh, 
2011; Sonnby-Borgström, 2002) and recently also in school-aged children (Des-
champs et al., 2012). Two manual behaviors were loosely based on those used 
in interactive adult studies (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003), namely using the fi ngertips to scratch the cheek (i.e. cheek-scratching) 
and rubbing the fi ngertips back and forth across sealed lips (i.e. mouth-rubbing; 
Figure 1.5). Finally, in the head-wiggling clip the model moved her head from 
side to side while looking forwards. Each behavior video showed the model in 
a neutral position for the fi rst and last 500 ms. Pilot data indicated that children 
of this age were capable of replicating all behaviors.
Social Manipulation Video (1x)
Randomized Action Clips (15x)
Social Manipulation Video (2x)
Baseline Animation Video
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Randomized Action Clips (15x)
FIGuRE 1 | Experimental design.
Design
This experiment consisted of three types of stimuli: the baseline, the social ma-
nipulation and the behavior videos. For the baseline, a nonsocial video (73.7 
s) from an unrelated experiment was shown displaying a single racecar driving 
Evidence for Mimicry 37
2
through a racetrack (Figure 1.1; Immens, 2011). Next, the social manipula-
tion video (average duration 23 s), depending on the condition the participant 
was assigned to, was shown twice (Figure 1.2). The behavior videos (average 
duration 7 s) were presented after the social manipulation videos (Figure 1.3 
and 1.5). Each of the six behaviors was presented five times, resulting in 30 
behavior videos in total, and after every five behavior videos an attention grab-
ber video (2 s) was shown. After half of the behavior videos were played, the 
same social manipulation video was shown a third time (Figure 1.4) and was 
announced via a recording of a voice saying in Dutch, “Look! Again this video.” 
Children’s behavior during the third repetition of the social manipulation video 
was not included in the behavior rate calculations. Together, the baseline, the 
three repetitions of the social manipulation video and the 30 behavior videos 
lasted approximately 6 min. At the end of the experiment, the experimenter 
asked the children if they remembered the social manipulation video, if they 
could describe what had happened and whether the model was nice or mean, 
as well as whether the child remembered copying the model’s behaviors.
Randomization and counterbalancing. The (pseudo)-randomizations 
were done using Mix (van Casteren & Davis, 2006). Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of the two conditions (i.e. helper or hinderer) and one of the two 
models (i.e. H1 or H2); hence there were four groups, one for every combination 
of condition and model. For each group there were two presentation orders of 
behavior videos (i.e. eight in total), which were constrained such that at least 
three different behavior types had to be presented before the same behavior 
could be shown again, and these presentation orders were counterbalanced 
across participants.
procedure
Following a short play session, the child and parent were led to the experiment 
room. Children were seated in front of an eye-tracker (T120, Tobii Technology, 
Stockholm, Sweden, Tobii Studio software) either alone or on their parent’s lap. 
A video camera (Sony Handycam, DCR-SR190E) was positioned to the side of 
the child such that it was not in her direct visual field but still obtained the most 
frontal recording angle possible. The only instructions given were to watch the 
videos. Upon conclusion, the participants were allowed to select a storybook or 
were given 10 Euros for participating in the experiment.
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Coding and reliability
The children’s behavior was coded using ELAN Linguistic Annotator (Lausberg 
& Sloetjes, 2009). The coder was blind to condition and the order of stimulus 
presentation.
Although the experiment was presented on an eye-tracker so that attention 
could be measured precisely, the percentage of looking time according to the 
output was often considerably lower than the amount of time that the child 
actually attended the screen (for comparable eye-tracking discrepancies, see 
Morgante, Zolfaghari, & Johnson, 2012). For this reason, attention was coded 
by hand. If the child looked away for more than 5 s, turned to interact with the 
parent or experimenter, or was not clearly visible on the video, that duration was 
coded as not-attending.
Pilot data was used to create the coding scheme for the behaviors so as 
to accommodate how children carry out each behavior. If the child verbally 
labeled a behavior right before, during or after carrying it out, it was not coded 
as mimicry. Also, behaviors that started while the child was not attending were 
not coded as these might have been externally triggered. The exact coding 
scheme is available from the first author, with the required characteristics as 
follows. Yawns were coded when the lips were parted forming an O-shape. For 
laughing, the corners of the mouth needed to be turned upwards (i.e. smiles 
were also counted) while for frowns they needed to be turned downwards. A 
cheek scratch was coded if the child brought her hand to her cheek or forehead 
and made scratching movements with her fingers. If the child rubbed her fingers 
over her mouth or chin it was coded as a mouth rub. Lastly, the head-wiggle was 
coded when the child tilted her head to the left or right and then to the other side 
at least once.
To ensure coding-reliability, a random sample of 20 percent of the participant 
videos was re-coded. The mean intraclass correlation coefficient between behav-
ior rates of the first and second coding was r = .98.
Behavioral measures
The timing of all events (e.g. onset and offset times of stimuli and the participant’s 
behaviors) were synchronized and rounded to the nearest 100 ms. The baseline 
and behavior videos period were separated; the baseline consisted of the dura-
tion of the racecar animation and the behavior videos period was defined as 
starting when the first behavior video started and ending after the last behavior 
video, but with the social manipulation video in between excluded. Participant’s 
behaviors that occurred during the behavior videos period but before the first 
attended behavior video of that type were excluded.
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Behavior rates. Per participant, it was counted how often each behavior 
was carried out, and rates were calculated separately for the baseline and 
behavior videos period. Total behavior rates were calculated by dividing the 
total behavior count by the duration in minutes that the screen was attended. 
Similarly, behavior rates were calculated per behavior type using the count of 
just one behavior. For these separate behavior rates, the duration attended in 
minutes for the behavior videos period was adjusted to start from the beginning 
of the first behavior video of that behavior type, resulting in the separate behav-
ior rates being lower than the overall behavior rate. Hence, per participant, per 
baseline or behavior videos period, seven behavior rates (i.e. behaviors per 
minute attended) were calculated: the overall rate and one rate for each of the 
six behavior types.
analysis
Several comparisons were run to check that the models and the presentation 
orders did not have an effect on behavior rates during the behavior videos 
period and were run separately for the two conditions. The helper condition 
consisted of 12 participants, 5 of whom saw the videos of model H1, while the 
hinderer condition had 14 participants, 7 of whom saw model H1. Independent-
samples t-tests and Mann-Whitney U-tests compared the effect of model (e.g. H1 
or H2) on total behavior rates and separate behavior rates, respectively, and 
Kruskal-Wallis H-tests compared the effect of the presentation orders on both 
total behavior rates and separate behavior rates. There were no effects of model 
or presentation orders for total or separate behavior rates in either condition 
(all ps >.1). Therefore, the models and presentation orders were collapsed in 
the subsequent analyses. Additionally, Mann-Whitney U-tests revealed no dif-
ferences in behavior rates between children sitting on their parents’ laps and 
those sitting alone on the chair during either the baseline or the behavior videos 
period (all ps > .2).
results
Out of the 26 participants, 25 participants demonstrated at least 1 of the 6 
behaviors during either the baseline or the behavior videos period, and 23 
participants carried out the behaviors more often while watching the behavior 
videos than during baseline.
Since it first needed to be investigated whether the two conditions (i.e. groups 
of participants) differed, the hypothesized difference between the helper and 
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hinderer condition during the behavior videos period was tested. However, a 
Mann-Whitney U-test revealed no significant difference in total behavior rates 
between conditions (p > .4). Hence, for the subsequent comparisons the partici-
pant groups were collapsed across conditions.
To investigate whether behavior rates differed between baseline and the be-
havior videos period, a paired-samples t-test was used to compare total behavior 
rates. Children carried out the behaviors significantly more often during the 
behavior videos period (M = 2.38 behaviors per min, SE = 0.24) than during 
the baseline (M = 0.92 behaviors per min, SE = 0.33; t(25) = -4.3, p < .001, 
r = .65).
Subsequently, each separate behavior was investigated using Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests, and alpha was corrected for multiple comparisons using a 
Bonferroni correction2 (Figure 2). During the behavior videos, the rates of yawn-
ing, frowning, mouth-rubbing and head-wiggling, were significantly higher than 
the baseline rates of yawning (z = 3.18, r = .44), frowning (z = 2.74, r = .38), 
mouth-rubbing (z = 2.61, r = .36) and head-wiggling (z = 2.93, r = .41; all ps 
< .008), respectively. Cheek-scratching occurred more often during the behavior 
videos period than during the baseline at a level of marginal significance (p = 
.011). Laughing did not differ significantly between the two periods.
For the five behaviors with significant and marginally significant effects, it 
was investigated post hoc whether any one behavior was more likely to be repli-
cated than the other behaviors. A Friedman’s ANOVA was used to compare the 
difference in behavior rates between baseline and behavior videos period (i.e. 
behavior videos period behavior rate minus baseline behavior rate) between the 
behaviors. No differences between the behaviors were found (all ps > .7).
A Mann-Whitney U-test showed that the children’s answers to the question of 
whether they consciously replicated the model’s behaviors were not predictive of 
their behavior rates during the behavior videos period (p > .6).
DisCussion
This study aimed to identify and investigate mimicry in 40-month-old children. 
We found that children carried out the behaviors significantly more often while 
watching the behavior videos than while watching the baseline video. This was 
evident across individuals, as 23 out of 26 participants showed higher behavior 
2 The Bonferroni correction was calculated by dividing the alpha level (one-tailed) by the number of comparisons 
(i.e. six). Hence, adjusted alpha levels were 0.008 for significance values of p<.05 and 0.017 for marginal 
significance values of p<.1.
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rates during the behavior videos period than during baseline, and across behav-
ior types, as five of the six behaviors were mimicked. Yawning, frowning, mouth-
rubbing, and head-wiggling all occurred at significantly greater rates during the 
behavior videos than during baseline and cheek-scratching showed this effect at 
a level of marginal significance. Of the mimicked behaviors, no one behavior 
was more likely to be mimicked than others, while controlling for baseline rates.
Mimicry of these behavior types have, to the best of our knowledge, not been 
tested during early childhood before, with the exception of yawning. Helt and 
colleagues (2010) report very low rates of yawning in live paradigms under 
the age of four and Anderson and Meno (2003) did not find any instances of 
yawning during video watching in three-year-olds. In their video-based study, 
children were instructed to clap whenever they saw a yawn; as also suggested 
by Helt and colleagues (2010), the disparity between their findings and ours 
may be a result of the assigned tasks, since our simple instructions to watch the 
videos better resemble the uninstructed nature of adult mimicry studies. Indeed, 
the behavior rates during the behavior videos period of our study are similar 
to the behavior rates measured during live interactions in adults. For example, 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) found an average rate of .57 face-rubs per minute, 
which closely corresponds to the children’s average behavior rate of .51 for 
mouth-rubs.
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The only behavior that did not demonstrate a mimicry effect in the current 
study was laughing. This was likely caused by the children’s enjoyment of the 
baseline video, as average laughing rates during the baseline far exceeded 
those of the other behaviors’ baseline rates. Although the baseline video was 
selected for its neutrality and nonsocial nature, the animation still needed to be, 
and in fact was, attractive enough for children to attend to it.
An important characteristic of mimicry is that it occurs outside of the aware-
ness of both the individual mimicking and the individual being mimicked (Char-
trand & van Baaren, 2009). Children were asked at the end of the experiment 
whether they copied the model while watching the behavior videos, and their 
answers were not related to their actual mimicry rates. Additionally, during a 
pilot study children were instructed to copy the behaviors, but it became appar-
ent that they found it unusual to consciously replicate the behaviors of a non-
responsive model, even when encouraged by their parents. Furthermore, our 
coding scheme ensured that the few cases in which children verbally labeled a 
carried-out behavior, indicating that they were focusing on doing that behavior, 
were not counted as mimicked behaviors. Anecdotally, several parents remarked 
that they were surprised to see their child replicate the behaviors seemingly 
automatically. Altogether, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the children 
nonconsciously replicated the behaviors, in line with the definition of behavioral 
mimicry.
This study further investigated whether children’s mimicry is sensitive to social 
dynamics. To influence the social dynamics, a helper-hinderer manipulation 
was used in a between-participants design. However, no significant differences 
between the conditions were found. Given that past studies have linked mimicry 
with social perspective taking skills (e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Platek et 
al., 2003), it might be that the sensitivity of mimicry to social factors gradu-
ally develops during childhood as an effect of increasing social cognition and 
experience. However, it should be considered whether the social manipulation 
could have been ineffective. A limitation of the present study was that the social 
manipulation and behaviors were recorded as separate video clips with differ-
ent background settings. Since Kenward and Dahl (2011) reported that their 
participants had difficulty later identifying the puppets, we allocated the helper 
and hinderer models a colored shirt to aid later identification. Nonetheless, the 
different setting of the two video types may have prevented children from making 
the link between the model in the social manipulation video and the model in 
the behavior videos. More support for this notion comes from recent pilot data 
with 5½-year-olds, which indicated that children older than those in this study 
often failed to relate the model in the behavior videos to the model in the social 
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manipulation video seen before. A similar limitation was that video presentation 
prevented participants from actually affiliating with the model, thereby possibly 
preventing an affiliation-driven social effect, as suggested by Over and Carpen-
ter (2012) regarding an over-imitation study by Nielsen, Simcock and Jenkins 
(2008).
The findings of this study highlight avenues for further research into the neural 
and cognitive underpinnings of mimicry. Whereas a perception-behavior match-
ing system founded in imitation research has been suggested to also underlie 
mimicry (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), it is unclear whether neural differ-
ences exist between nonconscious mimicry and instances of conscious motor 
observation and replication. Additionally, cognitive mechanisms have been 
suggested to contribute to imitative behaviors (e.g. Meltzoff, 2007; Woodward, 
Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson, & Buresh, 2009), and future studies should 
investigate whether similar mechanisms, and the development thereof, are in-
volved in mimicry’s reported social sensitivity.
In conclusion, this study is the first to identify uninstructed behavioral mimicry 
in 40-month-old children. The spectrum of behaviors for which this was the case 
reflects the repertoire of mimicked behaviors in the adult literature (Chartrand 
& van Baaren, 2009), and provides a basis for future research investigating 
the underlying neural and cognitive processes. It is unclear whether the lack of 
social modulation of mimicry was a result of experimental design or an effect of 
social-cognitive development, and this posits further investigation.
3Adults use behavioral mimicry to blend in with (or stand out from) their social environment. Adopting another’s mannerisms and behaviors, or ‘mimicking’, communicates liking and similarity between interaction partners and has been shown to serve as an implicit affi liation mechanism. Given this important social function, it is surprising that so little is known about the development of mimicry. In two studies, we investigated mimicry and its social sensitivity during early childhood. Children of 4-6 years (study 1) and 3 years (study 2) fi rst chose a novel group based on their color preference. Following a baseline phase, chil-dren observed videos of in-group and out-group models performing behaviors that are typically mimicked in adults. Importantly, the children received neither instructions nor encouragement to copy the behaviors. Both 3- and 4- to 6-year-olds displayed behavioral mimicry. Furthermore, the 4- to 6-year-olds mimicked the in-group model more than the out-group model, and this in-group bias was also evident in their explicit group preferences. Together, these studies present the fi rst evidence for behavioral mimicry and its social sensitivity during early childhood. Placed in the context of social development, the fi ndings provide a necessary contribution to current developmental and psychological theories on mimicry and behavior copying.
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Just as chameleons change color to match their environment, humans adapt 
their behaviors to the specifics of an interaction (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
One way this chameleon effect manifests itself is through behavioral mimicry, 
the copying of one another’s postures, mannerisms, or behaviors. The extent to 
which mimicry occurs is a function of the social factors governing the interaction. 
Adults mimic individuals they like and, in turn, being mimicked leads to liking 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Lakin & Chartrand, 2013).
Correspondingly, mimicry can be used to pursue affiliation goals (Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2013), such as those deriving from an individual’s need to belong 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). In the context of social groups, people hold stronger 
affiliation goals for certain individuals, such as in-group members, than for oth-
ers (Tajfel, 1974). Indeed, mimicry might be interpreted as communicating ‘I 
(am) like you’ (Lakin et al., 2008), as exemplified in adult participants’ mimicry 
of in-group but not out-group members (Yabar et al., 2006). An ostracism ma-
nipulation further demonstrates mimicry’s affiliative message; being excluded 
by in-group members selectively increased participants’ mimicry of in-group 
members (Lakin et al., 2008). Consequently, mimicry has been described as 
the social glue that bonds individuals, and hence groups, together (Lakin et al., 
2003).
The importance of mimicry is also evident in its everyday presence, as shown 
in both observational studies as well as laboratory experiments (for a review 
see Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). The automaticity of mimicry was demonstrated 
in a study in which participants mimicked the mannerisms of an individual they 
would later interact with even though they were observing her on what was 
known to be a one-way TV (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). Likewise, in a virtual 
reality study, participants rated mimicking avatars as more realistic and social 
than non-mimicking avatars while unaware of the mimicry (Bailenson & Yee, 
2005), indicating mimicry’s commonplace presence in human behavior. Accord-
ingly, deficits in mimicry have been found in several social disorders, including 
developmental disorders such as autism (Duffy & Chartrand, 2015; Hamilton, 
2013). Taken together, one might expect social behavioral mimicry to be an 
essential factor in social development and, at least, an implicit indication of a 
child’s sensitivity to their social environment. Surprisingly, though, almost nothing 
is known about the development of mimicry in ontogeny.
Only a handful of studies have investigated behavioral mimicry during early 
childhood. The few studies that investigate social yawning suggest that children 
start mimicking yawns around the age of 4 or 5 years (Anderson & Meno, 
2003; Helt et al., 2010; Millen & Anderson, 2011). Importantly, though, stud-
ies often explicitly direct children’s attention towards the yawns. This stands in 
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contrast to adult studies in which the to-be-mimicked behaviors are not explicitly 
emphasized. Only one study has investigated children’s mimicry in this way 
for a range of behaviors that are typically mimicked in adults (van Schaik, van 
Baaren, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2013). In this study, three-year-olds were first 
shown a video in which a model helped another person get a toy or prevented 
the person from getting the toy. Subsequently, they observed videos in which the 
helper or hinderer performed typically-mimicked behaviors. Results indicated 
that the children mimicked the models and did so equally across behavior types, 
including yawning and face-rubbing. However, their mimicry was not affected 
by whether the model had helped or hindered (van Schaik et al., 2013). Thus, 
there is only limited evidence to suggest that young children mimic others’ behav-
iors, and it is unknown whether their mimicry can be sensitive to social factors 
as is the case in adults.
To some extent, research on imitation can shed light on how social mimicry 
might develop. Yet, it is important to recognize that imitation differs from mim-
icry. While imitation is often intentional and object- or effect-directed, mimicry 
involves behaviors that carry little meaning in themselves, such as bouncing one’s 
foot, and generally occurs outside of the awareness of both the mimicker and 
the mimicked (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009). As a result, the translation of 
findings from thorough and informative investigations of imitation development 
(e.g. Jones, 2007) to mimicry research is limited, since often the behaviors in-
volve exciting effects and infants are encouraged to produce the actions. Recent 
evidence, though, shows that young children’s imitation, like mimicry in adults, 
is affected by wanting to communicate liking and similarity to the model and that 
imitation gains this social sensitivity during early childhood (Over & Carpenter, 
2012). During this period, children increasingly make use of similarities to guide 
liking. Three-year-old children prefer to play with others who share their prefer-
ences and physical features, such as hair color (Fawcett & Markson, 2010b), 
and expect that shared features between themselves and others also indicate 
that other preferences are shared (Shutts, Roben, & Spelke, 2013). By extension, 
young children categorize similar individuals into groups and prefer members of 
their own group (i.e. in-group bias; Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). In-group 
bias has also been found for novel-group divisions that carry no prior meanings 
nor exposure from the age of 3 years onwards, although the strongest evidence 
for this exists from the age of 5 (Dunham et al., 2011; Patterson & Bigler, 2006).
The reviewed findings suggest that social development during early child-
hood entails an increasing awareness of (the dynamicity of) social relationships, 
such as those based on shared preferences, and an extension of belonging that 
motivates affiliation with similar others. Considering this gradual emergence of 
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such facets of social cognition, we expect that socially-selective mimicry arises 
during these early childhood years, building on an already capable behavior 
copying system. Here, we investigated the developmental trajectory of social 
mimicry by using a video-based paradigm in which female models displayed 
behaviors that are typically mimicked in adults. We used a novel-group alloca-
tion based on preferences to affect the extent to which children would want to 
affiliate with the models. In the first study, we tested the hypothesis that 4- to 
6-year-olds’ mimicry is sensitive to novel-group membership.
stuDy 1
method
Participants. Forty-three children aged 49 to 80 months from mixed-year 
classrooms participated at a Dutch primary school that was approached to 
partake in this study. Three children were excluded from the analyses: 1 child 
did not want to complete the experiment and 2 children did not visually attend to 
at least 50% of the videos. The final sample consisted of 40 4- to 6-year-olds (17 
girls; Age: M = 65.10, SD = 7.99, Mdn = 64.2 months). The two classrooms 
were thanked for participating with a board game and a storybook. This line of 
research was approved by the social science faculty’s ethics board.
Behavior videos. Four behaviors were selected for the current experiment 
from a previous developmental mimicry study and the same videos were used 
(van Schaik et al., 2013). The behaviors consisted of two non-manual behaviors 
(yawning and nodding side-to-side) and two manual behaviors (rubbing the lips 
and scratching the cheek). These behaviors were carried out by two different 
female models, one wearing a blue shirt and the other a yellow shirt (N.B. in 
the previous study, the models were mimicked equally often and there were no 
differences in how often children mimicked the different types of behaviors; van 
Schaik et al., 2013). Each model performed one non-manual behavior and one 
manual behavior while the other model performed the other behavior of each 
type, counterbalanced across participants. The videos showed the upper bodies 
of the models facing the camera and the models, though they did not speak to 
the viewer, made eye-contact on and off in order to be social but not appear 
threatening. Each video lasted roughly 7 s and started and ended with 500 ms 
of the model in a neutral position.
Procedure. Two experimenters ran the study; the primary experimenter 
retrieved each child one-by-one from the classroom and ran the experiment, 
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while the other set up the experiment between consecutive participants and 
unobtrusively operated the test-computer.
The experiment started with the novel-group allocation. The experimenter 
uncovered two pieces of paper laying side by side, one blue and one yellow, 
and asked which color the child liked best. Once the child had selected a color, 
the experimenter told her that she now belonged to that group (17 children 
(43%) chose yellow). She took away the non-selected color, informing the child 
that their color would stay in front of them so that they could always see which 
group they belonged to. The child was also presented with a vest in their chosen 
color. The experimenter helped the child put on the vest and then pointed the 
child to a mirror, emphasizing the color of the vest while the child was looking 
at herself. The experimenter then seated the child in front of the computer screen 
and informed the child that the computer would provide the rest of the instruc-
tions. The experimenter subsequently pretended to work on a laptop at the other 
end of the table.
The computerized part of the experiment was instructed by a pre-recorded 
female voice and was run using Presentation software (www.neurobs.com). It 
consisted of six phases (see Figure 1). First, group membership was emphasized 
as the voice congratulated the child on belonging to the color-group they had 
chosen (Figure 1.1). This was followed by the baseline phase. The voice told the 
child that she would first play a game to earn points for her group. The voice 
explained that pieces of fruit would consecutively appear on the screen and it 
was the child’s job to say “strawberry” every time she saw a strawberry appear 
(Figure 1.2). The game started after the primary experimenter confirmed that 
the child understood the instructions. This game, which lasted 2 min, served as 
the baseline, as the target behaviors would later be coded during this phase to 
establish the natural occurrence of these behaviors. The baseline was designed 
like this so as to have the child sitting and paying attention to the screen in the 
same way as the rest of the experiment. After the game, the voice commended 
the child and said she had earned a lot of points for her group.
The voice then introduced the two models using neutral photos in a ran-
domized order (Figure 1.3). The models served as the in-group model and the 
out-group model, depending on the child’s color choice. The picture of the child’s 
in-group model was announced by saying, “Look! She belongs to the [in-group 
color] group, just like you. She is also wearing [in-group color] clothes.” The 
out-group model introduction was similarly formulated, “Look! She belongs to the 
[out-group color] group. She is wearing [out-group color] clothes.”
The next phase of the experiment concerned the presentation of the videos 
(Figure 1.4). Following the model introductions, the child was told that she would 
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see videos of these two models. The only instruction she received was to watch 
the videos. The order of the videos was pseudo-randomized such that the same 
video could not be directly repeated and the same model was not shown more 
than three times in a row. Each video (i.e. behavior) was shown six times, result-
ing in a series of 24 videos in total.
Subsequently, to see whether the novel-group manipulation affected explicit 
preferences, the voice asked three questions. The voice told the child that pic-
tures of the models would be shown (Figure 1.5) and that she would ask the 
child questions to which the child should respond by pointing to one of the two 
models. The child was asked: “Who do you like more?” (question 1), “Who 
would you like to play with?” (question 2), and “Who would you like to have as 
your teacher?” (question 3) in a randomized order. Finally, the voice thanked the 
child for her participation and emphasized that, because the game was over, it 
no longer mattered which group the child belonged to (Figure 1.6).
As in adult mimicry studies, at the end the experimenter checked whether the 
child was aware of her behavior during the experiment. In a funneled question 
sequence (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), children were fi rst asked whether they 
remembered watching the videos and if they remembered what they had done 
while watching. The fi nal and crucial question asked if they had copied the 
behaviors that the models performed.3 In total, the experiment lasted approxi-
mately 10 min.
1.                  3.             5.
         2.                       4.            6.
FIGuRE 1 | Timeline of computerized experiment phases; group membership congratula-
tions (1); baseline game (2); model introductions (3); videos of models (4); explicit prefer-
ence measures (5); group neutralization (6).
3 In study 1, no children reported that they had copied the behaviors.
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Coding and reliability. During the experiment the child was videotaped. 
Children’s behavior was blindly coded for the four target behaviors and their 
visual attention towards the computer screen using the coding scheme of van 
Schaik and colleagues (2013). Coding was carried out using ELAN Linguistic 
Annotator (Lausberg & Sloetjes, 2009). A second observer independently re-
coded 20% (n = 8) of the videos and Pearson’s correlation coefficients ranged 
between r = 0.82 – 1.00 for the behaviors.
Measures. The adult mimicry literature has been inconsistent in how mim-
icry is quantified. Following Hogeveen and Obhi (2012), who reason that the 
percentage of time spent performing a behavior best represents the overall pres-
ence of the behavior during an interaction, we used behavior percentages in 
this study.4 These were calculated per phase of the experiment (i.e. baseline and 
videos) and per condition (i.e. in-group and out-group). This was first calculated 
for each behavior separately, by dividing the amount of time the child performed 
the specific behavior by the duration of time that the child could demonstrate 
the behavior. With respect to the baseline phase, this duration consisted of the 
entire baseline game. For the videos phase, this duration ran from the first time 
the video of that behavior was shown (and visually attended by the participant) 
to the end of the last video. Then, percentages of each behavior were added 
to get the total percentage of time the child performed the behaviors per phase 
and condition.
results
Means and ranges of the behavior percentages are shown in Table 1, keep-
ing in mind that this dependent variable was non-normally distributed and thus 
non-parametric tests were used. In order to first establish whether the children 
mimicked the models, total behavior percentages were compared between the 
baseline phase and videos phase using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Behavior 
percentages were significantly higher during the videos phase than during the 
baseline (z = 2.68, p = .004, r = 0.42). This indicates that children displayed 
mimicry during this experiment, and that this mimicry effect was of a medium 
size. This includes all participants, but it should be noted that only 18 out of the 
40 participants (45%) performed any of the target behaviors during either the 
baseline or the videos phase.
The group manipulation was investigated next. Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
indicated a medium group effect, as in-group percentages were significantly 
higher than out-group percentages during the videos phase (z = 2.17, p = .015, 
4 In both studies, behavior rates (number of behaviors divided by allotted time), also commonly used in adult 
mimicry studies, showed an equivalent pattern of results.
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r = 0.34), but this was not the case during the baseline (p > .250). Indeed, a 
marginally significant interaction was found, as the difference between in-group 
and out-group percentages during the videos phase was bigger than this differ-
ence during the baseline (Wilcoxon signed-rank; z = 1.46, p = .072, r = 0.16).
Furthermore, binomial tests indicate that a higher proportion of children than 
would be expected by chance (0.5) selected their in-group model in answer to 
question 1 (proportion = 0.65, p = .04) and question 2 (proportion = 0.73, p = 
.003). Question 3 did not show a bias (proportion = 0.5).
Finally, control analyses found that there were no differences in the percent-
age of time children visually attended in-group versus out-group videos (paired 
samples t-test, p > .250) and that counterbalancing the behaviors across in-group 
and out-group models was successful (chi-square, p > .250). There were also no 
differences in behavior percentages between the behavior types (i.e. yawning, 
nodding, rubbing, and scratching) within the baseline and videos phases (ps > 
.250; Bonferroni corrected).
TaBLE 1 | Mean and range of behavior percentages per experimental phase and per 
group for study 1 and study 2
      mean range
Study 1          
  Baseline Phase 0.50 0 - 8.09
  Videos Phase 1.14 0 - 9.75
    In-group 0.82 0 - 7.85
    Out-group 0.33 0 - 2.37
Study 2        
  Baseline Phase 1.56 0 - 16.29
  Videos Phase 4.42 0 - 22.27
    In-group 2.81 0 - 17.06
    Out-group 1.61 0 - 9.00
Discussion
As predicted, children displayed behavioral mimicry and did so selectively. 
Children mimicked in-group models significantly more than out-group models, 
and a marginally significant interaction effect between experimental phase and 
social group is indicative of the mimicry effect holding primarily for the in-group. 
Importantly, children’s looking times did not differ between in-group and out-
group videos, hence they did not observe one model’s behaviors more than the 
other’s. Furthermore, the explicit preference questions corroborate the efficacy 
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of the social group manipulation, as on two out of the three questions children 
responded with an in-group preference. The absence of a preference on the third 
question likely reflects variability between children in whether teachers are seen 
as in-group or out-group members.
The pattern of results reflects those of past adult studies. Both Yabar and col-
leagues (2006) and Lakin and colleagues (2008) found in-group effects based 
on pre-existing groups. Thus, not only does this study provide what might be 
the first record of experimentally manipulated social mimicry in children, it also 
suggests that mimicry is sensitive to similar social dynamics during childhood as 
during adulthood. However, in a past study with younger participants, 3-year-
olds’ mimicry was not sensitive to a helper-hinderer manipulation. The authors 
suggested that this could be an effect of the video-based implementation and 
cognitively-demanding nature of the manipulation instead of a lack of selec-
tive mimicry at this age (van Schaik et al., 2013). Hence, it remains uncertain 
whether mimicry is sensitive to social factors earlier during development.
stuDy 2
In the second study, we sought to investigate whether 3-year-olds’ mimicry is 
already sensitive to this preference-based group manipulation. Previous studies 
have indicated that young children’s preference for similar others drive affiliative 
interactions during early childhood and, as a result, children might be particularly 
inclined to copy those who belong to their group (Haun & Over, 2015). Thus, 
the preference-based group manipulation of study 1, in which children receive 
visual reminders of their preferences, might be a more developmentally-relevant 
manipulation of the social dynamics than the cognitive helper-hinderer manipula-
tion of a previous developmental mimicry study (van Schaik et al., 2013). Yet, 
on the basis of the limited existent evidence for mimicry at this age (e.g. van 
Schaik et al., 2013), it could be hypothesized that mimicry, although present at 
three years of age, only develops social sensitivity later during childhood.
method
Participants. Twenty-five 3-year-olds were recruited from a database of vol-
unteer families. Signed consent was received from all guardians. Five children 
were excluded from the analyses: 2 did not attend to at least 50% of the baseline 
or videos, 2 explicitly labeled and demonstrated the target behaviors during the 
videos phase, and 1 reported explicitly copying the behaviors and indeed did 
so. The final sample consisted of 20 3-year-olds (11 girls; Age: M = 40.00, SD 
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= 0.26, Mdn = 40, range = 39.5-40.4 months). During the group allocation, 10 
children (50%) chose yellow. Participants could choose between a book or 10 
Euros as compensation for their participation.
Procedure. The procedure and design were identical to study 1 except for a 
few practicalities. This study was run by only one experimenter and started with 
a warm-up period of coloring or playing with blocks to acclimatize the children 
to the lab. After the child was seated at the computer screen, the experimenter 
went to the other side of a room divider to operate the test computer. Also, the 
guardian was present, but was seated behind the child throughout the experi-
ment. Finally, the third explicit preference question regarding group preferences 
for teachers was not asked because these children did not yet attend school.
Coding and reliability. Video coding and measure calculations were 
identical to study 1. A second observer independently recoded 20% (n = 4) of 
the videos, and Pearson’s correlation coefficients ranged between r = .85 and r 
= 1.00 for the behaviors.
results
A Wilcoxon signed-rank test showed a mimicry effect, as behavior percentages 
were significantly higher during the videos phase than during the baseline (z = 
1.66, p = .048, r = 0.26; see Table 1 for descriptive statistics).
A comparison of in-group versus out-group percentages showed no signifi-
cant differences (Wilcoxon signed-rank, p > .250), indicating that 3-year-olds 
in this study did not show a sensitivity to novel-groups in their mimicry behavior. 
Descriptively, while 6 children mimicked in-group over out-group models, 8 
mimicked out-group models more than in-group. This flat distribution illustrates 
that there was also no general trend towards in-group mimicry and that the 
non-significant effect is likely representative. Furthermore, the participants did 
not show a bias in their answers to the two explicit preference questions (both 
questions’ in-group response proportions = 0.45).
As a control, a chi-square test confirmed that counterbalancing of behavior 
types across in- and out-groups was successful (p > .250). Behavior types did not 
differ from one another in occurrence within the baseline nor within the videos 
phase (ps > .10; Bonferroni corrected).
Fourteen out of the 20 participants (70%) displayed at least one of the tar-
get behaviors during the experiment (i.e. baseline and/or videos phase). As 
an explorative measure of the effect of the experimental design on both age 
groups’ behavior, this proportion was compared between the two age groups. 
A chi-square test showed a significant difference in proportions between the 
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3-year-olds (study 2; 70%) and the 4- to 6-year-olds (study 1; 45%; χ2(1, N = 
60) = 3.35, p = .034).
Discussion
In study 2, 3-year-olds mimicked the models, but their mimicry was not affected 
by the social manipulation. This pattern of results reflects that of a previous study 
with the same age, which also found that the children mimicked but did not do 
so selectively in the context of a helper-hinderer manipulation (van Schaik et al., 
2013). Together, these findings suggest that experimentally manipulated social 
dynamics are not yet affecting mimicry at this age.
Notably, though, the efficacy of the manipulation should be considered. In 
agreement with their mimicry, this sample’s explicit preferences were also not 
sensitive to a novel-group manipulation. In a previous study, 3-year-olds, though 
only as part of an older sample, showed an in-group bias for novel groups. How-
ever, in that study the groups were instated for several weeks (Patterson & Bigler, 
2006). This provided the children with extensive experience belonging to their 
group, which stands in contrast to the 10-minute duration of the present experi-
ment. Still, the children in the present study could have used the models’ colors 
as indicators of the models’ preferences, since the children had gotten to choose 
their own color. Anecdotally, several 3-year-olds indeed explicitly emphasized 
the similarities; for example, during the in-group model introduction one child 
exclaimed, “I am also wearing yellow clothes!” However, preference studies in-
dicate that in the years leading up to effective minimal group manipulations (e.g. 
at 5 years of age; Dunham et al., 2011; Plötner, Over, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 
2015), preference-based liking is still sensitive to relevancy (Fawcett & Markson, 
2010b; Mahajan & Wynn, 2012). At three years of age, children did not prefer 
similar others if the similarity was based on a more arbitrary dimension, such 
as sticker color, whereas children did prefer to play with those who shared a 
toy preference (Fawcett & Markson, 2010b). Thus, the color-based preferences 
in the current study, although more concrete that pure assignment as in minimal 
group paradigms, might not have been a relevant marker for 3-year-olds.
general DisCussion
In these two studies, we investigated how behavioral mimicry develops dur-
ing early childhood. Three- and 4- to 6-year-olds displayed mimicry, as they 
performed the behaviors for a significantly greater percentage of time while 
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watching the videos than during a baseline, yet only 4- to 6-year-olds’ mimicry 
was sensitive to a preference-based novel-group manipulation.
These studies provide developmental evidence for behavioral mimicry analo-
gous to that recorded in adults. Mimicry in the adult literature is distinguished 
from imitation in that it occurs outside of awareness (Chartrand & van Baaren, 
2009). The present paradigm ensured that children were neither instructed nor 
encouraged to copy the models’ behaviors. Furthermore, those children who 
later reported that they had copied the behaviors and those who labeled or 
clearly demonstrated the behaviors to their parents during the experiment were 
excluded from the analyses. The adult behavioral mimicry also occurs for many 
different behaviors (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013) and this too is reflected in the 
mimicry across behavior types in this developmental sample. Hence, the present 
research measures a type of copying behavior that is distinct from the previous 
forms recorded in the developmental literature (see also van Schaik et al., 2013).
Importantly, the findings demonstrate that mimicry can be sensitive to social 
factors during early childhood. The older age group examined in study 1 was 
sensitive to the group manipulation and, correspondingly, selectively mimicked 
the in-group. The younger age group in study 2 did not show a group-based 
liking effect nor did they mimic selectively, though they did mimic in general. 
Thus, the development of social mimicry seems to be closely intertwined with 
the development of social cognition. Although the 3-year-olds were not explicitly 
sensitive to the group manipulation, it was also not the case that their explicit 
preferences were sensitive to it but that it was not reflected in their mimicry or 
vice versa. Tentatively, this consistency between explicit liking and mimicry in 
both age groups can inform theories of mimicry development.
The pattern of results highlights two factors of social-cognitive development 
that might influence behavioral mimicry development. First, the increased social 
sensitivity found between study 1 and 2 might be a function of a broaden-
ing social awareness and desire to belong. Around the ages of four and five, 
children are increasingly able to abstract interpersonal similarities, imitation 
and relationships to categorize not only their own but third-party affiliations 
(Over & Carpenter, 2015; Shutts et al., 2013). Thus, in a broad sense, as 
children become increasingly sensitive and aware of subtle social markers, this 
will be reflected in their behavioral mimicry. With respect to the current study, the 
relatively minimal though preference-based group manipulation may only have 
been effective in influencing the older age group’s mimicry as only this group 
was developmentally sensitive to the manipulation to begin with.
This social component might be supplemented by a second factor of social-
cognitive development, namely the increasing behavioral control during early 
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childhood (Carlson, 2005). Behavioral control plays a role in regulating copying 
in adults (Brass, Ruby, & Spengler, 2009; Hamilton, 2015; Heyes, 2013) and 
interpersonal coordination during early childhood (Meyer et al., 2015). Hence, 
behavioral control is thought to help regulate who does (e.g. in-group members) 
and does not (e.g. out-group members) get mimicked (Heyes, 2013). Although 
behavioral control was not explicitly assessed in this experiment, a quantifica-
tion of whether children performed any behaviors throughout the experiment 
(i.e. baseline and/or videos phases) provides a general measure of the extent 
to which children were regulating their overt behaviors during the experiment. 
A significantly lower proportion of 4-6-year-olds performed any behavior dur-
ing the experiment than the proportion of 3-year-olds, suggesting that the older 
children were regulating their behavior (i.e. inhibiting overt behaviors) more 
than the younger children. Since the older children, but not the younger children, 
mimicked selectively, it could be the case that this increased behavioral regula-
tion in the older children contributed to the selectivity of their mimicry. However, 
future research will need to test this regulatory function directly.
Even though the design of this study was successful in eliciting and modu-
lating mimicry, the results might have been limited by the arguably artificial 
nature of the setup. A video-based experiment was chosen because it provided 
a controlled means of exposing children to two models and helped maximize 
attention (e.g. as opposed to a live interaction where objects divert children’s 
attention away from their interaction partner). Looking times were indeed satis-
factory, as only 4 children across studies needed to be excluded for that reason. 
However, it might be the case that the aforementioned age group difference in 
the proportion of children who displayed any of the behaviors throughout the 
experiment and the low occurrences of mimicry in general (though cf. Yabar 
et al., 2006), can be attributed to the experimental design. Particularly for the 
older age group, the computer setting at school likely led children to think they 
were supposed to sit still, even though this was not instructed, eliciting extra 
behavior regulation. Furthermore, an individual (i.e. the model in the present 
studies) would need to be able to perceive that she is being mimicked in order 
for it to have a communicative function. There are indications that 2-year-olds 
are already sensitive to this nuance, as they imitate responsive models (through 
CCTV) more than unresponsive models (in prerecorded videos; Nielsen et al., 
2008). Hence, perhaps the general mimicry effects would be stronger in the 
4- to 6-year-olds and the social dynamics more salient to the 3-year-olds in a 
well-designed, attention-grabbing live interaction setup. Taken together, future 
work should address these points, building on the basis provided by these two 
studies.
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In conclusion, during early childhood children start to act like little chame-
leons by using mimicry to blend in (or stand out from) their social environment. 
As the first study to show social mimicry in young children, this research provides 
previously missing contributions to theories on social mimicry (Bavelas, Black, 
Lemery, & Mullett, 1986; Lakin et al., 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2012) and the 
development of social behavior copying (Over & Carpenter, 2012, 2013).
4This study investigated the roles of social-cognitive factors on 5-year-olds’ behav-ioral mimicry. Two groups of children were tested; the experimental group (n=28) observed a kind and an unkind adult perform face and hand rubbing behaviors while telling stories, whereas the control group (n=23) did not. Children’s inhibi-tory control was assessed using the day-night task and their social understanding was measured through a parental questionnaire. While the experimental group performed the behaviors signifi cantly less than the control group (i.e. a negative mimicry effect), inhibitory control predicted children’s selective mimicry of the kind versus unkind adult. Additionally, overall mimicry was positively correlated with social understanding. These results indicate separate roles of inhibitory control and social understanding in the development of social mimicry.
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The characteristics of social interactions are continuously developing during 
early childhood. As children’s cognitive skills improve and social experiences 
expand, children become increasingly able to regulate, plan, and coordinate 
with interaction partners (Endedijk, Cillessen, Cox, Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; 
Meyer et al., 2015; Meyer, van der Wel, & Hunnius, 2016). Importantly, such 
interaction behaviors foster beneficial social consequences, such as peer ac-
ceptance, liking, and sharing (Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, & Tomasello, 
2011; Ladd, 1999; Plötner et al., 2015). However, whereas task-related interac-
tion behaviors have been the primary subject of study, the early development 
of implicit social behaviors that likely also constitute a part of this interaction 
repertoire remains uncertain. Behavioral mimicry is an implicit behavior thought 
to develop during early childhood, but how social and cognitive development 
contribute to the emergence of mimicry, and hence mimicry’s role in early social 
interactions, is unknown.
Behavioral mimicry occurs when interaction partners copy each other’s 
meaningless behaviors (e.g. rubbing one’s face or bouncing one’s foot up and 
down) without being explicitly aware of doing so (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). 
Adult studies suggest that mimicry is affected by the social dynamics of an inter-
action (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013). In experimental paradigms, participants tend 
to mimic their interaction partner and like their interaction partners more if they 
mimic them back (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Moreover, if participants want to 
affiliate with their interaction partner, and especially when they have failed to af-
filiate during a preceding cooperation task, they mimic their interaction partners 
more (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2008). The opposite has also been 
documented; if participants do not like their interaction partner, they tend not to 
mimic them but instead seem to decrease their own executions of the behaviors 
performed by their disliked interaction partner (Yabar et al., 2006). This “nega-
tive mimicry” (Yabar et al., 2006) is in line with the notion that typical, affiliative 
interactions entail a certain level of behavioral mimicry, implying that deviations 
of too much or too little mimicry can have disaffiliative effects (Kouzakova, Kar-
remans, van Baaren, & Knippenberg, 2010; Kouzakova, van Baaren, et al., 
2010; Leander et al., 2012). Consequently, the increase in mimicry to affiliate 
and overcome exclusion on the one hand and the negative mimicry of disliked 
individuals on the other hand suggest that mimicry, and the lack thereof, subtly 
communicates (dis)affiliation during our daily interactions.
There is some evidence that young children already display behavioral 
mimicry. In three separate samples, children performed meaningless behaviors, 
such as cheek scratching and mouth rubbing, significantly more while observing 
a female video model do so than during a baseline period. While 3-year-olds’ 
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mimicry was unaffected by social manipulations (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016; 
van Schaik et al., 2013), 4-6-year-olds primarily mimicked in-group models (van 
Schaik & Hunnius, 2016). This developmental pattern suggests that during early 
childhood the propensity to mimic becomes more and more a product of the 
social dynamics of the interaction. It has been put forth that the development of 
mimicry into the implicit social behavior found in adult interactions is a function 
of a broadening social understanding and improvements in inhibitory control 
(van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016).
As children’s social experiences increase during early childhood, so too does 
their social understanding. This is not only reflected in classic measures of social 
perspective taking but is also evident from children’s socially selective copying 
behaviors and sensitivity to social norms. A range of false-belief tasks show 
steady improvement between the ages of two and six (Hughes & Ensor, 2007; 
Wellman & Liu, 2004). Individual differences in performance on such social 
perspective taking tasks are largely stable, and task performance predicts later 
peer acceptance (Caputi, Lecce, Pagnin, & Banerjee, 2012; Hughes & Ensor, 
2007). Awareness of the social dynamics of interactions is further evident in 
children’s imitative interaction behaviors. Similar to adult mimicry findings, 5- to 
6-year-olds imitate in-group members more after being excluded from this group 
(Watson-Jones et al., 2016). Correspondingly, particularly 5-year-olds, but to a 
lesser degree 4-year-olds, display contrasting instead of imitative behaviors in 
response to out-group members’ behaviors (Oostenbroek & Over, 2015). Chil-
dren’s explicit understanding of social norms also becomes more influential on 
their own behaviors with age. While toddlers are already sensitive to receiving 
an unequal share of resources and tend to equally share resources themselves 
when all else is equal, it is not until middle childhood that children can overcome 
preferences for resources and interaction partners to enforce the social norm 
of sharing on their own sharing behavior (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016; LoBue, 
Nishida, Chiong, DeLoache, & Haidt, 2011; Smith et al., 2013). In this regard, 
increasing social understanding might be related to the emergence of socially 
sensitive interactive behaviors such as mimicry. Indeed, in adults, mimicry is 
related to social understanding, as individuals who score higher on perspective 
taking mimic more (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & Lakin, 2013).
Alongside a growing social understanding, young children are increasingly 
able to regulate their behaviors. A spectrum of inhibitory control tasks show 
significant improvements between the ages of 2 and 6 years of age (Carlson, 
2005). This increasing inhibitory control seems to directly influence children’s 
interaction skills, as during joint actions inhibitory control is related to children’s 
accuracy in turn-taking (Meyer et al., 2015). With respect to behavioral mim-
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icry, these developmental improvements in inhibitory control could be related 
to the social sensitivity of children’s mimicry that is seen in 4- to 6-year-olds 
but not 3-year-olds (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016). Hence, it could be the case 
that, given a level of social understanding that ensures that a child is sensitive 
to the social interaction context in general, a child’s inhibitory control helps her 
regulate mimicry such that she is socially selective in who she mimics.
Taken together, behavioral mimicry is a facet of social interactions through 
which (dis)affiliation is communicated. Although there is evidence to suggest 
that mimicry develops during early childhood, it is unclear how social-cognitive 
factors contribute to the emergence of social mimicry. In the current study, we 
aimed to investigate naturalistic social mimicry during early childhood and the 
influences of inhibitory control and social understanding on children’s mimicry. 
To this end, we designed a partially live behavioral mimicry paradigm amicable 
to the use of a social manipulation.
The setup entailed two female experimenters; the first shared one of two stick-
ers with the child (i.e. the sharer) while the second decided to keep both stickers 
for herself (i.e. the keeper). After this social manipulation, children observed a 
video in which each experimenter told the child a story. Stories were used as a 
means of maintaining the children’s visual attention towards the experimenters 
while minimizing the use of objects that could distract children away from the 
experimenter. This combination of live interaction and videos was beneficial for 
several reasons. The social manipulation was live so that it would be experienced 
as a meaningful interaction for the children and to guarantee that children knew 
that the experimenters were real individuals, making affiliation possible. The 
videotaped stories ensured that experimenters did not implicitly act more friendly 
to some children, controlled the amount of behaviors children were exposed to, 
and kept the duration of the coded mimicry period constant.
To test mimicry, two groups of participants were used. The experimental 
group observed the experimenters display behaviors while telling the stories, 
whereas for the control group the experimenters told stories without display-
ing these behaviors. This between-participants baseline method ensured that 
experimental order did not influence behavior prevalence, as the timing of when 
during the experiment separate baseline and experimental periods occur could 
influence behavior prevalence due to extraneous factors such as fatigue or initial 
shyness. Also, arousal during social interactions, particularly in the context of 
a social manipulation, could be higher than during nonsocial baselines (Yabar 
et al., 2006), hence this method kept social arousal constant across baseline 
and experimental measures. Furthermore, a between-participants design also 
ensured that participants could not experience a contrast of a to-be-mimicked 
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behavior being absent or present during the stories as would be the case in a 
within-participants design (Emanuel, 2012).
Social understanding was measured with the short version of the Children’s 
Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) filled in by the accompanying parent (Tahi-
roglu et al., 2014). This scale was selected as it encompasses multiple aspects 
of social understanding, such as understanding emotions and desires, and 
concerns everyday examples making it more ecologically valid than a standard 
verbal false-belief task (Tahiroglu et al., 2014). Inhibitory control was assessed 
at the end of the experiment using the day-night task (Carlson, 2005; Gerstadt, 
Hong, & Diamond, 1994; Montgomery & Koeltzow, 2010). The day-night task 
requires participants to inhibit a prepotent response, for example the association 
between the sun and the concept day, in favor of an opposing response, saying 
day when seeing a moon picture (Gerstadt et al., 1994).
This design allowed us to test four hypotheses. First, it was hypothesized that, 
overall, children would display behavioral mimicry, as evident in higher behav-
ior occurrences in the experimental group than in the control group. Second, it 
was expected that children would mimic sharers but not mimic, or negatively 
mimic, keepers. Third, the selectivity of children’s mimicry (i.e. the difference 
between mimicry of the sharer and mimicry of the keeper) was hypothesized to 
be a product of inhibitory control, given a certain level of social understanding. 
Fourth, social understanding was expected to be related to children’s overall 
mimicry.
methoD
participants
Thirty-two 5-year-olds (60.6 to 61.8 months; 15 girls) participated in the ex-
perimental condition. Two children were excluded prior to data analysis: one 
because the child’s hands were not visible in the video recording and one 
because the child had a cast on his arm. An additional two participants’ data 
was excluded during data preparation (see Measures section below). The final 
experimental group consisted of 28 children (Age: M = 61.29, SD = 0.37 
months; 14 girls). However, three children’s day-night scores were scored as 
missing: one because the child did not want to complete the task, and two due 
to parental help during the task.
Twenty-nine 5-year-olds (60.4 to 61.9 months; 15 girls) participated in the 
control condition. Five were excluded prior to data analysis; one child had put 
the sticker on their hand and played with it throughout the session confounding 
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the coding of the hand rub behavior, one had to use the restroom during the 
story session, one was unable to hear the stories well, one child’s behavior could 
not be coded due to a corrupt video file, and for one child it could not be ruled 
out that they were mimicking their parent throughout the session. One additional 
participant’s data was excluded during data preparation (see Measures section 
below). The final control group consisted of 23 children (Age: M = 61.03, SD 
= 0.10 months; 10 girls).
Participants were recruited from a database of volunteer families representa-
tive of the middle-sized Western European city the research was conducted in. 
All parents gave signed informed consent before participation. Children were 
thanked for their participation with either a children’s book or 10 euros. Ad-
ditionally, children received a sticker during the social manipulation that they 
could keep.
materials
Experimenters. Two female experimenters ran the experiment for all 
participants (see Figure 1). To maximize children’s ability to identify which 
experimenter was which, one experimenter always wore a white T-shirt, had 
her hair loose, and sat on the left side of the table (from the child’s point of 
view), while the other always wore a black T-shirt, had her hair in a braid, wore 
glasses, and sat on the right.
Lab setup. The child sat across from the two experimenters and their parent 
sat next to them to the side. A projector was setup up such that videos could be 
projected on a white wall directly behind where the experimenters sat. Speakers 
were placed on the ground below the projected area. Each experimenter had a 
small box with two stickers and a laminated photograph of themselves on their 
side of the table. Parents were provided with a clipboard with an overview of 
the procedure and the CSUS. Two unobtrusive synchronized cameras recorded 
the session and could be monitored in an adjacent room.
Stimulus videos. The stimulus videos, displayed via the projector during 
the experiment, showed the two experimenters sitting side-by-side in the same 
manner as during the live interaction (i.e. each experimenter on her respective 
side with the same attire and appearance; Figure 1). Two types of videos were 
recorded. In the ‘introduction videos’, one of the two experimenters announced, 
“Hey, we are sitting here now.” There were two versions of the introduction 
video, one in which the experimenter on the left spoke and one in which the 
experimenter on the right spoke. Both experimenters were smiling and looking 
towards the camera. In the ‘story videos’, the experimenters took turns telling a 
“Jip and Janneke” story by Annie M. G. Schmidt. The experimenter on the left 
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always told a story about sewing seeds and the experimenter on the right told 
a story about picking flowers. While one experimenter told the story, the other 
experimenter looked at her. Both stories were supplemented with four pictures 
that the storytelling experimenter held up to the camera in order to maintain 
children’s attention.
  A             B
FIGuRE 1 | Still frames from story videos. A: Experimental condition: the experimenter on 
the left is performing the hand rub behavior while telling her story and the experimenter on 
the right is performing the face rub. B: Control condition.
In the experimental condition, each experimenter carried out one behavior 
nearly continuously (as is typical of adult mimicry experiments, see Figure 1.A; 
e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; Lakin et al., 2008), both while telling the story and while listening to 
the other tell the story. In other words, both behaviors were shown throughout 
the story session, one by one experimenter (e.g. face rubbing) and the other 
by the other experimenter (e.g. hand rubbing; counterbalanced). The face rub 
consisted of the experimenter freely rubbing her hand over her mouth and chin 
and scratching her cheek (right and left hands were used interchangeably). The 
hand rub consisted of the experimenter rubbing her hands over one another, 
rubbing her wrists, and interlocking fingers. Behaviors were not carried out by 
either experimenter while the storytelling experimenter was showing a picture. 
In the experimental condition there were four versions of the story videos, as 
dictated by the four combinations of experimenter order (i.e. first or second) and 
experimenter’s behavior (i.e. face rub or hand rub); each participant observed 
one of these versions.
In the control condition, there were two versions of the story video to counter-
balance across participants, as no behaviors were carried out (i.e. experimenter 
1 tells story first, experimenter 1 tells story second; see Figure 1.B). On average, 
story videos were 5.5 min in duration, with each story taking up about half of 
that time.
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procedure
Upon arrival at the lab, the child drew a picture while the experimenters ex-
plained the procedure to the parents and showed interest in what the child 
was drawing by asking questions and complimenting their work. Following this 
warm-up period, the so-called sticker game (i.e. social manipulation) started. 
One experimenter (counterbalanced) would open a small box on their side of 
the table, take out two stickers, and exclaim, “Look! I have two stickers! Wow, 
these are nice. Look a [picture on sticker, e.g. cat] and a [picture on sticker, e.g. 
dinosaur]. Wow, these are nice. Do you like them too?” At this point, the child 
was given the opportunity to answer (all children indeed said they liked the 
stickers). The experimenter then said, “Well, because I like them so much, I will 
share them with you. Which one would you like?” Once the child had chosen a 
sticker, the experimenter put the other sticker down in front of herself and said, 
“Look, now we both have a sticker!” The other experimenter then repeated this 
procedure, with the exception that, after asking the child if he/she liked the 
sticker the experimenter said, “Well, because I like them so much, I will keep 
both stickers for myself.” The experimenter proceeded to place both stickers in 
front of her.
Next, the ‘sharer’ gave a little box to the child to put their sticker in so that the 
child would not have the sticker in her hands during the rest of the experiment. 
Both experimenters also put their stickers back into their boxes. The sharer then 
announced that she would have to go to the other room but that she would leave 
a photograph of herself behind and proceeded to place the photograph facing 
the child on the table before leaving. After the sharer got up, the ‘keeper’ did 
the same.
Once the experimenters had left, the parent asked the child, “If you could 
play another game with one of these two ladies, with who would you want to 
play? Her or her?” Parents were free to point to the photos of the experimenters 
and had been instructed to repeat the question until the child made a choice.
Following this, the introductory video was played via the projector. Parents 
were instructed to move their child’s chair back from the table at this point. This 
was done so that children would not be leaning on the table nor be able to grasp 
objects on the table, and to ensure that children’s hands would be visible for 
offline coding. Once the child was situated, the story video was played. Which 
experimenter spoke in the introductory video, which experimenter first started to 
tell their story, and, in the experimental condition, which behavior was carried 
out by which experimenter, was counterbalanced across participants. Parents 
were asked to fill in the CSUS while their child watched the story videos.
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After the stories, the sharer came back into the room and carried out the 
day-night task with the child. The session was concluded with the keeper also 
coming back into the lab. In a funneled debriefing, the keeper asked the child 
if she had noticed anything while watching the videos and, in the experimental 
condition, whether she had noticed if the experimenters carried out face rubs or 
hand rubs. To ensure that the child could identify the experimenters, the keeper 
asked from whom they had gotten a sticker and from whom they had not (all 
participants were indeed able to correctly identify the sharer and keeper). The 
keeper then apologized for not sharing, saying that it was not a very kind thing 
to do and offered to make up for it by letting the child choose a gift (i.e. the 
children’s book or money).
measures
Video recordings were used to code children’s visual attention, face rubs and 
hand rubs during the story session, which was performed blind to sharer identity 
and sharer’s and keeper’s behaviors. For both groups, the percentage of the 
story time that a child carried out a behavior was calculated for both behavior 
types separately. Before further measure calculations, behavior percentages 
were checked for outliers above 3 SDs from the mean per behavior, per group. 
This led to the exclusion of two participants from the experimental group and 
one from the control group.
Behavior measure calculations are displayed in Table 1. Within the experi-
mental group, each child’s behavior percentages (i.e. face percent and hand 
percent) were divided by the control group’s average behavior percent of the 
corresponding behavior, providing behavior ratios. The same was done for the 
sum of both behaviors to obtain a measure of total mimicry. If a child from 
the experimental group’s ratio is above 1, the child performed the behavior(s) 
more than the control group did on average, while if it is below 1, the child 
performed the behavior(s) less than the control group’s average. The calculation 
of behavior ratios allowed for comparisons within the experimental group while 
correcting for possible general differences in face rubbing and hand rubbing 
prevalence (as measured in the control group). In other words, this allowed us 
to collapse across the counterbalancing of face and hand behaviors to test the 
difference in the mimicry of the sharer versus the keeper. A measure of selective 
mimicry was calculated per experimental participant by subtracting the keeper 
ratio from the sharer ratio, providing a difference score indicating how much 
more (positive values) or less (negative values) the sharer was mimicked than the 
keeper. Assumptions of statistical tests were checked first and non-parametric 
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analyses were used when needed. All reported p-values are two-tailed unless 
stated otherwise.
TaBLE 1 | Behavior measure calculations
measure group Calculation Comparison
Behavior Percentages experimental 
control
time spent carrying out behavior / 
time watching story videos
Hypothesis 1: 
experimental vs. control 
group
Face rub percent
Hand rub percent
Behavior Ratios experimental Behavior % / control group’s mean 
behavior%
Intermediate measure
Face rub ratio
Hand rub ratio
Social Ratios experimental behavior ratios split into sharer’s and 
keeper’s behaviors (dependent on 
counterbalancing)
Hypothesis 2: sharer vs. 
keeper ratiosSharer ratio
Keeper ratio
Selective Mimicry experimental sharer ratio - keeper ratio Hypothesis 3: relation 
inhibitory control and 
selective mimicry
Total Mimicry Ratio experimental Σ behavior %s /control group’s mean
Σ behaviors %s
Hypothesis 4: correlation 
social understanding and 
total mimicry
 
Control Comparisons
To ensure that the two groups of participants did not differ in social-cognitive 
development, the inhibitory control and CSUS scores were compared. There 
were no differences between the experimental and control groups in their day-
night task score nor their CSUS score (ps > .20).
The time children spent watching the videos was near ceiling in both the 
experimental and control groups, as on average children watched respectively 
99.14 and 98.45 percent of the story session. In the experimental group, there 
was no significant difference between how much of the sharer’s story children 
watched and how much of the keeper’s story (p > .25). This is an important 
comparison as it indicates that potential differences in the mimicry of the sharer 
and keeper were unlikely to be a simple effect of having seen one storyteller’s 
behavior more than the other’s. The control group, though, looked significantly 
longer at the keeper’s story (M = 99.63, SD = 1.30% of story attended) than 
the sharer’s story (M = 97.28, SD = 5.85% of story attended), t(22) = 2.17, p 
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= .04. Yet, the primary reason for conducting this control analysis, namely to 
ensure that one storyteller’s behavior was not observed more than the other’s, 
does not hold for this group as they did not observe the storytellers perform 
behaviors. Additionally, all behavior percentages were calculated by dividing 
the total duration of behaviors that started while the child was attending by the 
duration of time that the child was attending to the screen, thus eliminating the 
influence of looking time on the control group’s behavior percentages.
Binomial tests were used to test whether the social manipulation affected 
children’s explicit preference to play with either the sharer or the keeper. In both 
groups, the observed proportions of children who selected the sharer (experi-
mental group = .59; control group = .41) and keeper (experimental group = 
.41; control group = .59) did not differ significantly from chance (i.e. 50%; ps 
> .40).
results
To test the first hypothesis that the experimental group mimicked the storytell-
ers, the experimental group’s face rubbing and hand rubbing percentages 
were compared with those of the control group. For both behaviors, the control 
group performed the behaviors for a significantly higher percentage of time 
than the experimental group and these effects were of a medium effect size (see 
Figure 2.A). A Mann-Whitney U test revealed that the experimental group (Mdn 
= 0.34%) rubbed their face significantly less than the control group (Mdn = 
1.61%), U = 209.5, z = -2.20, p = .028, r = .31. Likewise, hand rubbing was 
significantly lower in the experimental group (Mdn = 4.04%) than in the control 
group (Mdn = 10.75%), U = 200, z = -2.33, p = .02, r = .33. This effect re-
mained significant for both behaviors when the ten children of the experimental 
group who reported having noticed one or both of the behaviors were excluded; 
face rubbing: U = 119, z = -2.370, p = .018, r = .37, hand rubbing: U = 118, 
z = -2.36, p = .019, r = .37. As an exploratory measure, face rubbing and 
hand rubbing percentages were compared within the control group to test for 
differences in the natural prevalence of these behaviors in 5-year-olds. A paired-
samples t-test indicated that hand rubbing (M = 12.32%) occurred significantly 
more often than face rubbing (M = 2.88%), t(22) = 3.97, p = .001, r = .65.
The second hypothesis was tested within the experimental group; behavior 
ratios of the sharer’s behavior were compared with those of the keeper to in-
vestigate social (negative) mimicry (see Figure 1.B). A Wilcoxon signed rank 
test indicated that, contrary to expectation, there was no significant difference 
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between sharer ratios (Mdn = 0.07) and keeper ratios (Mdn = 0.30), z = -1.43, 
p = .153, r = .27. Instead, sharer ratios (z = -4.35, p < .001, r = .82) and 
keeper ratios (z = -3.24, p = .001, r = .61) were significantly lower than 1, as 
tested with one-sample Wilcoxon signed rank tests. Thus, on a group level, both 
the sharer’s and the keeper’s behaviors were suppressed.
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FIGuRE 2 | Mimicry and social mimicry box plots. A: Experimental and control groups’ 
face and hand rub percentages. Behavior percentages indicate the percentage of the story 
session that children performed the behavior. B: The experimental group’s sharer ratio and 
keeper ratio. Behavior ratios indicate the proportion of the experimental group’s behavior 
percentages relative to the control group’s mean behavior percentage.
Third, the hypothesized effect of inhibitory control on selective mimicry (i.e. 
sharer minus keeper ratios) and the hypothesized moderation of this effect by 
social understanding were investigated using a linear regression with a modera-
tor. A linear regression model with the day-night score as the predictor yielded 
a model that significantly predicts selective mimicry (Table 2). Adding social 
understanding as a moderator of inhibitory control’s effect on selective mimicry 
did not significantly improve the model. The direction of the relation suggests 
that the better a child’s inhibitory control, the smaller (i.e. more negative) the 
difference between sharer and keeper behavior ratios (Figure 3).
The fourth hypothesis entailed the relation between social understanding and 
how much children mimicked overall. There was a marginally significant positive 
correlation between children’s score on the social understanding scale and the 
total mimicry ratio (i.e. the summed behavior percentages relative to the control 
group’s behavior percentages) indicating that the higher children’s social under-
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standing, the more they performed the behaviors (Table 3). To investigate the 
specificity of the relation between social understanding and total mimicry, the 
correlation between inhibitory control and total mimicry was tested and found 
to not be significant (p > .25). Indeed, a comparison of the correlations (Lee & 
Preacher, 2013) indicated a near significant difference between the correlation 
of total mimicry and social understanding and the correlation of total mimicry 
and inhibitory control, z = 1.63, pone-tailed = .052.
TaBLE 2 | Regression model inhibitory control and selective mimicry
    B se B β r2
Step 1
  Constant 0.884 0.457    
  Day-Night -0.089 0.036 -.460* 0.211
Step 2
  Constant 0.865 0.457    
  Day-Night -0.088 0.036 -.460*  
Social Understanding Moderator 0.249 0.245 .188 0.247
*p = .021; Step 2: ΔR2 = 0.035, p = .32
0
4
8
12
16
-2.5 -1.5 -0.5 0.5 1.5 2.5
D
a
y-
ni
gh
t n
 c
or
re
ct
Keeper > Sharer Sharer > Keeper
Selective Mimicry
r = -.46
FIGuRE 3 | Relation between inhibitory control and selective mimicry.
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TaBLE 3 | Correlation matrix of developmental factors and total mimicry ratio
     total mimicry ratio Day-night
CSUS (n = 28) .328* .039
Day-Night (n = 25) -.134 -
Spearman’s rho, *p < .088
DisCussion
The aims of this study were to investigate 5-year-olds’ social behavioral mimicry 
in a naturalistic interaction and to explore the developmental factors contributing 
to this behavior. After a live social interaction in which a child interacted with a 
kind individual, an experimenter who shared a sticker, and an unkind individual, 
an experimenter who kept stickers for herself, children observed these two experi-
menters each tell a short story. During the story session, the experimental group 
observed the experimenters rub their face and hands, while the control group did 
not see these behaviors. Following the stories, children completed the day-night 
task as a measure of inhibitory control. Parents’ evaluations of their child’s social 
understanding were collected through the CSUS. There were four comparisons 
of interest: (1) behavior percentages in the experimental versus control groups 
to test for (negative) mimicry, (2) sharer versus keeper ratios to examine social 
mimicry effects, (3) the influence of inhibitory control on children’s selective 
mimicry of the sharer over the keeper, and (4) the relation between children’s 
social understanding and how much they (negatively) mimicked overall.
First, we investigated whether children displayed behavioral mimicry overall. 
The percentage of time children spent face rubbing and hand rubbing was 
compared between the two groups. Significant suppression was found for 
both behaviors; children in the experimental group, those who observed the 
experimenters perform behaviors, performed face and hand rubbing less than 
the control group. Importantly, this effect cannot be explained as a consequence 
of participants noticing the behaviors, as the findings held when the participants 
who reported noticing the behaviors during the debriefing were excluded from 
the analyses. Thus, overall, there was evidence for negative mimicry, with chil-
dren seemingly refraining from these behaviors when they observed others carry 
them out.
The medium effect sizes of this suppression suggest that the findings are 
not spurious; instead, the sole difference between the experimental and control 
groups’ experience during the experiment, namely the presence or absence of 
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the experimenters’ behaviors during the stories, seems to have caused a con-
siderable difference in the two groups’ behavior. Yet, it is unclear why there 
would be an overall decrease in behaviors, since previous decreases in mimicry 
have been related to the social characteristics (Yabar et al., 2006). It could be 
the case that the presence of the to-be-mimicked behaviors subtly influenced 
the “interaction” dynamics in the experimental group to a degree of decreas-
ing affiliation and thereby reducing affiliative mimicry. Live interactions are in 
constant flux, with both partners mutually adjusting to the other (Kendon, 1970). 
In this video-based design, though, the storytellers could not act contingently on 
the children’s behavior in any way. Resembling a context with too little mimicry 
(Leander et al., 2012), this lack of any contingency might have served as a 
disaffiliative signal towards the child (see Catmur & Heyes, 2013), possibly 
reducing their mimicry behaviors as a result. Yet, this speculative interpretation 
warrants further investigations, as previous mimicry studies have successfully 
utilized video-based methods before (e.g. Emanuel, 2012; Lakin & Chartrand, 
2003; van Baaren, Horgan, Chartrand, & Dijkmans, 2004; Yabar et al., 2006).
Alternatively, the suppression effects might have been a consequence of 
the high behavior prevalence in the control group. Here, the storytellers did 
not perform any manual actions and, as was the case for the experimental 
group, they could also not act contingently on children’s behaviors through 
other means. Perhaps this relatively motionless storytelling contrasted too much 
with the dynamic live sticker game preceding the stories, making the children 
uncomfortable, causing them to fidget more, and, hence, thereby also perform 
the target behaviors more. However, past adult work in support of this design 
contradicts this point. In a nonsocial one-minute baseline preceding the experi-
ment, behavior rates were three times higher than those of a matched baseline 
group like that used in the present study (Emanuel, 2012).
Interestingly, hand percentages were higher than other behavior percentages 
in a previous developmental mimicry study. In that study, 4- to 6-year-olds’ base-
line and mimicry percentages of different face rubbing and non-manual behav-
iors combined was in the order of a few percent (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016), 
much like the face rubbing found in the present study. This low occurrence of the 
behaviors matches the lower bound of adult studies (e.g. Cheng & Chartrand, 
2003). Yet, in the present study, hand rubbing percentages were significantly 
higher than face rubbing percentages in the control group. These differences in 
behavior percentages indicate the importance of behavior type; from the control 
group’s behaviors, it seems that face rubbing is only occasionally performed 
by 5-year-olds while hand rubbing is a more natural behavior in a story telling 
situation. This suggests that mimicry studies should utilize behaviors that children 
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typically carry out in order to establish whether children mimic (or suppress) 
these behaviors during interactions. A previous adult study demonstrated the 
usefulness of such an approach. As opposed to the classic face touching and 
foot bouncing behaviors used in the majority of the mimicry literature, different 
behaviors were selected. While no mimicry of behaviors chosen purely on the 
basis of participant self-reports was found, cheek rubbing and ear touching 
selected based on participant observation did result in significant mimicry ef-
fects (Emanuel, 2012). Thus, although contrary to expectations, the suppression 
effects found in this study provide meaningful information regarding children’s 
social interaction behaviors. Future studies should investigate which behavior 
types are applicable to a developmental demography.
The second comparison tested whether children’s (negative) mimicry was 
affected by the social manipulation. It was hypothesized that children’s behavior 
ratios for the sharer would be significantly higher than those for the keeper. In 
addition, it could be predicted that particularly sharer ratios would be higher 
than 1, as this would indicate more behavior in the experimental group than 
in the control group (i.e. mimicry), while keeper ratios could be lower than 1, 
indicating less behavior in the experimental than control group (i.e. negative 
mimicry). However, no difference was found between sharer and keeper ratios. 
Moreover, both sharer and keeper ratios were significantly lower than 1, indicat-
ing that children suppressed their behaviors for both experimenters.
A negative mimicry effect has been previously documented in an adult study 
in which the more participants disliked the confederates the more negative mim-
icry they displayed. Yet, liked participants were mimicked (Yabar et al., 2006). 
In addition to the earlier discussed possible influences on total mimicry effects, 
the lack of group-level differences between the sharer and keeper in the present 
study could be due to the keeper’s inconsistent behavior. During the warm-up 
period, the keeper and sharer interacted to an equal and positive extent with the 
child, and later, following the sticker game, the keeper appeared to cooperate 
with the sharer by sitting next to her and telling the child a story. This might 
have caused children to reason about why the keeper kept both stickers leading 
them to overlook this unkind act and still want to affiliate. It could also have 
lead children to feel ostracized by this otherwise kind individual thereby pos-
sibly increasing affiliation goals (e.g. Watson-Jones et al., 2016; Watson-Jones, 
Legare, Whitehouse, & Clegg, 2014). In these situations, children would hold 
affiliation goals with both the keeper and sharer, thus explaining why there was 
no difference in children’s negative mimicry of the two experimenters.
Whereas the explicit liking measure did not show a significant preference 
for the sharer, this finding in itself does not necessarily indicate that the social 
Chapter 478
manipulation was not understood by the children. The phrasing of the preference 
measure, namely asking the child with whom they wanted to play if they could 
play another game, might have been interpreted differently in the context of this 
experiment than in previous experiments in which it was deemed understand-
able for children of this age (van Schaik, Endedijk, Stapel, & Hunnius, 2016). 
At the end of the experiment, several children reasoned that they selected the 
keeper to try to get the sticker from her, indicating that the question might have 
been interpreted as a repetition of the sticker game. Thus, the liking measure 
was not a sensitive measure of children’s true preferences. Indeed, all children 
could correctly identify the keeper at the end of the experiment, so there is little 
reason for children not to have been sensitive to fairness, an effect demonstrated 
in several past studies (Chernyak & Sobel, 2016; LoBue et al., 2011; Paulus, 
Gillis, Li, & Moore, 2013; Smith et al., 2013). However, the lack of social 
effects on children’s (negative) mimicry, as well as the overall negative mimicry 
effects, remains up for debate. It could be the case that the use of behavioral 
mimicry in interactions, and particularly its sensitivity to social dynamics, is still 
developing during early and middle childhood. Hence, whereas some strong 
social effects already influence mimicry on a group level at the age of five, such 
as group boundaries (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016), more subtle or intricate 
social dynamics might only appear in implicit social interactive behaviors later 
during development.
Evidence in favor of a prolonged developmental trajectory of social mimicry 
comes from the third analysis, entailing the effect of inhibitory control on selec-
tive mimicry. Even though there were no statistically significant social effects on 
the group level, individual differences within the groups could still have affected 
children’s selective mimicry. Accordingly, we investigated whether inhibitory 
control influences selective mimicry and whether this effect is moderated by 
children’s social understanding. In a regression analysis, inhibitory control sig-
nificantly predicted selective mimicry, but the addition of social understanding 
as a moderator did not improve the predictive power of the model. The model 
indicates that the more inhibitory control a child had, the more negative the 
difference between sharer and keeper ratios was. In other words, while children 
with lower inhibitory control would generally suppress the sharer’s behavior less 
than the keeper’s (i.e. mimic the sharer more), children with higher inhibitory 
control would overall suppress the keeper’s behavior less than the sharer’s (i.e. 
mimic the keeper more). This relation suggests that, if possible based on their 
inhibitory control, children influenced their behaviors in favor of the keeper, in 
line with the keeper-affiliation goals discussed above. Furthermore, these results 
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imply that using mimicry to display affiliation, particularly towards unkind others 
such as sticker keepers, requires some level of behavioral control.
Finally, there was a marginally significant correlation between social under-
standing and total mimicry in the hypothesized direction; the higher children’s 
social understanding, the more behaviors they carried out. In other words, the 
children with higher social understanding scores were also generally the chil-
dren who suppressed their behaviors less, and a few would even be said to have 
mimicked as their total mimicry ratios were above 1. This relation was specific 
to the CSUS score, as inhibitory control was unrelated to how much children 
mimicked overall. This is in line with the idea that a general understanding of 
social interactions and the individuals in those interactions is important for the 
display of affiliative behaviors. That is, it seems as if through increasing social 
experience and understanding, children’s interactive behaviors become increas-
ingly multifaceted. These results and those of the predictive relation of inhibitory 
control on the social sensitivity of mimicry suggest that distinct developmental 
factors influence the emergence of behavioral mimicry in children’s social inter-
actions and their specific social implementation of it.
Arguably, though, the range of the CSUS scores might have limited the 
strength of the effects of social understanding. The CSUS scale ranges from 1 to 
4 but the lowest individual score in the present sample was 2.5 meaning that no 
participant scored in the lower half of the scale. This lack of spread might also 
have limited the statistical sensitivity of finding the hypothesized moderator role 
of CSUS on inhibitory control’s influence on selective mimicry. Yet, interestingly, 
whereas typical false-belief tasks are related to inhibitory control (Carlson & Mo-
ses, 2001; Carlson et al., 2002; Hughes & Ensor, 2007; Mcalister & Peterson, 
2013), there was no correlation between the CSUS and the day-night task in this 
study. Thus, this measure was successful in capturing a distinct developmental 
factor, though its range was limited. Future research should investigate individual 
differences and their effects on mimicry in more diverse samples and different 
age groups to better understand the relations identified in this study.
In conclusion, this study was designed to measure naturalistic social mimicry 
in young children and investigate the effects of developmental factors on mim-
icry’s emergence. Only suppression, or negative mimicry, effects were found, 
regardless of the social identity of the interaction partner. On an individual level, 
though, inhibitory control predicted the amount of suppression of a sharer’s ver-
sus keeper’s behaviors. Additionally, social understanding was related to how 
much children mimicked overall. Thus, this study provides the first evidence that 
the social behavioral mimicry as seen in adults is the product of unique contribu-
tions of social and cognitive factors. Furthermore, the novel design presented 
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here provides a naturalistic yet controlled means through which to investigate 
behavioral mimicry from toddlerhood to middle childhood. This study opens the 
door for further investigations into the development of mimicry in early and also 
later childhood, the social contexts in which negative mimicry occurs, and the 
roles of behavior regulation and social understanding in the development of 
social interactive behaviors.

5From early childhood onwards, individuals use behavior copying to commu-nicate liking and belonging. This nonverbal signal of affi liation is especially relevant in the context of social groups and indeed both children and adults copy in-group more than out-group members. Given the societal importance of inter-group interactions, it is imperative to understand the mechanistic level at which group modulations of copying occur early in development. The current study was designed to investigate the effect of novel group membership on young children’s motor behavior during a simultaneous movement-observation and -execution task. Four- to six-year-olds (n = 65) fi rst gained membership to one of two novel groups based on their color preference and put on a vest in their chosen color. Subsequently, they were instructed to draw a straight line back-and-forth on a tablet computer that was concurrently displaying a stimulus video in which a model moved her arm congruently or incongruently to the child’s instructed direction. In half of the stimulus videos the model belonged to the in-group, while in the other half the model belonged to the out-group, as identifi ed by the color of her dress. The deviations into the uninstructed di-rection of the children’s drawings were quantifi ed as a measure of how much observing the models’ behaviors interfered with executing their own behaviors. The motor interference effect, namely higher deviations in the incongruent trials than in the congruent trials, was found only for the out-group condition. An additional manipulation of whether the models’ arms followed a biological or non-biological velocity profi le had little effect on children’s motor interference. The results are interpreted in the context of the explicit coordinative nature of the task as an effect of heightened attention towards interacting with an out-group member. This study demonstrates that already during early childhood, novel group membership dynamically infl uences behavior processing as a function of interaction context.
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Copying the behaviors of others occurs in many forms and plays a fundamental 
role in early social-cognitive development (Jones, 2009; Marshall & Meltzoff, 
2014; Over & Carpenter, 2013; Paulus, 2014). Imitative play guides toddlers’ 
everyday interactions with adults (Killen & Uzgiris, 1981) and peers (Eckerman & 
Peterman, 2004; Nadel, 2002). By the age of two, children’s copying behavior 
is sensitive to the social availability of an adult model (Nielsen, 2006; Nielsen & 
Blank, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2008). This social sensitivity increases during early 
childhood (Over & Carpenter, 2012), as early preferences for similar others 
(Fawcett & Markson, 2010b; Haun & Over, 2015; Mahajan & Wynn, 2012) ex-
pand to encompass even arbitrary distinctions to demarcate groups (Buttelmann 
& Bohm, 2014; Dunham et al., 2011; Plötner et al., 2015). By the age of five, 
children mimic and imitate the behaviors of novel in-group members more than 
out-group members (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016; Watson-Jones et al., 2016) 
and children use information about who copies whom to infer interpersonal 
affiliations (Over & Carpenter, 2015). These social effects of copying are not 
confined to childhood; the bi-directionality between copying those you like and 
liking those who copy you plays an important, often implicit role in adulthood 
(Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; Lakin, 2013). Hence, throughout the lifespan, but 
already starting during early childhood interactions, behavior copying is an 
essential means of communicating similarity and belonging (Heyes, 2013; Lakin 
& Chartrand, 2013; Over & Carpenter, 2012).
Underlying behavior copying is a neurocognitive coupling between observ-
ing and executing actions (Hamilton, 2015; Heyes, 2013; Molenberghs et al., 
2009; Paulus, 2014). Ontogenetically, this ‘mirror system’ is shaped through 
both observational and active experience (Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014), making 
it a dynamic product of an infant’s social environment (Heyes, 2010, 2013). 
Additionally, adult neuroimaging studies indicate that mirror system activation 
is modulated by social group membership. Mirror system and related activa-
tion triggered by the observation of actions has been found to be higher when 
the individual performing the action is an in-group member than an out-group 
group member, both for pre-existing and novel groups (Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; 
Molenberghs, 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2013; Rauchbauer et al., 2015).
However, the period in-between forming observation-execution associations 
during infancy and the mirror system’s social sensitivity in adulthood is under-
studied. During the preschool years, the complexity of the social environment in 
which young children execute and coordinate their behaviors expands and so-
cial groups increasingly play a role in daily interactions (Eckerman & Peterman, 
2004; Rubin, Bukowski, & Parker, 2006). Considering the social communicative 
function of copying behaviors reviewed above (Over & Carpenter, 2012), it is 
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imperative to understand social, and particularly group, modulations of copying 
on a mechanistic level during early childhood.
The motor interference task (Kilner et al., 2003) provides a versatile behav-
ioral measure of observation-execution associations and their modulators. This 
task, though importantly not a direct measure of neural mirror system activation, 
is based on the notion that if observing a behavior and executing a behavior 
elicit overlapping representations, then doing both simultaneously could cause 
interference (Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Kilner et al., 2003). In the original study, 
participants moved their arm back-and-forth in a straight line either horizontally 
or vertically while concurrently observing a confederate performing the same 
movement in the congruent or incongruent direction. As expected, in the incon-
gruent trials, participants’ movement paths showed significant deviations into the 
direction of the uninstructed axis compared to both congruent trials and baseline 
trials without concurrent observation. Conditions with a robotic arm instead of 
a human confederate, though, elicited no interference in the participants’ move-
ments, which the authors interpreted as an indication that the task is especially 
sensitive to biological movements (Kilner et al., 2003).
In a developmental adaptation of the task, Marshall and colleagues (2010) 
had four-year-olds draw straight lines back-and-forth in either horizontal or verti-
cal movements on a tablet computer screen using a stylus. At the same time, 
the screen was displaying a video of an adult female standing upright and 
moving her arm in either the congruent or incongruent direction. Like adults, the 
children in this study experienced motor interference (Marshall et al., 2010). 
As an initial exploration of the contribution of social factors on children’s motor 
interference, the experiment was then repeated with two different models. In a 
within-participants design, 4.5-year-olds performed the task atop stimuli of either 
a same-aged boy or an adult male. The children experienced interference in the 
peer condition but the interference effect for the adult model disappeared. The 
authors place the findings in the context of a “like me” framework, emphasiz-
ing the social relevance of similar individuals (Marshall et al., 2010). Yet, it is 
unclear whether the “like me” effects were driven by social factors, since the 
peer was a possible friend, or biological factors, since the participants’ own 
arm movements were more similar to the peer’s movements due to their similar 
body proportions. Thus, although laying the groundwork, this study’s results do 
not uniquely identify whether social factors influence young children’s motor 
interference.
A following developmental study investigated the influence of movement 
profile more closely (Saby et al., 2011). In a similar tablet version of the task, 
4- to 5-year-old children drew atop a bear puppet moving with a biological or 
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non-biological movement profile. The puppets had previously been animated or 
not during a story telling session. Contrary to expectations, though, motor inter-
ference was found for the biologically-moving previously-unanimated condition 
and non-biologically-moving previously-animated condition. The authors inter-
preted these results as an attentional effect of expectation violations that resulted 
from a mismatch between movement profile and animacy (Saby et al., 2011). 
Taken together, while these two developmental studies (Marshall et al., 2010; 
Saby et al., 2011) demonstrate the usability of the task with young children, the 
data are inconclusive as to the distinct influences of social and biological factors 
on children’s motor interference.
The current study was designed to investigate the influences of social and bio-
logical factors on young children’s motor interference more directly. Importantly, 
given the central role of social groups in young children’s copying behaviors as 
reviewed above, as well as the aforementioned evidence suggesting a specific 
influence of social groups on adults’ mirroring, we implemented a novel group 
manipulation. This provided a developmentally relevant manipulation and al-
lowed us to measure the sensitivity of copying mechanisms to group processing 
effects without confounding the groups with past group experience or familiar-
ity (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). By explicitly labeling group belonging and 
exposing the children to repeated interactions (i.e. trials) with in- and out-group 
models, the groups remained salient throughout the experiment. Addition-
ally, by independently manipulating the movement profile (i.e. biological vs. 
non-biological) of in- and out-group models, we could isolate the influence of 
biological factors. Consequently, a 2 (congruency) by 2 (group membership) by 
2 (movement profile) within-participants design was used.
It was expected that the motor interference effect would be replicated, by 
finding higher deviations into the uninstructed drawing direction in incongruent 
than congruent conditions. Also, interactions of both group membership and 
movement profile with congruency were expected. Observing in-group members 
was hypothesized to lead to greater interference effects than observing out-
group, in line with higher copying rates of in-group than of out-group members 
(van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016). Following the adult motor interference literature 
(Kilner et al., 2007), it was hypothesized that biological movements would 
lead to more interference than non-biological movements. Finally, an interaction 
between congruency, movement profile and social group was expected in the 
direction of in-group biological trials showing the most interference.
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materials anD methoDs
participants
Seventy children (35 female) participated at two primary schools in the Nether-
lands. Two children did not complete the experiment. The data of 3 children was 
at two or more standard deviations from the mean (see also Data preparation) 
and was excluded from the final analyses. The final sample consisted of 65 
4- to 6-year-olds (M = 63.85, SD = 7.27 months; 33 female). Signed informed 
consent was acquired from the guardian prior to participation. The schools 
could choose their preferred type of compensation: one school opted for each 
child receiving a sticker post-participation and the other school opted for a book 
voucher for the classrooms. This research was approved by the local social 
science faculty’s ethics committee.
stimuli
Stimulus videos displayed one of three female models (A, B, and C) from the 
waist up. The baseline stimulus (used for both the practice trials at the beginning 
of the experiment and baseline trials halfway through the experiment, see also 
Procedure) consisted of a video recording of model A wearing a green dress 
and standing still. In this manner, the baseline stimulus only differed from the 
experimental stimuli in the absence of arm movements, thus controlling for other 
factors such as body sway. In the experimental stimuli, the model (B, C; Figure 
1) was wearing a blue or red dress. The model moved her arm vertically or 
horizontally back and forth. The biological movement stimuli were recorded at 
25 frames per second. Loops (consisting of one back-and-forth movement) were 
selected for their straightness and how well they matched the other model’s and 
direction’s (i.e. vertical and horizontal) speeds. These loops were then repeated 
back-to-back such that one stimulus video showed 10 repetitions of the loop 
(note: this was also done for the baseline stimulus with a segment of 1.5 sec). The 
non-biological movement stimuli consisted of compiled photographs (frame rate 
= 25) in which the model’s arm did not follow a typical biological velocity profile 
of slowing down at the returning points. Instead, the model’s arm position shifted 
10 degrees between every two pictures, resulting in a triangular velocity profile. 
Stimulus videos lasted on average 16.6 s (range 15.9-18.0). The models’ dress 
colors (i.e. blue and red) were digitally edited, such that a full counterbalancing 
of model identity (i.e. models B and C) and color was possible.
Both stimulus display and the acquisition of data were performed with Pre-
sentation software (www.neurobs.com) on a tablet computer (Asus Eee Slate). 
The stimuli were cropped to be square (720 x 720 pixels; 146 x 146 mm on the 
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tablet screen). A hard plastic sheet with an opening overlaying the area of the 
screen where the videos were played was placed over the tablet screen, to limit 
the area on which children could draw to precisely the square dimensions of the 
video. The stylus’ position on the screen was acquired at 100Hz.
procedure
At the start of the experiment, the child was asked to draw a picture in Microsoft 
Paint in order to familiarize her with the stylus and tablet computer. Once the 
child had finished the drawing (or after 2 min), the experimenter started the 
experiment on the tablet computer. First, the colors red and blue appeared on 
the left and right sides of the screen (counterbalanced), and the child was asked 
to tap the stylus on the color they liked more (49% of the sample chose blue). 
The experimenter congratulated her on her choice and told her that she now 
belonged to that group. The child was given a vest to wear in the chosen color 
and the experimenter emphasized the group membership by exclaiming, “Wow! 
Now you are completely [chosen color], great!”
A practice session followed in which the baseline stimulus was shown twice, 
once as a horizontal practice and once as a vertical practice (order counter-
balanced). The practice trials and all subsequent experimental and baseline 
trials followed the same procedure; before each stimulus, the screen was black 
while the experimenter instructed the child to draw a straight line back-and-forth 
either from side to side (horizontal) or top to bottom (vertical). The experimenter 
ensured that the child was holding the stylus at an appropriate starting position 
prior to starting the stimulus video (e.g. on the top or bottom of the screen 
for vertical trials, or at the left or right side of the screen for horizontal trials). 
Children were instructed to draw for the duration of each video (i.e. on average, 
16.6 s of drawing per stimulus).
Following the two practice trials, the experimenter introduced the child to 
the two group models. A neutral picture of each model was shown for 7 s, ac-
companied by the experimenter’s explanation, “Look! She (also) belongs to the 
[color] group. She is (also) wearing [color] clothes.” The child was then informed 
that she would be seeing videos of these models and would have to draw lines 
like in the practice trials.
During the experimental trials, the experimenter instructed the child as for 
the practice trials; the experimenter instructed which direction to draw in and 
ensured the child held the stylus at an appropriate location while the screen was 
still black before each stimulus video started. The factors congruency (congruent 
vs. incongruent), movement profile (biological vs. non-biological), and group 
membership (in-group vs. out-group) were fully balanced within each child’s ran-
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domization of experimental trials (i.e. 8 trials). Whereas direction drawn was 
counterbalanced within participants, direction observed was counterbalanced 
across participants; each child drew half of their trials horizontally and half 
vertically, but always saw either vertical or horizontal videos.5 Halfway through 
the experimental trials (i.e. after 4 trials), the child took a break from working 
on the tablet by playing a game of Memory for a few minutes. After the break, 
two baseline trials (i.e. one vertical and one horizontal; order counterbalanced) 
were performed using the baseline stimulus following the same procedure as 
the practice and experimental trials. This was followed by the remaining 4 
experimental trials.
At the end, explicit preferences were measured by showing the neutral pic-
tures of the two models on either side of the screen. The experimenter asked two 
questions in a randomized order (question 1: Who do you like more?; question 
2: Who would you like to play with?) and the child responded by tapping 
the picture of the model she preferred. Before bringing the child back to the 
classroom, the experimenter thanked the child and emphasized that because the 
game was over, the groups no longer mattered.
A            B
FIGuRE 1 | Still frames of two stimulus videos illustrating different conditions. An example 
participant’s drawings from a congruent (A) and incongruent (B) trial is overlaid in black. 
Note: the stylus did not leave a line on the screen during the experiment.
5 In a pilot, a full counterbalancing of models’ movement direction (i.e. 16 trials) proved too long in duration for 
this age group.
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Data preparation
Motor interference was measured per trial as the standard deviation of all 
the sampled locations where the screen was touched in the uninstructed axis 
throughout the trial (Marshall et al., 2010; Saby et al., 2011). To account for 
individual variability in drawing ability, this was divided by the same measure 
(i.e. the standard deviation in the uninstructed axis) from the corresponding 
(i.e. horizontal or vertical) baseline trial, resulting in a ‘deviation ratio’. Across 
participants, baseline outliers were first calculated per direction drawn at two or 
more standard deviations from the mean. Subsequently, outliers in the deviation 
ratios were calculated per condition per direction drawn also at two standard 
deviations. Outlying trials were excluded on a trial-by-trial basis and only 3 
participants did not contribute any trials to the analyses.
results
First, the efficacy of the social group manipulation was tested. Explicit pref-
erences were analyzed with a binomial test per question. The proportion of 
children who chose their in-group model in response to the question who they 
would like to play with (observed proportion = .70) was significantly higher than 
would be expected by chance (i.e. 0.50; p = .002). In response to the question 
regarding which model the children liked more, the proportion of children who 
chose their in-group model did not differ from chance (observed proportion = 
.54, p = .615). As a control, a chi-square analysis verified that the models were 
counterbalanced across participants in representing in- and out-group members 
(p > .250).
A linear fixed-effect model by means of maximum likelihood estimation was 
used. The model was performed on the deviation ratios with the factors congru-
ency, social group, and movement profile (full-factorial; Figure 2) and direction 
drawn as a covariate. There was a significant main effect of congruency, F(1, 
385.81) = 17.12, p < .001, r = .21, with deviation ratios in the incongruent 
conditions (M = 1.21, SE = .031) being higher than in the congruent conditions 
(M = 1.05, SE = .024). No main effects of movement profile nor social group 
were found. Conversely, there was a two-way interaction between congruency 
and social group, F(1, 389.36) = 7.24, p = .007, r = .14, and a three-way in-
teraction between congruency, movement profile and social group, F(1, 396.72) 
= 4.10, p = .044, r = .10.
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FIGuRE 2 | Mean deviation ratios per condition. Deviation ratios were calculated by 
dividing the standard deviation in the uninstructed direction by the standard deviation in the 
uninstructed direction from the corresponding baseline trial. Error bars indicate standard 
errors of the mean.
The interactions were tested further by repeating the analysis for the in-group and 
out-group conditions separately. For the in-group analysis there were no significant 
effects (congruency main effect: p = .143, all other ps > .250). The out-group 
analysis indicated a main effect of congruency, F(1,195.43) = 19.42, p < .001, 
r = .30. Deviation ratios for incongruent out-group trials (M = 1.28, SE = .049) 
were significantly higher than those for congruent out-group trials (M = 1.02, SE 
= .032). The interaction between congruency and movement profile did not reach 
significance (p = .175, r = .10). With respect to the original three-way interaction, 
Figure 2 and the lack of any effects within the in-group suggest that this interaction 
was partially driven by the higher difference between incongruent and congruent 
trials in the biological out-group conditions (difference = .339) than in the non-
biological out-group conditions (difference = .178). In sum, significant interference 
effects were found in the out-group condition but not in the in-group condition and 
no significant effects of movement profile were found.
DisCussion
In this study, the effects of novel group membership and movement profile on 
4- to 6-year-olds’ motor interference were investigated. Participants performed 
Children’s Motor Interference 93
5
back-and-forth movements either congruently or incongruently with respect to an 
in-group or out-group model’s movement direction. The expected motor interfer-
ence effect was replicated, as incongruent conditions differed significantly from 
congruent conditions. This effect was only present for the out-group condition 
and did not occur for the in-group condition. Although there was also an interac-
tion with movement profile, the effect of whether the models moved biologically 
or non-biologically was minimal.
An explicit measure indicated that the group allocation was effective in elicit-
ing an in-group preference. Whereas the abstract question regarding liking did 
not show an in-group bias, the concrete question of whether children would like 
to play with the in-group or out-group model did show a significant in-group 
preference within the sample. This is in line with other studies using the same 
questions, in which the concrete question shows stronger effects with this age 
group (van Schaik & Hunnius, 2016). This finding indicates that the out-group 
modulation of the interference effect, although opposite to expectation, holds 
bearing.
Initially, more motor interference was expected to occur for in-group mem-
bers than for out-group members. Since motor interference is an effect of ac-
tion observation-execution coupling, and this, in turn, is thought to contribute 
to behavior copying, it was expected that the motor interference would reflect 
the general finding that we (unintentionally) copy individuals we like more 
than individuals we like less (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013; van Schaik & Hun-
nius, 2016). In favor of this underlying mechanism, a range of adult studies 
provide evidence for motor interference, under controlled circumstances, being 
a measure of action observation-execution coupling (e.g. Kilner et al., 2007) 
and for social modulations of mirror system activation (Molenberghs, 2013). 
However, in contrast to adult motor interference studies in which social factors 
are carefully controlled or discrete instances of mimicking an interaction partner’s 
behavior, the present continuous-action measure was embedded in an explicitly 
instructed social context. As a result, an additional overlaying process involving 
task-related social motivations likely influenced the underlying mechanisms, and 
hence influenced the behavioral effects more strongly. For instance, the explicit 
emphasis on the social groups and the continuous nature of the movements 
might have led children to experience the task as an instance of coordination 
(Richardson, Campbell, & Schmidt, 2009); like other instances of coordination 
such as dancing together, participants were carrying out a similar, continuous 
behavior in the same space as the models. And since interpersonal coordination 
is a means of establishing liking and affiliation between individuals (Hove & 
Risen, 2009; Lakin, 2013), additional social goals might have complicated the 
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group manipulation’s effect. Here, the out-group motor interference might have 
been caused by heightened attention towards the out-group model as a result of 
a need to overcome intergroup differences in what might be experienced as an 
affiliative, spatially coordinative task.
Two recent studies have found analogous results to those of the present study. 
In a motor interference study, adults saw pro-social words (e.g. ‘group’) or anti-
social words (e.g. ‘alone’) superimposed on the screen displaying the model. 
Contrary to expectation, the anti-social word condition led to higher motor inter-
ference than the pro-social condition. One of the authors’ interpretations of the 
findings holds that the anti-social condition threatened the “social harmony” of 
the interaction leading to increased attempts to affiliate with the model through 
increased coordination (Roberts et al., 2016, p.7). Likewise, in a study using 
novel groups, adult participants who performed a repetitive rhythmic interaction 
with an out-group member spontaneously synchronized more than those who 
interacted with an in-group member. The authors similarly interpreted these find-
ings as an effect of overcoming the inter-group differences, paralleling findings 
of synchrony being used to increase affiliation (Miles, Lumsden, Richardson, & 
Macrae, 2011). In sum, the out-group interference effect observed in the present 
study might be a result of increased processing of the out-group member’s move-
ment stemming from a desire to overcome the differing group memberships.
Notably, though, variants of this account could lead to the same effects. 
Group boundaries can be perceived as competitive, even in the absence of 
explicit competition (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). Hence, the inter-group dif-
ferences that in a cooperative case lead to increased affiliation attempts as 
discussed above (Miles et al., 2011), in another case might lead to wanting 
to appease a threat through affiliation (Rauchbauer et al., 2015), or in yet a 
third, more distinct case, could lead to enhanced monitoring of a competitor to 
facilitate prediction of their potentially dangerous behavior (Cikara & Van Bavel, 
2014; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013). Each case, though, would lead to increased 
processing of out-group movements. With respect to this study, one could argue 
that because children were brought into close contact with a potential threat 
(i.e. an out-group member), the enhanced interference effect was a result of 
increased vigilance of the out-group’s movement. However, this seems less likely 
for several related reasons. Threat effects in adults have primarily been found for 
existing groups and less so for novel group boundaries, which is likely caused by 
novel group manipulations leading to in-group preferences but not necessarily 
out-group derogation (Brewer, 1999; Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). Also, explicit 
competition leads to considerably more intergroup hostility than simply dividing 
individuals into groups (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014). Indeed, considering the 
Children’s Motor Interference 95
5
age of the current study’s participants, these latter considerations are particularly 
relevant; novel-group-based out-group hate appears to develop between the 
ages of 6 and 8 (Buttelmann & Bohm, 2014), hence at a later age than the 
participants in the current study. Nonetheless, the out-group motor interference 
finding illustrates the complexity of social manipulations in combination with 
interpersonal tasks and indicates that this dynamic interplay of factors should be 
investigated further (Cikara & Van Bavel, 2014; Roberts et al., 2016).
Regarding the movement profile, only a limited effect on interference was 
found, and this was within the already-salient out-group condition. While past 
adult studies using a full-body paradigm have found higher interference in biologi-
cal movement conditions (Kilner et al., 2007), a previous developmental study 
using a similar tablet-based design as the present study also found unexpected 
effects with respect to movement profile (Saby et al., 2011). Notably, in the tablet 
adaptation of the task used in this and past developmental studies, the similarity 
between the participants’ and models’ movements is reduced as compared to 
full-body paradigms. In the present stimuli (and in the past study’s puppet stimuli 
reported in Saby et al., 2011, though the puppets are anatomically less similar 
than the present study’s human models) the models make full shoulder-initiated 
arm movements that cross the midline as in the original adult paradigm but the 
participating children are asked to make unilateral movements with their wrists 
and hands in a precision pen-grip. As a result, the extent to which executing their 
action and observing the model’s action elicit overlapping representations is 
limited, hence reducing the motor interference effect. Our attempt to make wrist 
and hand configuration more similar between participant and model by having 
the model hold a pen in her hand seems to have produced insufficient overlap. 
Additionally, the aforementioned social task demands which led to increased 
saliency of the out-group condition, possibly diminished attention towards less 
salient features of the videos (i.e. the kinematic differences) reducing the overall 
influence of the movement profile manipulation even more. Yet, since within the 
out-group condition the pattern tended towards biological trials leading to more 
interference than non-biological trials, the interference that was measured is also 
not merely a spatial congruency effect. Taken together, the degree to which the 
observed action and the executed action overlapped, and the saliency of the 
different characteristics of the stimulus (e.g. social group vs. movement profile) 
likely diminished the extent to which the movement profile manipulation affected 
children’s motor interference.
In conclusion, this study investigated the sensitivity of children’s motor 
interference to group membership and movement profile. Motor interference 
was only found for out-group members’ movements. This effect likely stems from 
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heightened attention towards out-group members as a result of the coordinative 
nature of this explicitly instructed paradigm. Thus, this work demonstrates that 
the context of an interpersonal interaction uniquely interacts with the situation’s 
social dynamics, and consequently this interplay affects underlying imitative pro-
cesses. Future research should continue to investigate how social factors affect 
copying mechanisms during early childhood, as it is crucial in understanding 
inter-group interactions.

6Mimicry of others’ postures and behaviors forms an implicit yet indispensable component of social interactions. However, whereas numerous behavioral stud-ies have investigated the occurrence of mimicry and its social sensitivity, the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms remain elusive. In this study, single pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation was used to measure corticospinal facilitation during a naturalistic behavior observation task adapted from the behavioral mimicry literature. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants’ right hands were measured as they observed stimulus videos of a confederate describing photographs. MEPs were recorded while confederates were and were not car-rying out hand and leg behaviors that also differed in spatial extent (i.e. large behaviors: face rubbing and leg crossing; small behaviors: fi nger tapping and foot bouncing). Importantly, the cover task instructions required participants to focus on the confederates’ photograph descriptions in order to later perform a recognition test. A general arousal effect was found, with higher MEPs during stimulus video observation than during a fi xation-cross baseline, regardless of whether or not the confederate was carrying out a behavior at the time of the pulse. Additionally, MEPs during observation of the larger two behaviors were signifi cantly higher than the smaller two behaviors, irrespective of effector. Thus, by utilizing a controlled yet naturalistic paradigm, this study suggests that gen-eral sensorimotor arousal during social interactions could play a role in implicit behavioral mimicry.
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During social interactions, individuals mimic their interaction partners’ postures 
and otherwise-meaningless behaviors. Behavioral studies indicate that this 
phenomenon occurs largely outside of awareness yet is closely intertwined with 
the social dynamics of the interaction (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013). The social sensitivity of mimicry suggests that it plays an important 
role in social interactions and deviations in the occurrence of mimicry might be 
indicative of social cognitive disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (Duffy 
& Chartrand, 2015; Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Thus, investigating the neuro-
cognitive mechanisms of behavioral mimicry can contribute to our knowledge of 
implicit social processes relevant for daily interactions. However, only a handful 
of studies have started to address naturalistic behavioral mimicry from a neuro-
scientific vantage point (Hogeveen, Obhi, et al., 2015; Hogeveen, Chartrand, 
et al., 2015; van Ulzen et al., 2013).
The behavioral mimicry literature has advocated the “perception-behavior 
link” as the basic mechanism underlying the behavior (Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999; Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009) and suggests that the phenomenon is un-
derpinned by “mirroring” mechanisms (for a review see Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 
2010). A myriad of human cognitive neuroscience studies have demonstrated 
that observation of another individual performing an action activates one’s own 
motor system, a process referred to as sensorimotor simulation (Chong, Cun-
nington, Williams, Kanwisher, & Mattingley, 2008; Fadiga, Rizzolatti, Fogassi, 
& Pavesi, 1995; Kilner, Neal, Weiskopf, Friston, & Frith, 2009; Mukamel et 
al., 2010; for reviews see Caspers et al., 2010; Fox et al., 2016). Similarly, 
behavioral studies inspired by the “common coding approach” have shown 
that action perception and action execution are mutually interdependent (Prinz, 
1997). For instance, in response compatibility paradigms (RCPs), interference 
in motor performance of movements occurs when concurrently-observed move-
ments are incongruent to those being carried out (Brass et al., 2001, 2000; 
Kilner et al., 2003).
However, these studies were not designed to capture the implicit, communica-
tive nature of behavioral mimicry. For instance, in RCP tasks, although referred 
to as a laboratory version of behavioral mimicry (Heyes, 2011), participants are 
prepared to perform the simple, pre-defined target actions that they simultane-
ously observe. This experimental approach is fundamentally different from the 
unpredictable and open-ended nature of mimicry. It might be argued that some 
neuroimaging studies alleviate this problem by using passive observation of 
actions. This is often the case in single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(spTMS) measuring corticospinal facilitation. In such paradigms, an individual’s 
primary motor cortex (M1) is stimulated with a magnetic pulse and motor evoked 
Chapter 6102
potentials (MEPs) are recorded using electromyography (EMG) from the muscle 
controlled by that region of M1 (Fadiga et al., 2005, 1995). This method has 
provided evidence for time-locked, effector-specific sensorimotor simulation; 
MEPs are higher during passive observation of someone else performing an ac-
tion with the same effector as the effector being targeted on the participant’s M1 
than during the observation of a static hand or a baseline (Alaerts, Swinnen, & 
Wenderoth, 2009; Borroni, Montagna, Cerri, & Baldissera, 2005; Gangitano, 
Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2001; Romani, Cesari, Urgesi, Facchini, & Aglioti, 
2005; Strafella & Paus, 2000). Still, such studies use simple stimuli displaying 
single effectors and, importantly, lack an interactive context, limiting the transla-
tion of these findings to natural contexts.
In an attempt to start bridging this gap, van Ulzen and colleagues (2013) 
utilized an spTMS approach to measure sensorimotor simulation in a mimicry-
like paradigm. Participants observed an actor performing clerical tasks whilst 
either touching his face or not, and spTMS pulses occurred during face touching 
in the face-touch condition and at moments the actor was not moving his hands 
in the no-face-touch condition. Higher MEPs were recorded in the face-touch 
videos than in the no-face-touch videos and baseline, providing the first evidence 
for the feasibility of using MEP techniques in combination with noisier, more 
naturalistic stimuli (van Ulzen et al., 2013). However, the stimulus videos en-
tailed non-interactive observation, leading to two main limitations. First, contrary 
to what happens during social interactions, the task of remembering the order of 
clerical chores still required participants to focus on the actor’s motor behavior 
rather than on communication with an interaction partner. Second, the stimuli 
themselves did not yet capture the dynamics of a typical social interaction includ-
ing eye contact and information exchange.
The aim of the current study was to investigate whether a well-controlled MEP 
paradigm that reflects natural interactions and is amiable to a communicative 
cover task can be applied to investigate the role of sensorimotor simulation 
in behavioral mimicry. Building on the methodology used in previous spTMS 
studies on sensorimotor simulation, we wish to test whether behavioral mimicry 
leads to effector-specific increases in sensorimotor excitability during naturalistic 
action observation. To this end, we adapted a photograph description cover task 
commonly used in behavioral mimicry experiments (Lakin, 2013). Participants 
were informed that the study concerned the neural underpinnings of memory and 
communication between two individuals. In the stimulus videos, the confederates 
(thought to be past participants) described photographs to the participant while 
concurrently performing predefined behaviors typical of the mimicry literature. 
The participant’s task was to listen to the descriptions to be able to subsequently 
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identify the photographs in a recognition task. spTMS was used to elicit MEPs of 
the participants’ right index and little fingers while participants were viewing the 
confederates describe the photographs. Importantly, general sensorimotor arousal 
effects were assessed by applying spTMS both while the confederate performed 
a behavior and while the confederate sat still and described the picture. This 
provided an internally-valid baseline to discriminate between behavior-specific 
facilitation and general sensorimotor arousal (Labruna, Fernández-del-Olmo, & 
Ivry, 2011). Similarly, effector-specificity was investigated by exposing partici-
pants not just to the target hand behaviors (face rubbing and finger tapping), but 
also to the control leg behaviors (leg crossing and foot bouncing). Also, to allow 
for investigation of magnitude effects in the sensorimotor activation, behaviors 
of different spatial extents were used; for each effector, there was a behavior 
in which the effector covered a larger distance across the body (referred to as 
large behaviors; face rubbing and leg crossing) and one in which the effector 
only moved slightly (referred to as small behaviors; finger tapping and foot 
bouncing).
materials anD methoDs
participants
Eighteen female participants between the ages of 20 and 33 were recruited for 
participation via a database of volunteers. Due to a technical problem, insuf-
ficient data was acquired for one participant. The final sample consisted of 17 
female participants (Age: M = 25.12, SD = 4.08 years).
Only female participants were selected in order to avoid inadvertent gender-
group effects that have been shown to influence mimicry (Lakin et al., 2008). 
Participants were screened for any contraindications for TMS and gave their 
written informed consent prior to participation. All but one participant were 
right-handed as confirmed by the Standard Handedness Inventory (Briggs & Ne-
bes, 1975)6. Participants received monetary reimbursement and were debriefed 
as to the purpose of the experiment. The project was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Fondazione Santa Lucia and was carried out in accordance 
with the ethical standards of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
6 The conclusions of the statistical analyses reported in the results section were unchanged when run without the 
left-handed participant.
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stimuli
Stimulus videos. Each stimulus video depicted the full body of one of 
two female models sitting on a chair (Figure 1). The models were professional 
actresses paid for their participation in stimulus recording. Two models were 
used in favor of one in order to minimize the influence of possible idiosyncrasies 
of a single model (as a control, likeability was assessed, see Procedure). In 
each stimulus video, the model described a photograph following a script as 
though they were spontaneously describing it. They carried out target behaviors 
according to a pre-defined timing scheme. While not carrying out any upper or 
lower limb behaviors, the model sat with her legs crossed, her right hand resting 
on the arm of the chair and her left hand not visible (Figure 1.a,b). The models 
freely moved their gaze, looking at the photograph (adjacent to the camera), 
the camera, and upwards as if in thought. On average, stimulus videos lasted 
50.2 s (SD = 2.28).
The models carried out four types of behaviors in two effector categories, 
each with two types of behaviors; hand behaviors included face rubbing (Figure 
1.c) and finger tapping (Figure 1.d)7, and leg behaviors included leg cross-
ing (Figure 1.e) and foot bouncing (Figure 1.f). Per effector, one of the two 
behaviors was a large behavior as the models’ effector covered more distance 
(i.e. face rubbing and leg crossing), and the other was more subtle, only moving 
a small distance between start and finish positions (i.e. finger tapping and foot 
bouncing). Behaviors lasted on average 3.00 s (SD = 0.84) per stimulus video, 
the model carried out four behaviors of one effector category. In other words, 
in each video, four repetitions of either only hand or only leg behaviors were 
shown, resulting in “hand videos” and “leg videos”.
Participants observed 18 stimulus videos per model (i.e. nine hand and nine 
leg videos), hence 36 stimulus videos in total. Model identification was aided by 
framing the stimulus video on the left and right sides with yellow for one model 
and blue for the other, counterbalanced across participants (see Figure 1).
Stimulus photographs. The photographs described in the stimulus videos 
belonged to one of three categories: landscape, abstract sculptures, and houses. 
Landscape and house photographs were acquired from Wikimedia Commons 
and sculpture photographs were selected from the stimulus set of Era, Candidi, 
and Aglioti (2015). A pilot survey was performed to match stimulus photographs 
on the extent to which they elicited arousal and attention and how beautiful 
7 Face rubbing included a full hand behavior while finger tapping entailed primarily the FDI. This distinction 
was included to allow for a further investigation of muscle-effector-specificity effects in the ADM and FDI, see 
Results section.
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they were, as well as each photograph’s resemblance to a matched distracter 
stimulus photograph (see below).
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
 
 
FIGuRE 1 | Still frames from the stimulus videos. Model 1 (a) and 2 (b) while not perform-
ing target behaviors; face rub (c); finger tap (d); leg cross (e); and foot bounce (f). Note: 
arrows superimposed on still frames to illustrate movement direction. The white rectangle on 
the bottom left of each still frame indicates the placement of the photodiode.
emg and tms
EMG was measured with surface Ag-AgCl cup electrodes (1-cm-diameter) 
placed over the first dorsal interosseous (FDI) and abductor digiti minimi (ADM) 
of each participant’s right hand using a belly-tendon montage, with the ground 
electrode on the ventral wrist. Two additional electrodes were placed on each 
participant’s right leg, as if to measure EMG activity from the tibialis anterior 
muscle. The latter was done in order to not influence participants’ covert atten-
tion to their own right hand over right leg. Accordingly, participants were briefly 
shown the online EMG signal of voluntary muscle contractions before stating the 
experimental session to ensure that they understood the procedure and necessity 
of remaining relaxed. EMG activity from the leg muscle was recorded but not 
further processed, as no MEP from the leg muscle can be expected by stimulation 
of the optimal scalp position for hand muscles.
Recordings were made using a CED Power 1401 (Cambridge Electronic 
Design Ltd., Cambridge, UK) connected to an Isolated Patient Amplifier System 
Model D360 (Digitimer Ltd., Hertfordshire, UK), and interfaced with CED Spike 
2 software. The second-order Butterworth filter was set between 20 Hz and 2.5 
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kHz (1 kHz sampling rate). A 50 Hz notch filter was also applied. Signals were 
displayed at a gain of 1000.
Focal TMS was performed with a figure-eight stimulation coil (outer diameter 
of each wing 70 mm, Magstim polyurethane-coated coil), connected to a Mags-
tim 200 Mono Pulse (Magstim Whitland, Dyfed, UK), over the left primary motor 
cortex. The optimal scalp position for eliciting MEPs in FDI was found by moving 
the coil in steps of 1 cm from the vertex while holding the coil tangential to the 
scalp with the handle pointing caudally and laterally at 45° from the midline. 
Individual resting motor threshold (rMT) was defined as the lowest stimulus inten-
sity evoking five of ten MEPs with an amplitude of at least 50 μV. Participants’ 
rMT ranged between 43% and 63% of maximum stimulator output (M = 53.41, 
SD = 7.43%). Stimulus intensity was kept at 20% above rMT during data collec-
tion (M = 64.65, SD = 8.71%). EMG recording started 150 ms before TMS so 
as to be able to discard trials in which a muscular pre-activation (i.e. EMG signal 
exceeding 50 μV) was detected.
During the experiment, TMS pulses were triggered by a photodiode placed 
on the bottom left of the screen that sent a transistor-transistor logic signal dis-
charging the TMS. The photodiode was triggered when the screen underneath it 
turned black on the target frame of the stimulus videos (not visible to participants). 
MEP amplitudes were stored for offline analysis.
procedure
At the start of the experimental sessions, participants were comfortably seated 
in front of a 17-inch monitor (1151 × 964 pixels, refresh frequency of 60 Hz) 
at a distance of 60 cm with their right arm and right leg relaxed on supportive 
pillows. Participants were informed that the experiment would investigate the 
effects of TMS on memory and communication abilities. They were told that they 
had been selected to play the role of “receiver” and that they would be watching 
videos of two other participants previously selected to play the role of “send-
ers”. These senders (in actuality the stimulus video models) would be describing 
pictures and the participant’s task would be to closely attend the videos in order 
to later identify the described pictures in a recognition test. In order to ensure 
that participants’ would remain attentive throughout the experiment, they were 
informed that their own and the senders’ reimbursements were dependent on 
their recognition performance. Participants were instructed to remain relaxed 
throughout the experiment and that the EMG measurement was used simply to 
ensure that they did not move as this could influence the effect of TMS during 
the task.
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The experiment started and ended with a block of 18 fixation cross trials 
in which a fixation cross was presented at the center of the screen for 2 s. A 
TMS pulse was delivered between 1000 and 1600 ms from presentation of the 
fixation cross, with a random inter-trial interval ranging from 10 to 11 s.
Four experimental blocks were presented. Within each block, only one 
model’s videos were presented: they consisted of four stimulus videos of one 
behavior category (e.g. hands) and five of the other (e.g. legs) in randomized 
order within the block. Block order was pseudo-randomized per participant such 
that the model in the video alternated between blocks. Stimulus presentation and 
randomization were controlled by E-Prime v2.1 software (Psychology Software 
Tools Inc., Pittsburgh, PA).
Per stimulus video, three MEPs were induced, two during a behavior (i.e. 
behavior pulses) and one while the model in the video was describing the pic-
ture but not carrying out a target behavior (i.e. catch pulses). This latter pulse 
was introduced to record corticospinal facilitation due to naturalistic observation 
independently from specific body movements. Since the models carried out four 
target behaviors per video and only two behaviors were pulsed, there were 
also two non-pulsed behaviors per video (i.e. catch behaviors). This ensured 
that participants would not form an association between the TMS pulses and 
the target behaviors as only half of the behaviors would be accompanied with a 
pulse. Behavior pulses were pseudo-randomized to occur 1, 1.5, or 2 s into the 
start of a behavior. Inter-pulse interval within the video was at least 10 s (M = 
18.12, SD = 7.40 s) based on research that showed no change in corticospinal 
excitability with repetitive TMS at 0.1 Hz for 1 h (Chen et al., 1997). Similarly, 
behavior onset always occurred at least 5 s after the end of the previous be-
havior. Overall, 18 MEPs per pulse type were recorded per participant (i.e. 18 
catch MEPs during hand videos, 18 catch MEPs during leg videos, 18 face rub 
MEPs, 18 finger tap MEPs, 18 leg cross MEPs, and 18 foot bounce MEPs).
At the end of each block, a recognition test was presented. Each of the de-
scribed photographs from that block was shown paired with a distracter stimulus 
photograph for 5 s, after which participants were asked to indicate which of 
the two pictures had been described by the sender during the block. Stimulus 
photograph category was pseudo-randomized within and across stimulus video 
blocks; in doing so, each block contained three photographs of each of the three 
categories (i.e. landscape, sculptures, houses). After the recognition test of each 
block, participants were asked to rate how much the sender’s descriptions helped 
them recognize the photographs, by using a visual analogue scale ranging from 
‘not at all’ to ‘very much so’. Finally, at the end of the experiment, participants 
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were asked to rate the two senders on five measures of liking (i.e. similarity, 
niceness, beauty, trustworthiness, likability) on the same visual analogue scale.
Following the experiment, a funneled debriefing questionnaire was admin-
istered (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). Participants were first asked whether they 
believed the cover story. Next, participants were asked whether they believed 
that the actresses were indeed past participants. Then, participants were asked 
whether they had noticed the models’ behaviors, and if so, which behaviors 
they noticed. At the end, the participants were debriefed as to the true aim of 
the experiment.
Data handling and analysis
Individual mean MEP amplitudes were calculated as peak-to-peak distance in 
mV, and averaged for each experimental condition. MEP amplitudes that fell 2.5 
SDs above or below each participant’s mean for that experimental condition, 
trials contaminated by muscular pre-activation, and MEPs lower than 0.05 mV 
were excluded. On average, 1.99% (SD = 0.20) of the total number of trials 
were excluded. Mean values of MEP amplitudes of both muscles during the pre-
fixation did not differ from the post-fixation (ps > 0.80, 2-tailed paired-sample 
t-tests), thus ruling out the possibility of a general change in corticospinal facilita-
tion during the course of the experiment.
First, mean experimental MEP amplitudes were normalized on (i.e. divided 
by) the individual’s mean MEP amplitude of the fixation blocks and compared 
to 1 using one-sample t-tests. This comparison of “fixation-normalized” MEPs 
informs the extent to which there was a general heightening of corticospinal 
facilitation during naturalistic observation as compared to the fixation cross 
baseline.
Next, specific somatotopy of corticospinal facilitation during behavior obser-
vation was investigated. MEPs recorded in each video during the observation 
of a behavior were normalized on the MEP recorded during the catch pulse of 
that specific video. Thus, we could investigate the specific effects beyond the 
possible general arousal effects stemming from the observation of the naturalistic 
videos. This data preparation led to the inclusion of at least 9 and on average 
14.82 (SD = 0.83) trials per behavior type, per muscle, per participant. The 
mean “catch-normalized” MEPs were entered into a repeated measures within-
participants ANOVA with the factors muscle (ADM vs. FDI), effector (hand vs. 
leg) and behavior size (large vs. small). All tests of significance were based 
upon an α level of 0.05 and Bonferroni corrections were used where needed.
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results
Fixation-normalized MEPs were higher than 1 in both muscles. More specifically, 
ADM MEPs showed significant corticospinal facilitation (all pscorr < .027). For 
the FDI, the finger tap MEPs showed a statistical trend towards significance (pcorr 
= .06), while all other MEPs also demonstrated significant general corticospinal 
facilitation as compared to fixation trials (all pscorr < .001).
The mean values of the catch-normalized MEP amplitudes are shown in Figure 
2. In the RM ANOVA the only significant effect was the main effect of behavior 
size (all other ps > 0.120). The larger behaviors (i.e. face rub and leg cross; M 
= 1.28) elicited significantly higher MEPs than the smaller behaviors (i.e. finger 
tap and foot bounce; M = 1.16; F(1,16) = 7.71, p = .013, ηp 2 = 0.325). As 
there were no interactions, muscle-effector-specificity between the two types of 
behaviors and the two recorded muscles were not tested further.
Finally, the debriefing results were used to check for possible alternative 
explanations. Only two participants did not believe the cover story (i.e. that it 
concerned a memory experiment) but excluding them from the RM ANOVA did 
not affect the conclusions (main effect behavior size: p = .035, all other ps >.2). 
Also, four participants did not believe that the models were past participants but 
excluding them from the RM ANOVA similarly did not change interpretation of 
the results (main effect behavior size: p = .017, all other ps >.2). Participants’ 
awareness of the behaviors reflected the main effect of behavior size (see Table 
1). Whereas nearly all participants noticed the face rub and leg cross behaviors, 
only 7 noticed the finger tap and just 1 noticed the leg bounce.
additional task measures
Performance on the photograph recognition task was near ceiling, with an aver-
age accuracy of 96.57% (SD = 3.74). Participants did not rate one model’s 
descriptions as better than the other’s (p > .250), nor did they prefer one model 
over the other on any of the liking measures at the end of the experiment (ps > 
.144).
DisCussion
Whereas in other areas of social interaction research neuroscientific methods 
are used online during naturalistic behavioral paradigms (Kourtis et al., 2010; 
Meyer, Hunnius, van Elk, van Ede, & Bekkering, 2011; Sacheli, Aglioti, & 
Candidi, 2015; Sacheli, Candidi, Era, & Aglioti, 2015), this has rarely been 
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realized in mimicry research (for exceptions see Hogeveen, Obhi, et al., 2015; 
van Ulzen et al., 2013). Instead, our understanding of the neural mechanisms of 
behavioral mimicry is limited to indirect translations from neuroimaging during 
observation of simple behaviors and RCPs. To start addressing this disparity 
between artificial paradigms and natural mimicry behavior, this study utilized 
spTMS to measure corticospinal facilitation while participants observed natural-
istic stimuli as part of a cover task.
Comparisons of MEPs recorded while participants observed confederates 
only describing photographs and while the confederates were also performing 
behaviors allows us to disentangle the extent to which general and effector-
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Face Rub Leg Cross Finger Tap Foot Bounce
Large Behaviors Small Behaviors
C
at
ch
-N
or
m
al
ize
d
 M
EP
s
ADM FDI
*
FIGuRE 2 | Mean catch-normalized MEPs for each of the four observed behaviors for 
both the FDI and ADM muscles. Catch-normalized MEPs were calculated by dividing each 
behavioral MEP by the catch MEP of that video. Error bars indicate standard error of the 
mean. The asterisk indicates the significant main effect of behavior size.
TaBLE 1 | Counts and percentages of participants who reported noticing each behavior 
during the debriefing.
  face rub finger tap leg Cross foot Bounce
Noticed (n) 13 7 16 1
Percentage of 
Sample (%)
76 41 94 6
Note: sample size = 17.
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specific sensorimotor simulation is elicited during naturalistic action observation. 
If naturalistic behavior observation triggers non-time-locked general sensorimotor 
arousal, MEPs recorded during video observation (hence also including pulses 
occurring while the confederate was only describing the photographs without 
performing a target behavior) should be higher than during a fixation-cross 
baseline. Also, if natural sensorimotor simulation during a realistic communica-
tive task is generally triggered by observed behaviors, higher MEPs for larger 
behaviors than smaller behaviors should be expected. Finally, if sensorimotor 
simulation is effector-specific as during passive action observation paradigms 
(Alaerts et al., 2009; Strafella & Paus, 2000; Urgesi, Candidi, Fabbro, Romani, 
& Aglioti, 2006; Urgesi, Moro, Candidi, & Aglioti, 2006), MEPs during obser-
vation of hand behaviors should be significantly higher than leg behaviors.
Demonstrating a general sensorimotor arousal effect, MEPs were higher 
during video observation than during a fixation-cross baseline, regardless of 
whether or not the confederate was performing a behavior or which behavior 
it was. Even when correcting data for this general arousal effect, corticospinal 
facilitation was higher for the larger behaviors, face rubbing and leg crossing, 
than the smaller behaviors, finger tapping and foot bouncing. This was the case 
for both recorded muscles and for both hand and leg behaviors.
This finding of general sensorimotor arousal occurring during naturalistic 
observation of another individual is in line with past MEP studies. Van Ulzen 
and colleagues (2013) did not find significant differences in MEPs from the face-
touch condition and those measured during observation of a static image of the 
seated confederate, suggesting that the motor cortex is already generally active 
when observing an individual (in a static image or in a video). Correspond-
ingly, Hogeveen and Obhi (2012) found that following a social interaction, 
participants’ MEPs while observing human actions were significantly higher than 
for robotic actions, while this was not the case for participants who had not 
first engaged in a social interaction. Together, these MEP findings indicate that 
sensorimotor simulation during naturalistic observation of others is generally 
heightened and that this general enhancement extends beyond the duration of 
a single observed action.
Furthermore, in the present study, the general corticospinal facilitation effect 
was enhanced for the more-noticed behaviors as seen in a statistically large 
effect of behavior size (ηp2 = 0.325). In other words, beyond the general arousal 
effect of observing another individual, observing that individual performing a 
behavior caused additional sensorimotor arousal. This suggests that during a 
natural interaction in which mimicry typically occurs, observing a behavior will 
increase general sensorimotor arousal, perhaps to the extent that a behavior 
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would actually be executed. In line with this more general sensorimotor simula-
tion mechanism, behavioral mimicry experiment methodologies are not always 
specific regarding the precise behavior execution nor the timing thereof (van 
Ulzen et al., 2013). Repetitive behaviors, such as face touching, are used widely 
in behavioral mimicry studies and are often demonstrated regularly throughout 
the interaction by the confederate (Lakin, 2013). The description of how these 
face touch behaviors are coded is often limited, such that it could be interpreted 
by the reader to be considered mimicry if an individual rubs his chin several 
seconds after seeing an interaction partner scratch her forehead. Thus, the 
subjective experience of mimicry and related social consequences (Chartrand & 
Lakin, 2013), might not require a one-to-one matching of effectors, muscles and 
timing. Interestingly, the results from this study indeed reflect this more general 
type of sensorimotor simulation.
While this study provides evidence for general sensorimotor arousal occurring 
during naturalistic observation of others, no clear effects of effector-specificity 
were found. In interpreting this finding, it is important to consider that the cor-
ticospinal facilitation measured here was elicited in a different context than the 
MEPs of past studies. Typical MEP studies ensure participants’ full visual attention 
by presenting simplistic single-effector actions, and can hence carefully manipu-
late action-pulse timing (Fadiga et al., 2005). Such paradigms have shown that 
corticospinal facilitation during action observation anticipates the time-course of 
action kinematics (Urgesi et al., 2010) and is influenced by whether the observed 
action is successful (Aglioti, Cesari, Romani, & Urgesi, 2008; Candidi, Sacheli, 
Mega, & Aglioti, 2014). Importantly, these findings highlight characteristics of 
sensorimotor simulation that can be crucial in other social contexts, such as 
when coordinating with a partner during joint action (Bekkering et al., 2009; 
Knoblich & Jordan, 2003; Sacheli, Candidi, Pavone, Tidoni, & Aglioti, 2012; 
Sacheli, Tidoni, Pavone, Aglioti, & Candidi, 2013; Vesper, Butterfill, Knoblich, 
& Sebanz, 2010; Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013). On the 
contrary, in our “social” context we find evidence in favor of an unspecific, 
general facilitation that is independent from the specific motor behavior carried 
out by the participant. Crucially, the confederates’ motor behavior was irrelevant 
for the participants’ task, as is the case in real-life communicative situations 
where mimicry usually occurs. Taken together, the relevance of the observed 
behaviors and the need for fast predictions to ensure appropriate interactive 
responses likely dictate the level of sensorimotor simulation.
Moreover, it can also be the case that both the specific and more general 
functions of sensorimotor simulation might be interlinked and concurrently occur 
in interactive situations. For example, this is evident when participants need to 
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precisely synchronize with a partner but still show a socially-induced modulation 
of involuntary simulation of their movements (Sacheli, Christensen, et al., 2015). 
Indeed, the terms perception-behavior link or sensorimotor simulation have been 
used to refer to the mechanisms of a range of behaviors and processes and likely 
indicate activity of a shared neural substrate. Importantly, however, only through 
context-specific investigations does it become clear which sub-mechanisms are 
involved and to which extent.
The notion of context-specific investigations has proved insightful in other 
areas of sensorimotor simulation research. For example, neuroimaging studies 
have long since identified differences in simply observing an action versus 
observing an action to subsequently imitate it (Grezes, Costes, & Decety, 1998; 
Schuch, Bayliss, Klein, & Tipper, 2010; Suchan, Melde, Herzog, Hömberg, & 
Seitz, 2008). The notion of context-specificity therefore emphasizes that using 
substitute tasks like RCPs to infer possible mechanisms of another behavior, like 
mimicry, should be exercised with caution. Indeed, this distinction was recently 
demonstrated in a transcranial direct current stimulation study. The roles of two 
regions thought to influence sensorimotor simulation, the inferior frontal cortex 
and the temporal-parietal junction, were dissociated, demonstrating that each 
had a distinct effect on producing behavioral mimicry and performance on a 
RCP (Hogeveen, Obhi, et al., 2015).
Overall these observations and our results highlight the caveats of using non-
naturalistic set-ups as a proxy for natural social behaviors. This might also hold 
when social modulations of behavioral mimicry are taken into account. Many of 
the social factors found to influence behavioral mimicry also affect performance 
in RCPs (Hogeveen & Obhi, 2013; Leighton et al., 2010; Wang et al., 2011). 
Correspondingly, corticospinal facilitation can be also influenced by social fac-
tors, such as social groups (Désy & Théoret, 2007; Molnar-Szakacs et al., 2007) 
and social power (Hogeveen, Inzlicht, & Obhi, 2014). However, just like the 
features of corticospinal facilitation might change depending on the context, 
RCPs and spTMS results are perhaps not sensitive to all of the same social factors 
as mimicry (see for instance Farmer, Carr, Svartdal, Winkielman, & Hamilton, 
2016). Thus, future behavioral mimicry research should take further steps to 
closely match experimental context with the ecological context of interest.
Although the general sensorimotor arousal effects found in this study can 
go a long way in explaining the breadth of temporally spaced effects found in 
the behavioral mimicry literature, some level of anatomical specificity would 
nevertheless be required for mimicry to be experienced as such. Subjectively, it 
would not be perceived as mimicry if one individual crossed their legs after they 
observed their interaction partner rub their face. However, such evidence for 
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somatotopic mapping between observed behaviors and corticospinal facilitation 
was not clear in this study. One limitation of the cover task and naturalistic stimuli 
is that participants were free to look anywhere, likely leading them to primarily 
fixate on the face. Indeed, only 41% of the participants reported noticing the 
finger tap at all during the experiment and just a single participant noticed the 
leg bounce. Moreover, for those participants who did notice, the likely fewer 
trials in which the behavior was observed was averaged with the likely more 
numerous trials that the behavior was not being observed at the time of the 
TMS pulse. This matter could be investigated in future simultaneous TMS and 
eye-tracking studies utilizing such naturalistic stimuli. It would then be expected 
that particularly when the behaviors were fixated on, the enhancement of sen-
sorimotor arousal would be highest. Nonetheless, the pattern of results found 
in this study provide a starting ground for further investigations into the role of 
sensorimotor simulation in producing behavioral mimicry.
In conclusion, this study employed a naturalistic spTMS paradigm to measure 
the nature of online sensorimotor simulation that could play a role in produc-
ing behavioral mimicry. General arousal effects were found, as observing the 
stimulus videos elicited increased corticospinal facilitation as compared to a 
fixation-cross baseline. Additionally, the size of observed behaviors affected MEP 
amplitudes. Taken together, this study provides support for general sensorimotor 
simulation being involved in producing behavioral mimicry and opens the door 
for novel perspectives on sensorimotor simulation in naturalistic interactions.

7
Chapter 7
General Discussion
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In this thesis, I set out to investigate the emergence of social behavioral mimicry 
during early childhood and the developmental and neurocognitive mechanisms 
underlying it. In doing so, I first identified mimicry in 3- to 6-year-olds’ behavior 
and found that it was socially modulated by approximately 5 years of age 
(Chapters 2 and 3). This developmental trajectory was used to inform an in-
vestigation into the developmental mechanisms of social behavioral mimicry; 
5-year-olds’ social understanding was related to their overall mimicry while 
the social selectivity of children’s mimicry could be predicted from individual 
differences in inhibitory control (Chapter 4). Additionally, young children’s 
perception-behavior mapping was found to be sensitive to the social identity of 
their interaction partners (Chapter 5) and an adult TMS study provided further 
evidence for a socially-sensitive role of the mirror system in behavioral mim-
icry (Chapter 6). Below, I first examine how these findings contribute to our 
understanding of behavioral mimicry. Subsequently, I evaluate the limitations 
of behavioral mimicry methodology. Finally, I explore the implications of these 
experiments within a wider body of social interaction literatures.
Development anD meChanisms of mimiCry
As reviewed in Chapter 1, behavioral mimicry has been the subject of extensive 
behavioral research in adults. However, where this behavior comes from has 
remained unanswered. It was unknown whether young children mimic and 
whether their mimicry is sensitive to the social dynamics of an interaction, as 
is the case for adults’ mimicry. Similarly, while the perception-behavior link has 
been the advocated neurocognitive basis of mimicry (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; 
Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), there was only limited evidence for its role in 
naturalistic interactions conducive to behavioral mimicry (Hogeveen, Chartrand, 
et al., 2015).
Findings from both developmental and neurocognitive research into copying 
behaviors provided the theoretical framework in which the present investigations 
were grounded. Since infants start to imitate actions by the end of their first year 
of life (Jones, 2007) and toddlers use imitation to initiate social interactions 
(Eckerman & Peterman, 2004), it was expected that children would be capable 
of mimicry at least by the end of toddlerhood. Furthermore, the increasing social 
sensitivity of young children’s behavior during experimental imitation para-
digms (e.g. Yu & Kushnir, 2014) suggested that social-cognitive development 
would likely influence social behavioral mimicry during the kindergarten years. 
Based on evidence for the perception-behavior link’s sensitivity to the social 
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characteristics of explicit action tasks in adults (e.g. Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2010; 
Molenberghs et al., 2013) and possibly also in young children (Marshall et al., 
2010), it was expected that this neurocognitive mechanism would also underlie 
implicit behavioral mimicry. Overall, the findings from the present studies largely 
matched these predictions.
Developmental trajectory
Chapter 2 demonstrated that 3-year-olds mimic and this finding was replicated 
in Chapter 3. At this age, the basic mechanism necessary for mimicry behavior 
is present, as the mirror system likely develops during infancy and toddlerhood 
(Cook, Bird, Catmur, Press, & Heyes, 2014; Cuevas, Cannon, Yoo, & Fox, 2014; 
Del Giudice et al., 2009; Ferrari et al., 2013). Toddlers are also experienced 
imitators (Jones, 2009) and imitate peers during play (Eckerman et al., 1989). 
Interestingly, past studies have found that peer imitation decreases in prevalence 
across early childhood starting at the age of 3, which was suggested to be due 
to the development of other pathways of affiliation (Abramovitch & Grusec, 
1978; Lubin & Field, 1981; Nadel, 2002). Hence, the present findings suggest 
that at the age at which explicit instances of peer imitation start to diminish, a 
more implicit form of behavior copying is already emerging. Yet, whether behav-
ioral mimicry is present in young children’s peer interactions remains unknown. 
An essential next step in ascertaining mimicry as a social interaction behavior 
during development is for future studies to investigate its emergence in peer 
interactions. The present mimicry findings serve as a guide, since they for the 
first time indicate that young children, at times, can display behavioral mimicry.
Although the social manipulations of Chapters 2 and 3 did not affect 3-year-
olds’ mimicry, Chapter 3 found that 4- to 6-year-olds’ behavioral mimicry was 
sensitive to the social identity of their interaction partners. Following allocation 
to a novel group, the kindergartners mimicked their in-group members more 
than out-group members. These findings suggest that, as in adults (Lakin et al., 
2008), mimicry during childhood can already convey an affiliative message, 
“I (am) like you”. The sensitivity of children’s behavior to group manipulations 
has previously been documented in instructed imitation paradigms (Oostenbroek 
& Over, 2015; Watson-Jones et al., 2016) and in preference tasks (Dunham 
et al., 2011; Richter et al., 2016). The present study adds to these findings 
by demonstrating that uninstructed forms of interaction behaviors are similarly 
guided by group boundaries. As such, this study contributes to theories of the 
importance of groups for guiding and fostering affiliative social interactions (e.g. 
Haun & Over, 2015; Heyes, 2013).
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Chapter 3’s evidence that the young children mimicked in-group members 
more, inversely indicates that they mimicked out-group members less. Decreased 
or even negative mimicry of out-group members has been previously documented 
in adult research (Yabar et al., 2006). In Chapter 3 it was put forth that this abil-
ity to regulate who gets mimicked could be a product of children’s developing 
behavioral control. This was supported by the results of Chapter 4; although the 
social manipulation of this study did not affect children’s mimicry on a group 
level, individual differences in performance on an inhibitory control task were 
predictive of the extent to which they mimicked the sticker keeper more than the 
sticker sharer. In line with increasing behavioral control during early childhood 
(Carlson, 2005), and the social sensitivity of older but not younger children’s 
mimicry in Chapter 3, it seems that behavioral control might be one of the 
developmental mechanisms contributing to the social sensitivity of mimicry.
Furthermore, Chapter 4 also explored the relation between behavioral mim-
icry and social development. Children’s total mimicry scores were positively cor-
related with a measure of their social understanding. Since the utilized Children’s 
Social Understanding Scale broadly measures children’s understanding of others 
in their daily lives (Tahiroglu et al., 2014), there could be several pathways 
through which social understanding and mimicry are related. Following adult 
findings (Chartrand & van Baaren, 2009), perspective taking and mimicry might 
be related through an enhanced attention for other individuals (Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1999). It could also be the case that an understanding of social relation-
ships and affiliation (e.g. Plötner et al., 2016) is related to performing affiliative 
behaviors oneself. Additionally, a child’s sensitivity to social relationships based 
on the extent of her own desire for relationships, for example as governed by her 
attachment style, might drive the expression of affiliative behaviors. Particularly 
the latter pathway might be utilized in future research as a more sensitive factor 
that could influence toddlers’ or young children’s social mimicry. Indeed, at-
tachment style has been found to affect adult’s mimicry levels (Hall, Millings, & 
Bouças, 2012). Thus, although 3-year-olds were the youngest children studied 
in this thesis and sensitivity to the social manipulations was only found in 4- to 
6-year-olds, individual differences in social understanding might reveal mimicry 
in some children earlier on in development.
Taken together, these studies provide a first glimpse into the development of 
behavioral mimicry and suggest separable roles of two developmental mecha-
nisms, behavior control and social understanding. Further research is needed to 
address the questions raised by this initial investigation, such as whether young 
children already display behavioral mimicry in natural peer interactions and 
how different aspects of children’s social and cognitive development are related 
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to the emergence of social mimicry. Through continuing this exploration into the 
early development of behavioral mimicry, we might come to find that, akin to 
how imitation contributes to children’s social cognition (Meltzoff & Williamson, 
2010), mimicry might likewise play a valuable and dynamic role in children’s 
social development.
neurocognitive Basis
Chapter 6 provided insight into how mirror system8 activity might lead to be-
havioral mimicry during natural social interactions. In this TMS study, observing 
an interaction partner, even when not performing specific behaviors, resulted in 
significantly higher MEPs than those elicited during a nonsocial baseline. Beyond 
this general enhancement effect, MEPs recorded during noticed behaviors were 
significantly higher than during less noticed behaviors. Together, these findings 
suggest that observation of an interaction partner generally enhances sensorimo-
tor activation, hence providing an already higher level of motor activity (see also 
Hogeveen, Chartrand, et al., 2015; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2012). Consequently, 
when the interaction partner does perform a behavior, the sensorimotor cortex 
is even more active, and this could potentially surpass the threshold of activity 
required for overt motor movements (granted other neurocognitive mechanisms 
allow). More simply, while we evidently do not copy everyone around us at all 
times, this generally enhanced mirror activity during an engaging social interac-
tion suggests that when an interaction partner’s behavior is observed it could 
more easily result in behavioral mimicry.
In addition to a general enhancement effect caused by observing another 
individual regardless of whether they are performing behaviors (i.e. passive 
nonsocial observation versus passive social observation; Chapter 6), past adult 
neuroimaging studies have indicated that specific social characteristics, such 
as group membership (i.e. in-group members’ hand actions versus out-group 
member’s hand actions; Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2013; Molenberghs et al., 2013), 
modulate mirror system activity during action observation. Since adults’ be-
havioral mimicry displays similar sensitivities (Lakin et al., 2008; Yabar et al., 
2006), it could be that this specific social mirroring further stimulates the overt 
production of behavioral mimicry. If this is the case, then this should also already 
be evident in young children at the point at which they socially mimic. Though not 
a direct measure, the motor interference paradigm used in Chapter 5 provided 
a feasible, child-friendly means of investigating the possible social sensitivity of 
8 As in Chapter 1, ‘mirror system’ terminology is reserved for discussing the neural implementation of the 
‘perception-behavior link’, which, conforming to the behavioral mimicry literature, is used to describe behav-
ioral findings or the general phenomenon.
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children’s perception-behavior mapping. The interference in 4- to 6-year-olds’ 
movements, caused by simultaneously observing an incongruent motion path to 
the one being performed, was higher when the children observed an out-group 
member than an in-group member. Hence, it seems as if already during early 
childhood, specific social effects could influence the degree of mirroring activity.
Together, Chapters 5 and 6 suggest that overt behavioral mimicry could be 
the product of a mirror system that is generally engaged during social interac-
tions and is possibly further enhanced by the specific social relevance of one’s 
interaction partner. Taking this as the basis of behavioral mimicry, the mimicry 
findings from Chapter 4 would suggest that, at least in children, these social 
modulation effects might be regulated by behavioral control mechanisms. In 
this study, inhibitory control, measured through a cognitive task, predicted the 
extent to which children’s mimicry was socially selective. Importantly, though, 
these findings do not necessarily implicate an active, direct inhibition of the 
motor activation resulting from perception-behavior mapping (though this might 
occur at times, such as when you suddenly notice you are about to mimic your 
interaction partner or during a TMS study investigating mimicry in which you are 
required to sit still; see Wang & Hamilton, 2012). Instead, these effects might 
be the result of a neurocognitive network involved in upregulating perception-
behavior mapping (Heyes, 2011). Further neurocognitive research is needed to 
distinguish between such pathways.
In sum, these studies can serve as a starting ground for future investigations 
into the interplay of neurocognitive processes underlying mimicry. Central to 
understanding the neurocognitive mechanisms of mimicry is studying how mirror 
system activity can lead to overt behavioral mimicry and at which point during 
the processing of observed behaviors social modulatory effects operate. An 
exciting avenue for addressing such questions is through ongoing advances in 
neuroimaging. What has greatly hampered our understanding of neurocognitive 
mechanisms of mimicry is the challenge of incorporating a natural, implicit, 
social behavior into a restrictive neuroimaging setup. Recent technological and 
methodological advances have increased the applicability of noninvasive 
stimulation techniques in cognitive neuroscience (Sandrini, Umiltà, & Rusconi, 
2011). Particularly of interest are repetitive TMS and transcranial direct current 
stimulation techniques, which can be used to enhance or inhibit specific regions 
of the cortex and ensure that, following stimulation, the participant is free from 
any constraining apparatuses (Dayan, Censor, Buch, Sandrini, & Cohen, 2013; 
but see also Horvath, Forte, & Carter, 2015). Such techniques could be used to 
provide causal evidence for the involvement of specific neural correlates, and 
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thereby the underlying processes, during naturalistic, live, social interactions 
(e.g. Hogeveen, Obhi, et al., 2015).
operationalizing Behavioral mimiCry
Following Chartrand and Bargh’s (1999) seminal paper, behavioral mimicry ex-
periments have largely adhered to a particular formula. These adult paradigms 
have also provided the basic template for the mimicry experiments presented in 
this thesis. Yet, capturing a dynamic social behavior in a controlled laboratory 
setup inevitably presents an array of challenges. The adaptation of adult mimicry 
paradigms to child-friendly designs has brought to light several methodological 
limitations in the mimicry literature and pinpoints facets of measuring mimicry 
that necessitate further investigation.
Baselines
With a few exceptions (e.g. Emanuel, 2012), baselines have only intermittently 
been utilized in experimental designs and have largely been ignored on a theo-
retical level. It is for this reason that in the overview of adult work in Chapter 1, 
the type or absence of baselines was noted per experiment. Indeed, as described 
by Lakin (2013, p.543) with respect to typical mimicry experiments, “[h]ow 
much mimicry occurs is sometimes [emphasis added] compared to a baseline 
situation to control for participants’ initial tendencies to engage in the behavior 
in question.” However, I would argue that mimicry cannot be directly measured 
during a single experimental session; instead, whether participants mimic or not 
is established through a comparison of behavior rates during a baseline period 
(or of a control group) and an experimental period (or group).
In an ongoing attempt to improve how we measured mimicry, the baselines 
progressed together with the experimental paradigms in this thesis. In Chapters 
2 and 3, the baselines were designed as in the majority of earlier adult studies 
(e.g. Chartrand & Bargh, 1999; Cheng & Chartrand, 2003; Lakin et al., 2008); 
the participants were recorded for a brief nonsocial period of time preceding the 
experimental session. In these chapters, the priority was to maintain children’s 
visual attention towards the screen so as to best match the experimental period’s 
setting. While in Chapter 2 the 3-year-olds’ task was to watch a short (~1 min) 
animation clip, in Chapter 3 a simple game was used as the baseline so that it 
could be longer (i.e. 2 min) while still ensuring also older children’s visual atten-
tion. In these studies the baseline matched the video-based stimulus presentation, 
as participants never interacted with the models in the stimulus videos. Addition-
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ally, the use of this conventional, nonsocial, baseline design (e.g. Lakin et al., 
2008) allowed for a higher procedural overlap with adult findings; as a result, 
one could argue that the mimicry identified in these studies closely resembles the 
effects found in adult studies.
However, arousal due to the social nature of interactions could generally af-
fect behavior rates, thereby creating a difference between a nonsocial baseline 
and the experimental period by definition (van Swol & Drury, 2006; Yabar et al., 
2006). Hence, in a pilot study preceding the experiment presented in Chapter 
4, the first few minutes of a story session in which the model did not yet perform 
any behaviors were used as a baseline (van Schaik, Peereboom, & Hunnius, 
2014). But, it could further be the case that behavior rates change throughout 
an interaction, which in any baseline-then-manipulation design means that tem-
poral influences on behavior rates are confounded with the resulting measure 
of mimicry. Temporal effects of mimicry were documented by Charny (1966) in 
his analysis of a videotaped interaction, as he found that postural congruence 
increased during the course of the conversation. Consequently, in Chapter 4 a 
control group of participants who were not exposed to the target behaviors was 
used to ascertain mimicry in the experimental group, instead of using a preced-
ing baseline. This between-participants design resembles those of adult studies 
that investigate the consequences of being or not being mimicked (Lakin, 2013).
Arguably though, a between-participants design has other limits. Indeed, on 
a group level, only negative mimicry was identified in Chapter 4 and it cannot 
be ruled out that these effects were at least partially due to the baseline methodol-
ogy. For example, without within-participant comparisons, individual differences 
in typical behavior rates cannot be entirely factored out. Additionally, this design 
required the experimental group to observe the storytellers regularly perform 
behaviors, whereas during the control group’s stories, the storytellers were much 
more limited in their movement. This less dynamic storytelling situation might 
have created a less natural interaction context, possibly increasing the control 
group children’s fidgeting as a result.
On the whole, while the presented experiments reflect the diverse baselines 
used in adult mimicry studies, they likewise point to a widespread shortcoming 
of mimicry methodology. Further research should determine how the baseline 
measure influences mimicry quantification and thereby define best practices in 
defining behavioral mimicry. As a start, it should be tested whether the different 
types of baseline settings (e.g. one minute nonsocial, first minute of interaction, 
full interaction, etc.) lead to different behavior rates (corrected for duration), as 
this would indicate the extent to which baseline styles can bias mimicry calcula-
tions.
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Behavior Differences
While considered to be a general phenomenon, evidence for behavioral mim-
icry comes primarily from the early explorations of postural congruence (e.g. 
LaFrance, 1979) and experimental investigations of face rubbing and foot bounc-
ing (Emanuel, 2012). A few authors have strived to show the generalizability of 
social effects by using face rubbing in one experiment and foot bouncing in the 
next (e.g. Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), or by using one of these classic behaviors 
alongside pen playing (e.g. van Baaren et al., 2003) or arm touching (e.g. 
van Swol & Drury, 2006). In line with this attempt to test the generalizability of 
mimicry, the experimental designs presented in this thesis used multiple target 
behaviors. Particularly Chapter 2 investigated differences between behavior 
types and found that, of the behaviors and facial expressions mimicked (i.e. 
cheek scratching, mouth rubbing, yawning, head wiggling, and frowning), there 
were no significant differences in rates. This suggests that behavioral mimicry in 
young children is to a certain extent wide-ranging and not bound to the copying 
of a particular behavior. Based on this finding, in Chapters 3 and 4 behavior 
types were counterbalanced across the within-participants social manipulations.
Chapter 4’s between-participants baseline exemplified another important 
reason to use multiple behaviors. In the control group, there was a significant 
difference between face rubbing and hand rubbing, suggesting that this age 
group might typically perform the latter more often in such a context. In contrast, 
adult participants in Chapter 6 reported noticing face rubbing more than a hand 
behavior and in another adult study, face rubbing was performed more often by 
the adult participants than leg behaviors (Emanuel, 2012). These findings sug-
gest that typical child and adult behaviors might differ. Conceivably, there might 
be a developmental shift towards face-oriented behaviors, as these resemble 
personal grooming behaviors. In addition to age-related differences, individual 
differences also exist. For example, Lakin and colleagues (2008) reported sig-
nificant main effects of baseline covariates with medium to large effect sizes, 
indicating noteworthy individual differences in natural behavior tendencies. 
With respect to both individual and age-related differences, it is imperative to 
consider whether these could disproportionately affect mimicry due to biases in 
the underlying mechanisms. Perhaps we tend to mimic the behaviors we sponta-
neously perform ourselves. A possible reason for this could be that there might 
be stronger perception-behavior associations for commonly performed and ob-
served (i.e. trained) behaviors (Catmur, Walsh, & Heyes, 2009; Heyes, 2010). 
Indeed, infants tend to start imitating behaviors only after they have extensively 
practiced them themselves (Jones, 2006b). In future mimicry experiments, testing 
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for behavior differences could maximize the sensitivity of mimicry paradigms 
and potentially shed some light on the mechanisms of mimicry.
Behavior types
Defining behavior types has also received limited direct attention. Oftentimes, 
what the confederate demonstrates and which participant behaviors are counted 
are not explicitly stated in mimicry papers. For instance, in a footnote of Char-
trand and Bargh (1999) the reader discovers that face rubbing can include 
“many physical gestures that can be made in the facial area (e.g., scratching an 
itch, playing with an earing, fixing hair)”, yet what is included in their precise 
coding scheme is not listed (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). An example of an 
exception to this scarcity of behavior definitions is Hall and colleagues (2012) 
who describe the modeled face rubbing as variable, including “all elements of 
the face, (e.g., cheek, temple, forehead, eye-brow, nose, below nose, mouth, 
chin and jaw line) with each area being touched at least twice and some touches 
covering multiple areas.” (Hall et al., 2012). As opposed to the distinct face 
behaviors (i.e. cheek scratching and face rubbing) of Chapters 2 and 3 (see also 
Emanuel, 2012), Chapter 4 followed this clustering of face touching behaviors. 
Support for such a broader classification comes from a controlled experiment 
comparing the effect of effector (hand or foot) and movement (inward-outward or 
forward-backward) on liking. Adult participants liked the video models more if 
they moved with the same effector as the participant did, but movement similarity 
did not affect liking (Sparenberg, Topolinski, Springer, & Prinz, 2012). Thus, it 
seems that precise movement matching is not a requirement for mimicry’s social 
benefits, but this raises several questions. At which point is a behavior no longer 
mimicry? And how does a perception-behavior matching system, known to be 
capable of precise mirroring (Fadiga et al., 2005), also generate this imprecise 
behavioral mimicry? Again, further investigations will be needed to address 
such questions in our pursuit of the mechanisms of behavioral mimicry.
Behavioral mimiCry as a part of DynamiC soCial 
interaCtions
Placed in the context of a wider body of literature, the experiments presented in 
this thesis highlight the importance of considering the dynamicity of interactions 
and reveal mimicry to be one component of a complex behavioral repertoire.
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social Dynamics
The reported studies had mixed effects with respect to the intended social manip-
ulations. While in Chapter 3 4- to 6-year-olds mimicked in-group members more 
than out-group members, the motor interference of Chapter 5’s 4- to 6-year-olds 
was more affected by out-group members’ movements. Also, on a group level, 
the 5-year-olds of Chapter 4 did not significantly differentiate between a sticker 
sharer and a sticker keeper in their negative mimicry of these models, though 
descriptively this group tended to mimic keepers more. Similarly, social effects 
contrary to expectations have been documented in a handful of other adult 
social interaction studies (e.g. Miles et al., 2011; Roberts et al., 2016), and 
perhaps in many more unpublished studies. Though seemingly contradictory, 
these effects instead exemplify the importance of considering the dynamics of 
each experimental interaction.
Depending on the context, the social dynamics of an interaction can differ-
entially determine affiliation goals. Whereas a general liking-based preference 
might lead to higher affiliation goals in typical interactions (e.g. Chapter 3; 
Lakin & Chartrand, 2003), certain situations, such as being ostracized from a 
communal game (Lakin et al., 2008; Watson-Jones et al., 2016) or knowing 
you will later meet or collaborate with an individual (LaFrance, 1985), could 
increase the need to affiliate with disliked or out-group individuals (Miles et al., 
2011). Following the general neurocognitive mechanisms outlined above, the 
heightened social relevance of this individual would be evident in enhanced 
perception-behavior mapping (e.g. Chapter 5) which, in turn, could lead to 
relatively more mimicry of this individual (e.g. Chapter 4). Hence, in interpreting 
past work and designing future studies, it is imperative to consider how the 
social dynamics and contextual demands interact to affect the underlying social 
motivations during interactions.
Behavior Dynamics
As a product of the social dynamics and tasks of an interaction, the presence of 
copying behaviors is also variable. Though ostensibly following similar method-
ological formulas, adult experimental mimicry rates vary from negative mimicry 
(e.g. Yabar et al., 2006) and the absence of mimicry effects (e.g. van Swol & 
Drury, 2006) to low prevalence (e.g. Cheng & Chartrand, 2003) and even fairly 
frequent mimicry (e.g. van Baaren et al., 2003). Similarly, the present studies 
found low to average levels of mimicry (Chapters 2 and 3) but also negative 
mimicry (Chapter 4). In addition to an unknown number of unpublished null 
results (including an adult pilot study preceding the experiment of Chapter 6), 
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this range of findings raises the question, when do experiments elicit mimicry 
and when do they not?
In addition to the methodological considerations discussed previously, an 
answer to this question could lie in the context of the experimental interactions. 
In mimicry experiments, the goal is to isolate behavioral mimicry, and since it is 
a communicative behavior, this necessitates limiting other communication routes 
to enhance the use of mimicry. It could be for this reason that the majority of 
published mimicry studies utilize structured verbal interactions with a confeder-
ate (Emanuel, 2012), such as scripted interviews (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003) 
and the photograph description task (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). For example, 
during the photograph description task, the experimenter often remains in the 
corner of the room while the confederate and participant describe the pictures 
to one another (Hall et al., 2012; van Baaren et al., 2003), essentially obliging 
the participant to refrain from verbal routes of affiliation as these would devi-
ate from the instructed task. Moreover, in the original study, confederates were 
instructed to limit eye-contact (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), which might have 
limited nonverbal communication through facial expressions as well. Hence, 
perhaps through restricting verbal and nonverbal social signals, the need for 
participants to use mimicry to affiliate in these contexts is amplified.
In other words, since different forms of behavior can communicate affilia-
tion, the contextual dynamics likely define which behaviors are expressed. For 
instance, whereas during a face-to-face conversation mimicry might be the 
least-obstructed route, when operating a novel apparatus together over-imitation 
might be a more effective means of communicating affiliation. Consequently, 
studies in which communication routes are not as limited might find lower 
mimicry prevalence. This might have been the case in Chapter 4, in which 
children already had a chance to freely interact and affiliate with experimenters 
prior to the video-based story session, thus reducing the need to mimic in this 
now less-affiliative video setting. Yet, limiting communication routes entirely by 
solely presenting models in videos has arguably also led to low mimicry rates 
(Chapters 2 and 3; Lakin & Chartrand, 2003; van Baaren et al., 2004; Yabar et 
al., 2006). Support for this ‘limitation of affiliation routes’ explanation of interac-
tion behavior prevalence comes from an over-imitation study with elementary 
school children. In this study, 6.5- to 8-year-olds over-imitated most when the 
demonstration was live as compared to televised (i.e. affiliation was possible) 
and the model did not make eye contact (i.e. other communication paths were 
limited; Marsh et al., 2014).
Taken together, since mimicry is one means of communicating affiliation, it 
should be considered as part of a wider system of affiliation behaviors whose 
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individual occurrences are a dynamic product of the interaction. Instead of 
dampening interest in behavioral mimicry, though, this understanding should 
inspire future investigations into the dynamicity of social interactions, particularly 
during development, as this has the potential to reveal the intricacy of interac-
tion behaviors. An example of how integrating mimicry into a broader view of 
interactions can provide new insights is explored below.
mimicry as an interpersonal Coordination Behavior
Placing behavioral mimicry in the big picture of interaction behaviors has the 
potential to elucidate the dynamic characteristics of these behaviors and help 
isolate the mechanisms underlying them. Recently, efforts have been made to 
reunite the interpersonal coordination literatures concerning behavioral mimicry 
and interactional synchrony (Lakin, 2013). Interpersonal coordination refers to 
the degree to which either the copying (i.e. mimicry) or temporal coupling (i.e. 
synchrony) of behaviors during interactions is non-random (Bernieri & Rosenthal, 
1991). Importantly, both mimicry and synchrony contribute to liking and rapport 
during social interactions in adults (Lakin, 2013).
Like behavioral mimicry, synchrony as a form of interpersonal coordination 
has received limited attention in the developmental literature. The existent evi-
dence indicates that, though to a lesser degree than adults, children are able to 
adjust their behavior timing to that of an adult partner by the age of 2.5 years 
(Kirschner & Tomasello, 2009) and with a same-aged peer by 4 years of age 
(Endedijk, Ramenzoni, et al., 2015). Synchrony continues to develop through 
middle childhood, as children increasingly synchronize their movements to those 
of a partner (Kleinspehn-Ammerlahn et al., 2011; Marsh et al., 2013). Intrigu-
ingly, several studies show a social sensitivity to synchronization earlier during 
development; twelve-month-olds tended to select a teddy bear that was rocked 
in synchrony with them over one that was rocked to a different beat (Tunçgenç, 
Cohen, & Fawcett, 2015) and 14-month-olds who were bounced in synchrony 
with an adult helped this adult more than an adult bouncing out of phase (Cirelli, 
Einarson, & Trainor, 2014; Cirelli, Wan, & Trainor, 2016). Similar effects have 
been found with respect to being copied. When 18-month-olds’ actions were 
copied by an experimenter the infants later helped the adult more than when 
adults responded to the infants’ actions with a different action (Carpenter, Uebel, 
& Tomasello, 2013) and 18-month-olds who observed an adult copy their actions 
on an identical set of toys, as compared to independently play with different 
toys, were later more likely to invite the adult to play (Fawcett & Liszkowski, 
2012). Thus, whereas children begin to mimic (as documented in this thesis) and 
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synchronize with others themselves during early childhood, even infants seem to 
be sensitive to being copied or synchronized with.
This similarity in developmental trajectories of behavioral mimicry and 
synchrony implies that tracking both behaviors to identify commonalities and 
discrepancies could help pinpoint central social-neurocognitive mechanisms. 
As a case in point, infants’ early sensitivity to being copied and synchronized 
with suggests that the social benefits of experiencing these behaviors could be 
partially underpinned by a common mechanism. In an adult experiment, Catmur 
and Heyes (2013) isolated a role of contingency in the social effects of being 
copied. Contingency entails a predictive relationship between the movements of 
two individuals and is thereby also a hallmark of synchrony. When participants’ 
hand actions were contingently followed by either a hand or foot action (i.e. 
similar or dissimilar action), participants reported greater enjoyment of the task 
and closeness to a friend than when a hand action followed their hand action 
(i.e. always similar action) but not predictably (Catmur & Heyes, 2013). Hence, 
part of the social benefits of being mimicked could be a product of the contingent 
relationship between the mimicker’s and mimickee’s behaviors (though note that 
other studies in which contingency is kept constant across conditions also indi-
cate the importance of similarity in the benefits of copying (e.g. Carpenter et al., 
2013; Sparenberg et al., 2012)). A social role of contingency likely has its roots 
in early infancy, as infants are sensitive to the timing of their caregiver’s behav-
iors (Gergely & Watson, 1999; Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, Marcelli, & Reserbat-
Plantey, 1999; Tarabulsy, Tessier, & Kappas, 1996), and in turn, contingency is 
fundamental to forming (imitative) associations in perception-behavior mapping 
(Cook et al., 2014). It follows that contingency detection has been suggested 
to contribute to the positive effects of being copied in adults (Hale & Hamilton, 
2016; Heyes, 2013). This example of being mimicked demonstrates that, as 
we gradually find more evidence of children’s own production of mimicry in the 
future, integrating those findings into the wider literature of interaction behaviors 
will help us to understand mimicry’s development and distinguish its underlying 
mechanisms.
Incorporating mimicry back into the (developmental) social interaction litera-
ture also obliges us to further scrutinize the experimental paradigms. In addition 
to the methodological concerns explored in the previous section, we need to de-
termine whether we are truly measuring mimicry: do investigations into the social 
effects of being mimicked ensure that the level of contingency within the interac-
tion is constant while only the presence or absence of mimicry varies between 
conditions? Inversely, what effect does the scripting of a confederate’s behaviors 
have on the participants’ perceptions of interactional contingency? Typically, 
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studies have focused on one side of the interaction, while keeping the other 
constant. For instance, this thesis specifically focused on children’s production of 
mimicry and used videotaped models to control the other half of the interaction. 
Certainly, such basic investigations are necessary to first determine whether the 
target behaviors or effects can be identified (i.e. we first needed to study whether 
or not young children mimic). Yet, the above contingency example indicates that, 
through focusing on one half of the interaction, we might be unknowingly factor-
ing out underlying mechanisms. Hence, even the ideal participant-confederate 
mimicry paradigm might not appropriately address future questions. Instead, to 
accurately understand dynamic social interactions, our experimental paradigms 
need start capturing this dynamicity, as that is ultimately where our research 
questions lie (Hari, Henriksson, Malinen, & Parkkonen, 2015; Sacheli, Aglioti, 
et al., 2015).
ConCluDing remarks
In this thesis, I have shown that young children mimic and that the social sensitiv-
ity of their mimicry is a product of social-cognitive development. Underlying 
mimicry is the perception-behavior link, which is already dynamically modulated 
by the social relevance of the interactions during early childhood. When viewed 
as part of a greater literature, these findings provide initial stepping-stones: 
while they start to bridge the gaps in our knowledge of behavioral mimicry, 
they lay a foundation of questions that need to be answered in order to reach 
a structured understanding of this social interaction behavior, its neurocognitive 
mechanisms, and its dynamic development.
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During social interactions, adults have been found to mimic the postures and 
mannerisms of one another. Though this behavioral mimicry occurs largely out-
side of awareness, it conveys an affiliative message to our interaction partners. 
The present thesis aimed to investigate how social behavioral mimicry develops 
during early childhood and to explore its developmental and neurocognitive 
mechanisms.
In Chapter 2 we asked whether 3-year-olds display behavioral mimicry and 
whether their mimicry is already sensitive to the extent to which they might want 
to affiliate. In a video-based design, children observed either a helper or a 
hinderer scenario; when an adult model reached out to try to reach a toy, she 
was either helped by a second adult, who handed her the toy, or hindered by 
the second adult, who pulled the toy further away. This social manipulation was 
intended to indicate that the helper was a kind individual with whom a child 
might wish to affiliate whereas the hinderer was unkind and therefore someone 
a child would not want to befriend. Subsequently, the children observed either 
the helper or hinderer, dependent on condition, perform a range of meaningless 
behaviors, namely cheek scratching, mouth rubbing, head wiggling, yawning, 
and two facial expressions, laughing and frowning. Importantly, children were 
simply asked to watch the videos and were hence not instructed to copy these 
behaviors. In line with a mimicry effect, children performed five of the six be-
haviors more often while watching the behavior videos than during baseline. 
There was, however, no evidence for a social sensitivity in children’s mimicry, as 
there were no differences in mimicry rates of children who observed the helper 
compared to those who observed the hinderer. Thus, this study presented the 
first evidence that children demonstrate mimicry like that reported in adults for a 
range of meaningless mannerisms, but left open the question of whether young 
children’s mimicry is socially sensitive.
Chapter 3 went on to address the social sensitivity of mimicry in a devel-
opmental study with 3-year-olds and 4- to 6-year-olds. Building on Chapter 
2’s paradigm, we used novel groups based on color preference to affect the 
extent to which children would want to affiliate with the adult models. In a 
within-participants design, children observed both an in-group and an out-group 
model, each displaying two behaviors. The percentage of time children spent 
performing the behaviors while watching the videos was compared with the 
percentage of time they performed the behaviors during a preceding baseline 
to determine whether children mimicked. Replicating the findings from Chapter 
2, 3-year-olds mimicked the behaviors but did so irrespective of which model 
performed them. Instead, the 4- to 6-year-olds mimicked selectively; they mim-
icked the in-group member significantly more than the out-group member. An 
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explicit liking measure reflected this developmental trajectory, as 4- to 6-year-
olds but not 3-year-olds preferred to play with the in-group model. This study 
suggested that behavioral mimicry develops during the early childhood years. It 
was posited that as children’s social understanding develops, so too would their 
use of implicit affiliative behaviors. Similarly, children’s increasing inhibitory 
control during early childhood was put forth as playing a role in regulating the 
selectively of children’s social mimicry, as a socially specific mimicry effect was 
found in the older but not in the younger children of this study.
To explore these hypothesized roles of inhibitory control and social under-
standing in the production of social behavioral mimicry, we designed a novel 
mimicry paradigm in Chapter 4. Here, we combined a social manipulation of 
two live experimenters with a video-based experimental session during which 
the recorded experimenters displayed the target behaviors. This semi-live de-
sign ensured that the social manipulation was salient and that children could 
indeed affiliate with the experimenters, while also controlling for unintended 
differences in experimenter behavior during the experimental session. During the 
live session, the first experimenter shared one of two stickers with the participant 
whereas the second experimenter kept both stickers for herself. Subsequently, 
the 5-year-old participants observed the video session in which both the sticker 
sharer and sticker keeper told the child a story. A between-participants baseline 
was used in order to control for order and context effects on behavior rates; an 
experimental group observed the experimenters perform face and hand rubbing 
behaviors throughout the story session while the control group did not see these 
target behaviors. After the stories, children’s inhibitory control was assessed 
using the day-night task and their social understanding was measured through a 
parental questionnaire. Comparing the experimental group’s behavior percent-
ages to the control group’s indicated a significant suppression effect; overall, 
the experimental group negatively mimicked both the sharer and the keeper. 
Investigations into individual differences, though, revealed that children’s social 
behavioral mimicry was related to inhibitory control and social understanding. 
The higher children’s inhibitory control, the more they mimicked the keeper over 
than the sharer. Additionally, children’s total mimicry was positively correlated 
to their social understanding. These findings suggested that behavior regulation 
plays a role in mimicry’s navigation of complex social environments while social 
understanding is related to the emergence of this implicit affiliation behavior in 
general.
In an investigation into the social sensitivity of the possible neurocognitive 
basis of mimicry, Chapter 5 explored whether a behavioral proxy of perception-
behavior mapping was sensitive to social groups during early childhood. In the 
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motor interference task, the extent to which executed movements are interfered 
with by the simultaneous observation of incongruent movements is thought to 
be indicative of neurocognitive perception-behavior mapping. A tablet com-
puter version of the motor interference task was adapted from Marshall and 
colleagues (2010). First, similar to the group procedure of Chapter 3, 4- to 
6-year-olds gained membership to one of two novel groups based on their color 
preference. Following this group manipulation, children were instructed to use a 
stylus to draw a straight line back- and-forth on the tablet while it simultaneously 
displayed a stimulus video of a model moving her arm congruently or incon-
gruently to the child’s instructed direction. There were two within-participant 
manipulations of the stimulus videos, namely group membership of the model 
and whether or not her movement followed a biological velocity profile. How 
much children deviated into the uninstructed drawing direction was quantified as 
a measure of how much observing the models’ behaviors interfered with execut-
ing their own behaviors. The motor interference effect was found only for the 
out-group trials and this was interpreted as a consequence of the coordinative 
nature of the task, which could have heightened attention towards interacting 
with an out-group member. The manipulation of velocity profile had little effect 
on children’s motor interference, though this manipulation might have been too 
subtle. Thus, the study demonstrated that already during early childhood, the 
social characteristics of an interaction affect the degree of perception-behavior 
mapping.
Lastly, the study presented in Chapter 6 was designed to test whether the mir-
ror system could be involved in the production of behavioral mimicry. In contrast 
to the majority of the experimental contexts in which mirror system activity is 
demonstrated, in interactions in which individuals mimic they are not explicitly 
instructed to observe their interaction partner’s subtle, meaningless mannerisms 
and postures. Hence, this study used single pulse TMS to measure mirroring 
during a naturalistic behavior observation task adapted from the behavioral 
mimicry literature. Motor evoked potentials (MEPs) in participants’ right hands 
were measured as they observed stimulus videos of a model describing photo-
graphs. MEPs were recorded while models were and were not carrying out hand 
and leg behaviors that also differed in spatial extent (i.e. large behaviors: face 
rubbing and leg crossing; small behaviors: finger tapping and foot bouncing). 
Comparing the MEPs recorded during stimulus video observation with those 
from a nonsocial baseline demonstrated that, regardless of whether or not the 
models were performing a behavior, stimulus video MEPs were significantly 
higher. This suggested that simply observing an interaction partner in a typical 
communicative context enhanced mirroring effects. Additionally, comparing 
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the larger, more noticed behaviors, with the smaller, hardly noticed behaviors, 
revealed significant size effects. Hence, when an interaction partner’s behavior 
is noticed, it seems that mirroring increases beyond the general arousal effect of 
observing a social partner. Together, these results suggest that behavioral mim-
icry is indeed supported by perception-behavior mapping, which is generally 
enhanced during social interactions and can thus, at times, lead to behavioral 
mimicry.
In conclusion, the presented studies shed light on both the developmental tra-
jectory and mechanisms of behavioral mimicry. It was found that, while 3-year-
olds mimic (Chapters 2 and 3), 4- to 6-year-olds’ mimicry is sensitive to the social 
identity of their interaction partner (Chapters 3 and 4). The emergence of social 
behavioral mimicry is likely a product of developing behavioral regulation skills 
as well as a growing social understanding during early childhood (Chapter 4). 
In line with the presence of socially modulated mimicry in kindergartners, the 
extent of 4- to 6-year-olds’ perception-behavior mapping is likely a dynamic 
product of the social interaction (Chapter 5). This perception-behavior mapping 
indeed seems to underlie behavioral mimicry, as in adults mirror system activity 
is enhanced during naturalistic social interactions in which mimicry would typi-
cally occur (Chapter 6).
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Tijdens sociale interacties spiegelen volwassenen vaak elkaars houdingen en 
gedragingen. Hoewel dit spiegelgedrag grotendeels gebeurt zonder dat we 
het doorhebben, laat het onze interactiepartner zien dat we ons met hen willen 
affiliëren. De doelstellingen van dit proefschrift waren om te bestuderen hoe dit 
sociale spiegelgedrag ontwikkelt tijdens de vroege kindertijd en om de onderlig-
gende ontwikkelings- en neurocognitieve mechanismen te onderzoeken.
In Hoofdstuk 2 onderzochten wij of 3-jarigen spiegelgedrag vertonen en of 
dit spiegelgedrag al gevoelig is voor de sociale context waarin het gebeurt. 
Kinderen keken naar een filmpje van iemand die óf iemand anders hielp óf 
iemand anders hinderde: wanneer een volwassene een knuffel probeerde te 
pakken, hielp een tweede volwassene haar daarbij door de knuffel aan te geven 
of hinderde ze haar juist door de knuffel af te pakken. Het doel van deze sociale 
manipulatie was om aan de kinderen te laten zien dat de helper een aardig 
persoon is waarmee ze zich mogelijk willen affiliëren of dat de hinderaar een 
onaardig persoon is waarmee ze geen vrienden willen zijn. Nadat de kinderen 
dit filmpje hadden gezien, zagen ze de helper of hinderaar, afhankelijk van de 
conditie, een aantal gedragingen uitvoeren, namelijk aan de wang krabben, 
over de mond wrijven, het hoofd heen en weer schudden, gapen, lachen en 
fronzen. De kinderen werden alleen gevraagd om naar de filmpjes te kijken 
en kregen dus geen instructies om deze gedragingen na te doen. Uit de re-
sultaten blijkt dat kinderen spiegelgedrag vertoonden: ze voerden vijf van de 
zes gedragingen vaker uit terwijl ze naar het filmpje keken dan tijdens een 
controleperiode aan het begin van het onderzoek. Er was echter geen effect 
van de sociale context: kinderen spiegelden het gedrag van de helper even 
vaak als het gedrag van de hinderaar. Deze studie laat dus voor de eerste keer 
bewijs zien voor spiegelgedrag bij jonge kinderen, maar is het nog onduidelijk 
wanneer de sociale gevoeligheid van spiegelgedrag ontwikkelt.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzocht de sociale gevoeligheid van spiegelgedrag bij kin-
deren van 3 en 4 tot 6 jaar. Dezelfde gedragsfilmpjes als in Hoofdstuk 2 werden 
gebruikt in combinatie met een groepsmanipulatie. Nadat kinderen op basis van 
hun voorkeur voor een kleur ingedeeld werden in een groep, zagen kinderen 
een vrouw uit hun eigen kleurgroep twee gedragingen uitvoeren en een vrouw 
uit een andere kleurgroep twee andere gedragingen uitvoeren. Om spiegelge-
drag vast te stellen, werd gemeten hoe lang (als percentage van de totale tijd) 
kinderen de gedragingen uitvoerden tijdens het kijken naar gedragsfilmpjes in 
vergelijking met een controleperiode aan het begin van het onderzoek. Dit liet 
zien dat 3-jarigen de gedragingen spiegelden, net als in Hoofdstuk 2. De 4- tot 
6-jarigen spiegelden ook, maar deden dat specifieker: ze spiegelden het gedrag 
van de vrouw uit hun eigen groep meer dan het gedrag van de vrouw uit de 
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andere groep. Deze voorkeur was ook terug te vinden in een vraag over met wie 
de kinderen zouden willen spelen. De 4- tot 6-jarigen, maar niet de 3-jarigen, 
kozen hierbij vaker voor de vrouw uit hun eigen groep. Deze studie suggereert 
dat de sociale gevoeligheid van spiegelgedrag zich tijdens de vroege kindertijd 
ontwikkelt. Op basis van deze resultaten werden twee hypotheses opgesteld. 
Ten eerste werd gesteld dat naar mate kinderen sociaal begrip ontwikkelen, 
ze ook sociaal spiegelgedrag ontwikkelen. Ten tweede werd verondersteld dat 
gedragsinhibitie belangrijk is in het reguleren van de sociale afstemming van 
spiegelgedrag.
Om deze twee hypotheses over de rollen van sociaal begrip en gedrags-
inhibitie in sociaal spiegelgedrag te toetsen, werd in Hoofdstuk 4 een nieuwe 
onderzoeksopzet ontwikkeld. Tijdens een sociale manipulatie aan het begin 
deelde één vrouwelijke onderzoeksleider één van haar twee stickers met het 
kind, terwijl een andere vrouwelijke onderzoeksleider beide stickers zelf hield. 
Daarna keek het kind naar een filmpje waarin beide onderzoeksleiders een ver-
haal aan het kind vertelden. Kinderen werden verdeeld over twee groepen; de 
experimentele groep zag de onderzoeksleiders gedragingen uitvoeren terwijl ze 
de verhaaltjes vertelden, terwijl de controlegroep deze gedragingen niet zagen 
tijdens de verhaaltjes. Na de verhaaltjes werd gedragsinhibitie gemeten door 
middel van de dag-nacht taak en werd sociaal begrip van de kinderen gemeten 
met een vragenlijst voor de ouders. Een vergelijking van de gedragingen in de 
twee groepen liet zien dat kinderen in de experimentele groep de gedragingen 
minder vaak uitvoerden dan kinderen in de controle groep, hetgeen suggereert 
dat het effect van spiegelgedrag omgekeerd was. Verdere analyses gericht op 
individuele verschillen lieten echter zien dat het spiegelgedrag van de kinderen 
gerelateerd was aan gedragsinhibitie en sociaal begrip. Hoe meer gedragsin-
hibitie, des te meer de kinderen in de experimentele groep de onderzoeksleider 
die beide stickers zelf hield spiegelden dan de delende onderzoeksleider. Ook 
was er een positieve correlatie tussen hoeveel kinderen spiegelden en hun soci-
aal begrip. Deze bevindingen laten zien dat gedragsinhibitie en sociaal begrip 
een rol spelen in de ontwikkeling van sociaal spiegelgedrag tijdens de vroege 
kindertijd.
Hoofdstuk 5 beschrijft een onderzoek naar de sociale gevoeligheid van de 
vermoedelijke neurocognitieve basis van spiegelgedrag. Onderzocht werd of 
een gedragsmaat dat gerelateerd wordt aan het neurale spiegelnetwerk ge-
voelig is voor sociale groepen bij jonge kinderen. In de motor-interferentie taak 
wordt gemeten in welke mate het uitvoeren van een actie beïnvloed wordt door 
het tegelijkertijd observeren van een soortgelijke actie. Net als in Hoofdstuk 
3 mochten kinderen eerst een groep kiezen op basis van hun voorkeur voor 
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een kleur. Daarna kregen ze de instructie om steeds een rechte lijn heen en 
weer te tekenen op het scherm van een tabletcomputer. Terwijl de kinderen 
tekenden, werden er op de tablet filmpjes afgespeeld waarin een vrouw haar 
arm heen en weer bewoog in dezelfde (bijvoorbeeld horizontale) of een andere 
(bijvoorbeeld verticale) richting als waarin het kind tekende. De filmpjes lieten óf 
een vrouw uit dezelfde groep als het kind óf een vrouw uit de andere groep dan 
het kind zien die op een normale biologische manier of juist op een biologisch 
onmogelijke manier haar arm bewoog. Hoeveel de getekende lijnen van de kin-
deren afweken in de niet-geïnstrueerde richting werd gebruikt als een maat voor 
motor-interferentie. Uit de resultaten bleek dat kinderen alleen motor-interferentie 
vertoonden als de persoon in het filmpje tot de andere groep behoorde. Omdat 
ze samen moesten bewegen met iemand uit een andere groep, kan het zijn dat 
kinderen tijdens deze conditie extra aandachtig waren voor hun interactiepart-
ner. Deze studie suggereert dat de activiteit van het neurale spiegelnetwerk kan 
variëren, afhankelijk van de sociale context waarin het gebeurt.
Het onderzoek in Hoofdstuk 6 had als doel om de rol van het neurale 
spiegelnetwerk in de aansturing van spiegelgedrag te bestuderen. Meestal 
wordt de activiteit van het spiegelnetwerk gemeten tijdens taken waarbij de 
aandacht van de proefpersonen specifiek gericht is op het observeren van 
eenvoudige, doelgerichte handelingen. Tijdens natuurlijke interacties waarin 
spiegelgedrag voorkomt, is dit echter niet het geval. Daarom werd er in dit 
onderzoek gebruik gemaakt van transcraniële magnetische stimulatie (TMS) om 
spiegelnetwerk activiteit te meten terwijl de proefpersonen een taak uitvoerden 
waarbij hun aandacht niet per se gericht was op de subtiele bewegingen van 
hun interactiepartners, net als tijdens typische sociale interacties. Als maat van 
activiteit van het spiegelnetwerk werden zogeheten motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) teweeggebracht met TMS pulsen boven de motor cortex van de volwas-
sen proefpersonen. Deze MEPs werden gemeten terwijl proefpersonen filmpjes 
keken waarin iemand plaatjes beschreef die de proefpersonen later moesten 
herkennen zowel op momenten dat de persoon in het filmpje een gedraging 
uitvoerde (grote gedragingen: gezicht wrijven, benen over elkaar slaan; kleine 
gedragingen: vinger op en neer bewegen, voet op en neer bewegen) en op 
momenten waarop dat niet het geval was. Een vergelijking van deze MEPs met 
MEPs die gemeten waren tijdens een niet-sociale controleconditie liet zien dat, 
ongeacht of de persoon in de filmpjes een gedraging uitvoerde op het moment 
van de MEP meting of niet, MEPs tijdens de sociale observatie groter waren 
dan tijdens de controleconditie. Dit laat zien dat het simpelweg observeren van 
een ander persoon in een interactiecontext leidt tot hogere activiteit van het 
spiegelnetwerk. Daarnaast was er een effect van grote van de gedragingen. 
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MEPs gemeten terwijl proefpersonen de twee grote gedragingen zagen waren 
groter dan die van de twee kleine gedragingen, wat suggereert dat als een 
gedraging opgemerkt wordt, deze tot extra activatie leidt bovenop de algemene 
toename in activatie. Samen suggereren deze bevindingen dat het neurale 
spiegelnetwerk spiegelgedrag ondersteunt omdat de activatie van dit netwerk 
toeneemt tijdens sociale interactie. In sommige gevallen zou dat kunnen leiden 
tot het daadwerkelijk uitvoeren van de geobserveerde gedraging.
Samen geven deze studies nieuwe inzichten in zowel de ontwikkeling als in 
de mechanismen van spiegelgedrag. Terwijl 3-jarigen spiegelgedrag al verto-
nen (Hoofdstukken 2 en 3), wordt spiegelgedrag pas rond de leeftijd van 4 tot 
6 aangepast aan de sociale context waarin het plaatsvindt (Hoofdstukken 3 en 
4). De ontwikkeling van dit sociaal-gevoelige spiegelgedrag is waarschijnlijk 
een resultaat van zowel een toename in sociaal begrip en een verbetering van 
gedragsinhibitie (Hoofdstuk 4). Waarschijnlijk ligt het neurale spiegelnetwerk 
ten grondslag aan sociaal spiegelgedrag (Hoofdstuk 6) en is de activiteit van 
dit netwerk al bij 4- tot 6-jarigen gevoelig voor de sociale context waarin het 
gedrag wordt geobserveerd.
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